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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS Nos. 24-CV-0778 & 24-CV-0982 LUCY R. EDWARDS & DELPHINE M. JONES, APPELLANTS, V.
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, D/B/A CHRISTIANA TRUST, NOT INDIVIDUALLY BUT AS TRUSTEE FOR PRETIUM MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST BY RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC ITS APPOINTED ATTORNEY IN FACT, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2019-CA-002230-R(RP))
(Maurice A. Ross, Judge)
(Submitted June 4, 2026 Decided August 20, 2026)
Lucy R. Edwards, pro se.
Delphine M. Jones, pro se.
Sara Tussey and Andrew Higgins were on the brief for appellee.
Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
SHANKER, Associate Judge: Appellants Lucy R. Edwards and Delphine M.
Jones, both proceeding pro se, seek reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of their counterclaims against appellee Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, and the
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court’s grant of summary judgment for Wilmington, which resulted in a foreclosure order for Ms. Edwards’s and Ms. Jones’s property in Northwest Washington, D.C. We discern no error in the trial court’s orders and affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2007, Ms. Edwards obtained a loan for $430,000 from Lime Financial Services, LTD, in connection with her property located at 4812 Iowa Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. She also executed a promissory note documenting the loan and a deed of trust securing the note against her property. After Ms. Edwards defaulted on the promissory note, Wilmington’s predecessor in interest filed a foreclosure action against her in 2014. Through an assignment, Wilmington assumed all rights and interests in the loan in 2015. The trial court subsequently dismissed the case against Ms. Edwards without prejudice after Wilmington moved to dismiss because of a deficiency in the notice of default that its predecessor in interest had sent to Ms. Edwards.
Wilmington mailed Ms. Edwards a new notice in 2018 that informed her that her loan was delinquent due to nonpayment and that she needed to provide the missing payments within thirty days to cure the default. The letter also notified Ms. Edwards that failing to pay may result in the acceleration of the loan but that she had the right to reinstate the loan after acceleration. Ms. Edwards responded with a letter
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disputing the amount Wilmington claimed she owed, but she did not dispute before the trial court and does not dispute on appeal that she defaulted on the loan.
Wilmington then filed a judicial foreclosure action pursuant to D.C. Code § 42-816 in April 2019. Ms. Edwards filed an answer and two counterclaims asserting that Wilmington violated D.C.’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA), D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 to -3913, and committed common-law fraud. Wilmington moved to dismiss Ms. Edwards’s counterclaims in March 2020 under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and, after a stay caused by the COVID-19 public health emergency, the trial court dismissed the counterclaims in an oral ruling in March 2023. The following year, the court granted Wilmington’s motion for summary judgment against Ms. Edwards and ordered the foreclosure of her property. The court entered judgment against Ms. Edwards in July 2024, and this appeal followed.
Turning to Ms. Jones, Wilmington amended its complaint in August 2023 after it learned that Ms. Edwards had conveyed a fifteen percent interest in her property to Ms. Jones in 2022. In November 2023, Ms. Jones filed an answer and a counterclaim for fraudulent misrepresentation. Wilmington moved to dismiss her counterclaim in January 2024, also under Rule 12(b)(6), which the trial court granted three months later. Later that summer, the trial court granted summary judgment in
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Wilmington’s favor and entered judgment against Ms. Jones the same day it did so against Ms. Edwards. After the trial court denied her motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment against her, Ms. Jones appealed.
II. Analysis
Ms. Edwards and Ms. Jones both appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their respective counterclaims and the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilmington. Seeing no error in the trial court’s rulings, we affirm.
A. Appellants’ Counterclaims
Appellants argue that the trial court erred when it dismissed their counterclaims for failure to state a claim. We disagree.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint,” so we review an order granting a 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Tovar v. Regan Zambri Long, PLLC, 321 A.3d 600, 609 (D.C. 2024) (citation modified). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legally cognizable claim,” Bell v. First Invs. Servicing Corp., 256 A.3d 246, 251 (D.C. 2021) (citation modified), and those facts, “accepted as true,” must also “state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face[,]” Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609 (quoting Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 544 (D.C.
