Edwards v. Dorsey

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Edwards v. Dorsey

111 S.E. 687, 28 Ga. App. 437, 1922 Ga. App. LEXIS 576

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 11, 1922

Docket12752

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 111 S.E. 687 (Edwards v. Dorsey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Edwards v. Dorsey, 111 S.E. 687, 28 Ga. App. 437, 1922 Ga. App. LEXIS 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1922).

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Opinion

Bloodworth, J.

While it is not necessary that the offense named in a recognizance be stated with the same degree of particularity as is required in an indictment, or that it be set out specifically or in detail, “ the offense described in the recognizance must be one punishable by law; ” and where it is not, the recognizance is void. The recognizance in the instant case is conditioned for the appearance of the principal to answer to a special presentment of the grand jury for “the offense of shooting,” and having failed to set out specifically or in substance an “ offense committed against the laws of this State,” or “ an indictable pne,” or “ one punishable by law,” or to describe the offense with which the accused stands charged, “with sufficient clearness to show of what offense he is in fact accused,” it is void, and all proceedings based thereon are nugatory. For this reason the trial judge erred in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment based on such a bond, and the judgment of the lower court must be reversed. See Nicholson v. State, 2 Ga. 365; Vaughan v. Candler, 113 Ga. 11 (38 S. E. 352).

Judgment reversed.

Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.

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Bloodworth, J.

While it is not necessary that the offense named in a recognizance be stated with the same degree of particularity as is required in an indictment, or that it be set out specifically or in detail, “ the offense described in the recognizance must be one punishable by law; ” and where it is not, the recognizance is void. The recognizance in the instant case is conditioned for the appearance of the principal to answer to a special presentment of the grand jury for “the offense of shooting,” and having failed to set out specifically or in substance an “ offense committed against the laws of this State,” or “ an indictable pne,” or “ one punishable by law,” or to describe the offense with which the accused stands charged, “with sufficient clearness to show of what offense he is in fact accused,” it is void, and all proceedings based thereon are nugatory. For this reason the trial judge erred in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment based on such a bond, and the judgment of the lower court must be reversed. See Nicholson v. State, 2 Ga. 365; Vaughan v. Candler, 113 Ga. 11 (38 S. E. 352).

Judgment reversed.

Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

111 S.E. 687, 28 Ga. App. 437, 1922 Ga. App. LEXIS 576, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edwards-v-dorsey-gactapp-1922.

Opinion

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