Edwards v. City of Raleigh

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Edwards v. City of Raleigh

81 S.E.2d 273, 240 N.C. 137, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 664

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedApril 14, 1954

Docket451

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 81 S.E.2d 273 (Edwards v. City of Raleigh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Edwards v. City of Raleigh, 81 S.E.2d 273, 240 N.C. 137, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 664 (N.C. 1954).

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Opinion

Bobbitt, J.

Parties through their counsel may make stipulations of fact. Harrill v. R. R., 144 N.C. 542, 57 S.E. 382; Lumber Co. v. Lumber *139 Co., 137 N.C. 431, 49 S.E. 946. Where a ease is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, the agreement as to the facts must stand unless set aside for fraud or mutual mistake. Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., supra; Hood v. Johnson, 208 N.C. 77, 178 S.E. 855; Hood v. Johnson, 209 N.C. 112, 182 S.E. 709.

Such submission is in effect a request by the litigants that judgment be entered in accordance with the law as applied to the agreed facts. Auto Co. v. Ins. Co., 239 N.C. 416, 80 S.E. 2d 35. “The court cannot, against the objection of one party to an agreed case, receive additional evidence touching the controversy, unless so authorized by stipulation in the agreement for submission.” 2 Am. Jur., pp. 383-384, Agreed Case, see. 22. As stated by Winborne, J., in Realty Corp. v. Koon, 216 N.C. 295, 4 S.E. 2d 850: “The case is to be heard only upon the facts presented and the court cannot go outside of the statement of facts. McIntosh P. & P., 556. McKethan v. Ray, supra; Overman v. Sims, 96 N.C., 451, 2 S.E., 372; Waters v. Boyd, supra; Wagoner v. Saintsing, 184 N.C., 362, 114 S.E., 313; Realty Corp. v. Koon, 215 N.C., 459, 2 S.E. (2d), 360.”

There being no allegation or suggestion of fraud or of mutual mistake in the submission of the agreed statement of facts, the court below should have considered the plaintiffs’ appeal from the full Commission in respect of errors of law, if any, in relation to the agreed facts. The cause is remanded to the court below to the end that such hearing be conducted and adjudication made.

The defendant’s appeal is from an order remanding the cause to the Industrial Commission, not from a final judgment. As stated by Ervin, J.: “an appeal does not lie to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court, unless such interlocutory order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he might lose if the order is not reviewed before final judgment. G.S. 1-277; Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E. 2d 377; Emry v. Parker, 111 N.C. 261, 16 S.E. 236.” Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 67 S.E. 2d 669. However, since the plaintiffs cannot go outside of the agreed facts in the presentation of their cause, a further hearing by the Industrial Commission would be inconvenient, expensive and futile; and it would seem that this Court, under the facts of this case, in the exercise of its power “to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a general supervision and control over the proceedings of the inferior courts” (N. C. Const., Art. IV, sec. 8), should not require this wholly unnecessary and circuitous course of procedure.

Error and remanded.

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Bobbitt, J.

Parties through their counsel may make stipulations of fact. Harrill v. R. R., 144 N.C. 542, 57 S.E. 382; Lumber Co. v. Lumber *139 Co., 137 N.C. 431, 49 S.E. 946. Where a ease is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, the agreement as to the facts must stand unless set aside for fraud or mutual mistake. Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., supra; Hood v. Johnson, 208 N.C. 77, 178 S.E. 855; Hood v. Johnson, 209 N.C. 112, 182 S.E. 709.

Such submission is in effect a request by the litigants that judgment be entered in accordance with the law as applied to the agreed facts. Auto Co. v. Ins. Co., 239 N.C. 416, 80 S.E. 2d 35. “The court cannot, against the objection of one party to an agreed case, receive additional evidence touching the controversy, unless so authorized by stipulation in the agreement for submission.” 2 Am. Jur., pp. 383-384, Agreed Case, see. 22. As stated by Winborne, J., in Realty Corp. v. Koon, 216 N.C. 295, 4 S.E. 2d 850: “The case is to be heard only upon the facts presented and the court cannot go outside of the statement of facts. McIntosh P. & P., 556. McKethan v. Ray, supra; Overman v. Sims, 96 N.C., 451, 2 S.E., 372; Waters v. Boyd, supra; Wagoner v. Saintsing, 184 N.C., 362, 114 S.E., 313; Realty Corp. v. Koon, 215 N.C., 459, 2 S.E. (2d), 360.”

There being no allegation or suggestion of fraud or of mutual mistake in the submission of the agreed statement of facts, the court below should have considered the plaintiffs’ appeal from the full Commission in respect of errors of law, if any, in relation to the agreed facts. The cause is remanded to the court below to the end that such hearing be conducted and adjudication made.

The defendant’s appeal is from an order remanding the cause to the Industrial Commission, not from a final judgment. As stated by Ervin, J.: “an appeal does not lie to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court, unless such interlocutory order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he might lose if the order is not reviewed before final judgment. G.S. 1-277; Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E. 2d 377; Emry v. Parker, 111 N.C. 261, 16 S.E. 236.” Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 67 S.E. 2d 669. However, since the plaintiffs cannot go outside of the agreed facts in the presentation of their cause, a further hearing by the Industrial Commission would be inconvenient, expensive and futile; and it would seem that this Court, under the facts of this case, in the exercise of its power “to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a general supervision and control over the proceedings of the inferior courts” (N. C. Const., Art. IV, sec. 8), should not require this wholly unnecessary and circuitous course of procedure.

Error and remanded.

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81 S.E.2d 273, 240 N.C. 137, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edwards-v-city-of-raleigh-nc-1954.

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