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2011)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Bare allegations of wrongdoing that are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and are insufficient to sustain a complaint.” Logan v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 A.3d 1014, 1019 (D.C. 2013) (citation modified). “Any uncertainties or ambiguities in the complaint must be resolved in favor of the pleader.” Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609 (quoting Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C. 2011)).
We address each of the appellants’ claims seriatim.
1. CPPA Violation
“The CPPA is a comprehensive statute designed to provide procedures and remedies for a broad range of practices which injure consumers.” Sundberg v. TTR Realty, LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1129 (D.C. 2015) (citation modified). The statute makes it unlawful for “any person to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3904; e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel Food Corps., 258 A.3d 174, 180 (D.C. 2021). The CPPA “establishes a consumer’s ‘right to truthful information about consumer goods and services’ that are purchased or received in the District of Columbia,” and we construe and apply it “liberally.” Frankeny v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, LP, 225 A.3d 999, 1004 (D.C. 2020) (quoting D.C. Code
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§ 28-3901(c)). Nevertheless, “[t]his court has repeatedly concluded that the CPPA was designed to police trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant relationships.” Archie v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 255 A.3d 1005, 1020 (D.C. 2021) (citation modified); see also Sundberg, 109 A.3d at 1129 (same); DeBerry v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Invs. Corp., 743 A.2d 699, 701 (D.C. 1999) (confirming that an unlawful trade practice must be committed by a “merchant” to fall under the CPPA’s prohibitions).
A consumer, defined by the statute as “a person who, other than for purposes of resale, does or would purchase, lease (as lessee), or receive consumer goods or services,” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2)(A), “may bring an action seeking relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District[,]” id. § 28-3905(k)(1)(A). To sufficiently plead a CPPA claim on these grounds, the consumer-plaintiff generally must establish: (1) the existence of a consumer- merchant relationship, Archie, 255 A.3d at 1020; (2) an unfair or deceptive trade practice as defined by D.C. Code § 28-3904, see Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 250-52 (D.C. 2011) (en banc); Frankeny, 225 A.3d at 1004; and (3) “a concrete injury-in-fact,” Stone v. Landis Constr. Co., 120 A.3d 1287, 1289 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Grayson, 15 A.3d at 244). While the CPPA’s pleading standard is designed to reduce the burden of particularized pleadings that are required for common-law fraud claims, see Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64 A.3d 428, 442 (D.C.
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2013), including by demanding that only “some cognizable injury be alleged,” Logan, 80 A.3d at 1026 n.13, “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)” remains “appropriate where the complaint fails to allege the elements of a legally viable [CPPA] claim[,]” Stone, 120 A.3d at 1289 (citation modified); see Grayson, 15 A.3d at 250.
Even construing Ms. Edwards’s allegations “liberally”—as we “are required”
to do, Black v. D.C. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 188 A.3d 840, 847 (D.C. 2018) (noting that we liberally construe a pro se party’s arguments and pleadings)—we are unable to “draw the reasonable inference that [Wilmington] is liable for” a CPPA violation based on Ms. Edwards’s counterclaim, see Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609 (citation modified). Restricting our review to the four corners of her claim, see Rayner v. Yale Steam Laundry Condo. Ass’n, 289 A.3d 387, 396 (D.C. 2023), the most apparent shortcoming is Ms. Edwards’s failure to sufficiently allege the existence of a consumer-merchant relationship between herself and Wilmington, see Archie, 255 A.3d at 1020; Sundberg, 109 A.3d at 1129.
The CPPA defines a “merchant” as “a person . . . who in the ordinary course of business does or would sell, lease, or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services . . . which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3)(A); see also Snowder v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 599 (D.C. 2008) (reiterating that a “merchant” under the CPPA “must
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be a ‘person’ connected with the ‘supply’ side of a consumer transaction” (citation modified)). “We have recognized that” this definition “applies to” merchants that engage in “real estate mortgage transactions . . . and to mortgage refinancing.” Logan, 80 A.3d at 1027 (citations omitted).
