Edwards v. Hutchings

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: June 29, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01634
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

5 Harold Edwards, ) 6 ) Plaintiff, ) Case No.: 2:20-cv-01634-GMN-BNW 7 vs. ) ) ORDER 8 William Hutchings et al., ) 9 ) ) 10 Defendants. ) 11 Pending before the Court is the Motion for Default Judgment, (ECF No. 17), filed by 12 Plaintiff Harold Edwards (“Plaintiff”). Defendants William Hutchings and Charles Daniels 13 (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 19), and Plaintiff did not file a reply. 14 Also pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, (ECF No. 21). 15 Plaintiff did not file a response. 16 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Default 17 Judgment and DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This case arises out of Plaintiff’s complaints under 42 U.S.C § 1983 about his living 20 conditions at the Nevada Department of Correction’s (“NDOC”) Southern Desert Correctional 21 Facility (“SDCC”). (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his 22 cell’s lack of smoke detectors, fire sprinklers, and operable emergency summons buttons 23 amounts to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 24 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 3–4). 25 On June 7, 2021, the Court stayed this case for 90 days to allow for mediation 1 proceedings. (Screening Order 6:11–25, ECF No. 5). On August 20, 2021, Plaintiff and 2 Defendants participated in an early mediation conference, although a settlement was not 3 reached. (Mins. Proceedings, ECF No. 11). The Court lifted the stay of this action on August 4 30, 2021, and provided the Attorney General’s Office with 21 days to file its Acceptance of 5 Service and 60 days to file Defendants’ Answer. (Order 2:13–22; 3:1–3; 3:18, ECF No. 12). 6 The Attorney General’s Office subsequently accepted service on behalf of Defendants on 7 September 16, 2021, and filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint on November 1, 2021. (See 8 Acceptance of Service, ECF No. 14); (Answer, ECF No. 18). 9 On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Default Judgment against 10 Defendants, alleging that Defendants failed to timely respond to this Court’s August 30, 2021 11 Order. (See Mot. Default J. at 1:20–2:4, ECF No. 17). In response, Defendants filed their 12 Motion for Sanctions, alleging that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is frivolous. (See 13 Mot. Sanctions 3:10–5:3, ECF No. 21). 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 A. Default Judgment 16 Obtaining a default judgment is two-step process governed by Rule 55 of the Federal 17 Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 18 19 1986). First, the moving party must seek an entry of default from the clerk of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). This entry of default is only appropriate when a party “has failed to plead or 20 otherwise defend.” Id. Additionally, the FRCP 55(a) advisory note indicates that it is 21 inappropriate to enter a default against a party who has indicated their intent to defend. See Fed. 22 R. Civ. P. 55(a). After the clerk of court enters the default, a party must then separately seek 23 entry of default judgment from the court in accordance with Rule 55(b). Upon entry of a 24 clerk’s default, the court takes the factual allegations in the complaint as true. 25 In determining whether to grant default judgment, courts are guided by the following 1 seven factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s 2 substantive claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the 3 action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was 4 due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong public policy favoring decisions on the 5 merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 6 B. Sanctions 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides, in relevant part: 8

9 By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented 10 party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 11

12 (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 13 (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 14 law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing 15 law or for establishing new law;

16 (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 17 further investigation or discovery. 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). An attorney is subject to sanctions for violating the requirements of Rule 19 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); see Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 675–76 (9th Cir. 2005). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment 22 Plaintiff argues that this Court should enter default judgment against Defendants because 23 the Attorney General’s Office failed to timely file their notice of Acceptance of Service and the 24 25 Answer. (Mot. Default J. 1:20–26).1 In response, Defendants claim that both the Acceptance of 1 Service and Answer were timely filed. (Resp. 2:2–4, ECF No. 19). Further, Defendants argue 2 that they have otherwise appeared and indicated their indent to defend this matter by 3 participating in the early mediation process. (Id. 2:10–14; 3:5–9). 4 As an initial matter, Plaintiff moved the Court for default judgment without first seeking 5 an entry of default from the Clerk of Court under Rule 55(a). As such, Plaintiff has not met the 6 requirements for a default judgment, and his Motion is denied. See, e.g., Vongrabe v. Sprint 7 PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“entry of default by the clerk is a 8 prerequisite to an entry of default judgment”). 9 However, even if the clerk had entered default against Defendants, the Court would still 10 not be inclined to grant a default judgment. As demonstrated by the docket in this case, the 11 Court’s Order on August 30, 2021, gave the Attorney General’s Office 21 days to file a notice 12 of Acceptance of Service and 60 days to file Defendants’ Answer. (Order 2:13–22; 3:1–3, ECF 13 No. 12). The Attorney General’s Office filed its Acceptance of Service on behalf of both 14 Defendants on September 16, 2021, which was well within 21 days of August 30, 2021. 15 (Acceptance of Service, ECF No. 14). Though the 60-day deadline expired on October 29, 16 2021, and Defendants untimely filed their Answer on November 1, 2021, it would still be 17 inappropriate to grant default judgment because Defendants had already indicated their intent to 18 defend against Plaintiff’s allegations by participating in mediation and filing other pleadings. 19 See, e.g., Renfro v. Anderson, No. 2:29-cv-00001-JAM-JDP, 2021 WL 363681, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 20 21 1 Plaintiff erroneously styles his Motion for Default Judgment as one under FRCP 42(a)(4)(A) and 7(a), rather 22 than FRCP 55. However, the Court is obligated to hold a pro se litigant to a different standard than a party who is represented by counsel. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The pleadings of a pro se litigant are “to 23 be liberally construed” and “however inartfully pled, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). However, the pro se litigant 24 “should not be treated more favorably” than the party who is represented by counsel. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, even though Plaintiff invokes FRCP 42(a)(4)(A) and 7(a) in his 25 Motion, the Court construes his Motion as one under FRCP 55. Feb. 2, 2021) (declining to enter default judgment where the defendant had “manifested his 1 intent to defend against [the] plaintiff’s claims”). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s 2 Motion for Default Judgment. 3 B. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions 4 Defendants argue that this Court should sanction Plaintiff because his Motion for 5 Default Judgment was clearly frivolous and presented false and misleading claims. (See Mot. 6 Sanctions 3:11–12, ECF No. 21). Defendants explain that Plaintiff filed his Motion for Default 7 Judgment on October 22, 2021, which was after Defendants had filed their Acceptance of 8 Service and before the 60-day period provided by the Court’s August 30, 2021, Order had even 9 expired. (Id. 3:12 –13). Defendants conclude that Plaintiff attempted to commit a fraud upon 10 the Court. (Id. 3:14–15). 11 The Court does not find it appropriate to sanction Plaintiff for filing the Motion for 12 Default Judgment. Plaintiff is a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and thus 13 the Court finds it more likely that Plaintiff misunderstood the FRCP and substantive law rather 14 than intended to commit a fraud on the Court. This is evidenced both by Plaintiff’s inaccurate 15 reference to FRCP Rules 42(a) and 7(a) as the basis for his Motion, and Plaintiff’s failure to 16 meet the entry of default requirement. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Motion was not completely 17 meritless as Defendants argue because Defendants did fail to timely file their Answer to the 18 Complaint, as Plaintiff claimed. (See supra Section III.A). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion 19 for Sanctions is denied. 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 IV. CONCLUSION 1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, (ECF No. 2 17), is DENIED. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, (ECF No. 21), is 4 DENIED. 5 DATED this _2_9___ day of June, 2022. 6 7 8 ___________________________________ Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25