Ms. Edwards, however, has not alleged that Wilmington provided or would be providing either of those two consumer services. See D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3)(A). Indeed, her counterclaim states the opposite. For example, she claims that Wilmington did not notify her when, through an assignment, it assumed all rights in interest in the promissory note and deed of trust. She further asserts that Wilmington never contacted her before sending her the revised notice of default in 2018 or after she sent her letter disputing the amount Wilmington claimed she owed. Wilmington, according to Ms. Edwards, also made no effort to “reach any agreement or settlement” before filing its complaint for judicial foreclosure despite the trial court finding that “negotiation between the parties [was] a viable option.” Moreover, Ms. Edwards avers that Wilmington “never permitted” her to make partial payments to “cure the mortgage default” and “never provided any other type of modification.”
An examination of Wilmington’s notice of default, which Ms. Edwards arguably incorporates into her counterclaim, see Bell, 256 A.3d at 251 (“[T]he court may consider the complaint itself and any documents it incorporates by reference.”
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(citation modified)), bolsters the conclusion that she did not sufficiently plead a consumer-merchant relationship. The notice, which was sent by a law firm, identifies Wilmington only as the holder of the promissory note. On its face, it offers no services to Ms. Edwards, focusing instead on Ms. Edwards’s default and the steps she could take to cure it. The notice also advises Ms. Edwards to contact either the law firm or the mortgage loan servicer, Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC—without mentioning Wilmington—with any inquiries, which, as revealed by her letter disputing the amount owed (which she attached to her counterclaims), is exactly what Ms. Edwards did. One potential ambiguity that could further Ms. Edwards’s cause is the notice’s direction to contact the “Loss Mitigation Department” if she had questions; however, even when resolving this in her favor to mean that a consumer service was being or would be offered, see Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609, the offeror is the law firm that issued the notice, not Wilmington. We need not wade into whether, in acting to collect the debt on Wilmington’s behalf, the law firm was a merchant, see Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, P.A., 341 A.3d 1, 12-13 & n.15 (D.C. 2025), nor whether the CPPA applies to Rushmore as a mortgage loan servicer, see Logan, 80 A.3d at 1027, because neither the law firm nor Rushmore is a named party in the case. In answering the question at issue—
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whether Ms. Edwards sufficiently alleged that Wilmington is a merchant under the CPPA—the notice of default indicates that the answer is no. 1
In short, Ms. Edwards does not allege (and her incorporated documents do not support) that Wilmington supplied or “would” supply her with a consumer service of any kind. 2 See D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3)(A); Snowder, 949 A.2d at 599. But cf., e.g., Archie, 255 A.3d at 1020-21 (holding, at the summary judgment stage, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether an assignee to a mortgage was a
1 The deed of trust, also arguably incorporated into Ms. Edwards’s counterclaim, likewise fails to provide support. It states that, if the promissory note on the property is sold, the purchaser of the note does not assume the “mortgage loan servicing obligations,” which will remain with the current loan servicer unless otherwise provided. As Rushmore is the identified loan servicer in the notice of default and Ms. Edwards recognizes that it was the servicer as far back as 2014, the counterclaim at best alleges that Wilmington is the assignee and holder of the promissory note, which is not enough on its own to establish that Wilmington is a merchant under the CPPA. See infra at note 3.
2 To the extent that Ms. Edwards argues in her appellate brief that a consumer-
merchant relationship existed between herself and Wilmington, we decline to consider her points because “[o]ur review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may not rely on any facts that do not appear on the face of the complaint itself.” Rayner, 289 A.3d at 396 (citation modified); see also Martin v. Bicknell, 99 A.3d 705, 712 n.17 (D.C. 2014) (“When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, trial courts are generally limited to the four corners of the complaint and may only consider documents incorporated in the complaint—i.e., either documents attached to the complaint or documents which do not allege facts extrinsic to the pleadings.” (citation modified)). The same reasoning applies to her arguments that Wilmington “participated in a trade practice.” Her counterclaim is devoid of allegations that Wilmington acted to “effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer . . . services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6).
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“merchant” under the CPPA where the record showed that the assignee informed the mortgagor that it “possibly could help arrange a loan modification”); Byrd v. Jackson, 902 A.2d 778, 781-82 (D.C. 2006) (affirming trial court’s ruling that the appellant was a merchant under the CPPA because he offered foreclosure avoidance services to the plaintiff-homeowner). Therefore, because Ms. Edwards has not alleged that Wilmington “suppl[ied]” her with a consumer good or service, see Snowder, 949 A.2d at 599 (citation modified), we cannot reasonably infer from the face of her counterclaim that Wilmington satisfies the definition of “merchant” under the CPPA, D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3)(A); cf. Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C., 857 F.3d 939, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding that a debt collector, who is “attempting to recoup funds on behalf of a creditor who did not itself provide Appellant with any credit,” “does not fall within the bounds” of the CPPA in part because the collector is providing services to the holder of the debt, not the borrower). 3 The trial court thus appropriately dismissed Ms. Edwards’s CPPA cause of action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
3 On appeal, Ms. Edwards insinuates that assignees who assume the rights and interests in a promissory note and deed of trust automatically qualify as “merchant[s]” under the CPPA. We do not agree because this court has not decided whether the CPPA applies in those circumstances. See Archie, 255 A.3d at 1020-21. While we cannot say that the CPPA would never apply to an assignee of a mortgage—a fact-specific inquiry—we decline to decide the scope of the CPPA in this case because Ms. Edwards failed to allege any conduct that suggests that Wilmington, as an assignee, acted as a merchant as defined by the statute.
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Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6); Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
2. Fraud
Ms. Edwards’s fraud claim also falls short. “[C]ommon law fraud is never presumed”; instead, a plaintiff alleging fraud “must do so with particularity and must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.” Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 613 A.2d 916, 923 (D.C. 1992). “To be entitled to a trial on the merits of a fraud claim, a plaintiff must allege such facts as will reveal the existence of all the requisite elements of fraud. Allegations in the form of conclusions on the part of the pleader as to the existence of fraud are insufficient.” Id. (citation modified). To succeed on her fraud claim, Ms. Edwards was required to establish that Wilmington made “(1) a false representation (2) in reference to a material fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity and (4) with the intent to deceive, and that (5) an action was taken in reliance upon the representation.” DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC v. Capitol Hill Grp., 332 A.3d 518, 529 (D.C. 2025).
The crux of Ms. Edwards’s fraud claim is that Wilmington did not enter into a settlement agreement with her to resolve her outstanding payments despite the
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defects in the original notice of default and, instead, misrepresented how much she owed in the revised 2018 notice of default. Wilmington’s “overall actions in this matter,” according to Ms. Edwards, “are consistent with a fraudulent intent to take [her] property.” These allegations, without more, fall short of establishing the requisite elements for a claim of fraud.
Focusing specifically on the fifth element, Ms. Edwards does not allege anywhere in her counterclaim that she acted “in reliance” on the allegedly inaccurate amount Wilmington claimed that she owed in the 2018 notice of default. See id. On the contrary, her counterclaim and the record reveal that she disputed the amount that Wilmington listed in its notice of default and contended that she was not liable for the amount Wilmington claimed. She also does not identify any document either attached to or incorporated by reference into her counterclaim that shows she paid Wilmington any sum of money either before or after receiving the notice of default. See Rayner, 289 A.3d at 398 n.24 (“Our review of a 12(b)(6) ruling is limited to documents incorporated into the complaint such as those that were attached to appellants’ complaint.” (citation modified)); Bell, 256 A.3d at 251 (“[T]he court may consider the complaint itself and any documents it incorporates by reference . . . .” (citation modified)). Thus, Ms. Edwards failed to establish at least one of the essential elements of a prima facie fraud case. See DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, 332 A.3d at 529. And in light of this flaw in Ms. Edwards’s counterclaim, “the trial court did
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not err when it dismissed [her] claim of common law fraud.” Schiff v. Am. Ass’n of Retired Persons, 697 A.2d 1193, 1198 (D.C. 1997); see Kitt v. Cap. Concerts, Inc., 742 A.2d 856, 861 (D.C. 1999) (affirming dismissal of a fraud claim when the appellant did not plead reliance on the appellee’s alleged misrepresentation); see also Bell, 256 A.3d at 251 (“[A] complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legally cognizable claim.” (citation modified)).
3. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Turning to Ms. Jones’s claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, we similarly conclude that the trial court did not err. “It is well established that to succeed on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the claimant must prove six elements.” Sibley v. St. Albans Sch., 134 A.3d 789, 808 (D.C. 2016). The first five—“(1) that a false representation was made, (2) in reference to a material fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with intent to deceive, and (5) action taken in detrimental reliance upon the representation”—mirror the elements of common-law fraud. Id.; cf. DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, 332 A.3d at 529. In addition, “to be actionable, reliance on the misrepresentation must (6) have been justifiable.” Sibley, 134 A.3d at 809. Like common-law fraud claims, “[s]pecial pleading requirements apply to claims of fraudulent representation” in that they “must be pled with particularity.” Id. at 809 n.13.
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In her counterclaim, Ms. Jones alleges that Wilmington fraudulently represented that it would “work out some type of settlement with [Ms.] Edwards” but it “never made any efforts to reach any settlement with [Ms.] Edwards.” She claims that this supposed deception “directly affected [her] interest in the [disputed] property” because she “relied upon Wilmington Savings’ representations.” These assertions fail “[t]o comply with the more rigorous” fraud pleading requirements because the alleged facts do not “reveal the existence of all the requisite elements of fraud.” See id. (quoting Bennett v. Kiggins, 377 A.2d 57, 59-60 (D.C. 1977)).
Even when granting Ms. Jones every inference to which her allegations are entitled, we cannot hold that she adequately alleged that she relied on Wilmington’s supposed misrepresentation or that any claimed reliance was “justifiable.” See id. at 808-09. Starting with reliance, Ms. Jones’s counterclaim simply states that, “like [Ms.] Edwards, [she] relied upon Wilmington Savings’ representations.” Such “[b]are allegations . . . that are no more than conclusions . . . are insufficient to sustain a complaint” under our normal standard of review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Logan, 80 A.3d at 1019 (citation modified); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[F]ormulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”). Considering “the more rigorous” pleading requirements for a claim of fraudulent representation, see Sibley, 134 A.3d at 809 n.13, Ms. Jones’s
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counterclaim falls well short of what is needed to survive Wilmington’s motion to dismiss. 4
In any event, Ms. Jones’s claim that Wilmington made a false representation is not “plausible on its face.” Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609 (quoting Potomac Dev. Corp., 28 A.3d at 544). She asserts that Wilmington “indicated that some form of settlement could be worked out” and that the trial court “found negotiation between the parties to be the viable option.” It is true that “we have encouraged parties to settle their property rights and claims by agreement rather than leave the task to the courts,” Willcher v. Willcher, 294 A.2d 486, 489 (D.C. 1972), and that “we enforce a valid and binding settlement agreement just like any other contract[,]” In re Estate of Drake, 4 A.3d 450, 453 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified). But parties are not obligated to reach a settlement, and they maintain the right to pursue a judicial remedy. See
4 In her appellate brief, Ms. Jones contends that Wilmington’s purported representation that it would settle with Ms. Edwards “encouraged” her “to exercise her options clause” and purchase a fifteen percent stake in Ms. Edwards’s property. While this provides some additional “particularity” to her claim, our task upon review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test[ ] the legal sufficiency of the complaint,” Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609 (citation modified), not the content of the parties’ briefs, see Boyd v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, 164 A.3d 72, 78 (D.C. 2017) (“We do not consider matters outside the pleadings unless we treat the motion as one for summary judgment.” (citation modified)); Martin, 99 A.3d at 712 n.17 (“When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, trial courts are generally limited to the four corners of the complaint . . . .”); see also Honickman v. BLOM Bank SAL, 6 F.4th 487, 502 n.19 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the adequacy of the complaint not the briefs.” (citation modified)).
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Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104, 1121 (D.C. 2009) (agreeing with the trial court that the law “promotes and encourages” a party’s “ability to pursue any remedies [they] may have”); Spencer v. Spencer, 494 A.2d 1279, 1285 (D.C. 1985) (“Parties are free to choose the method for resolving their dispute . . . .”); see also Perez v. Maine, 760 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1985) (observing that parties have “no duty to settle” a case “or reduce claims” and that it is ultimately their choice); cf. Makins v. District of Columbia, 861 A.2d 590, 594-95 (D.C. 2004) (en banc) (holding that an attorney, even when acting in good faith, does not have the power to accept a settlement without approval from their client).
Moreover, Ms. Jones does not direct us to any allegation in her counterclaim, nor a document attached thereto, that suggests that Wilmington entered a binding agreement or even promised to settle the case with Ms. Edwards. See Rayner, 289 A.3d at 398 n.24; Bell, 256 A.3d at 251. Indeed, Ms. Jones alleges that Wilmington said an agreement “could be worked out,” not that an agreement definitively would be reached. Such speculative language might be enough to make Ms. Jones’s claim possible, see In re K.M., 75 A.3d 224, 234 (D.C. 2013), but it does not allow this “court to draw the reasonable inference that [Wilmington] is liable for the misconduct alleged[,]” Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609 (citation modified); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As a result, when we “test[ed] the legal sufficiency” of Ms. Jones’s counterclaim, it was found wanting. Tovar, 321 A.3d at 609 (citation modified).
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Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Jones’s counterclaim for fraudulent misrepresentation.
B. Summary Judgment Orders
Ms. Edwards and Ms. Jones also both contest the trial court’s grant of Wilmington’s motions for summary judgment on its judicial foreclosure claim. “This court reviews a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standard as the trial court does in considering the motion for summary judgment.” Garner v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 317 A.3d 333, 338 (D.C. 2024) (quoting Bowyer v. Reinhardt, 277 A.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. 2022)). “On appeal, this court is required to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether any relevant factual issues exist by examining and taking into account the pleadings, depositions, and admissions along with any affidavits on file, construing such material in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. (quoting Bowyer, 277 A.3d at 1265). “Summary judgment is proper if, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Bowyer, 277 A.3d at 1265).
A movant seeking summary judgment on its own claim must first make a prima facie evidentiary showing as to each of the elements of that claim. See Tolu v.
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Ayodeji, 945 A.2d 596, 600 (D.C. 2008) (per curiam). “The burden then shifts to the [nonmovant] to present evidence showing the existence of genuine issues of material fact,” i.e., unsettled factual questions that (1) could be resolved by a reasonable jury in the nonmovant’s favor and (2) if so resolved, could lead to the nonmovant’s successful defeat of the claim. Id. at 600-01. When making this showing, the nonmovant “may not rest upon conclusory allegations or denials, but must provide affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories that set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 600 (citation modified).
1. Ms. Edwards
Ordinarily, we would begin by determining whether the movant—
Wilmington—made a prima facie showing on the elements of its judicial foreclosure claim. 5 See id. Ms. Edwards, however, does not contend that Wilmington failed to meet its initial burden. Instead, she argues that this case is about Wilmington’s 2018 “deficient [d]emand [l]etter,” which “stated the wrong amount owed and therefore
5 To make a “prima facie case for judicial foreclosure,” Wilmington must show (1) that it is the current holder of the promissory note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, (2) that Ms. Edwards defaulted on the promissory note and failed to cure the default, and (3) that it is “entitled to enforce the [d]eed of [t]rust through a judicial foreclosure sale of the [p]roperty.” Stevenson v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 324 A.3d 295, 307 (D.C. 2024) (citation modified); see also Johnson v. Fairfax Vill. Condo. IV Unit Owners Ass’n, 641 A.2d 495, 506 (D.C. 1994) (“Central among the issues in a judicial foreclosure proceeding is whether the party is in default.”).
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the incorrect amount necessary to cure [her] mortgage default.” The alleged deficiency in Wilmington’s letter, according to Ms. Edwards, is “a definite dispute of material fact” that “preclude[s] a foreclosure.” Addressing the issue as framed, we see no such material dispute.
First, Ms. Edwards makes multiple arguments that present only legal conclusions, including that Wilmington “had a duty to start [the loan] over” and “decelerate the loan and permit [her] to return to monthly payments with the appropriate amount of interest added to the loan,” and that “[t]he proper remedy in the instant case was to mediate and or enter into some type of settlement agreement.” Assertions that “constitute [only] legal conclusion[s] to be made by the court” do not “raise a disputed issue of material fact.” Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C. 1986); see also 1417 Belmont Cmty. Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia, 302 A.3d 512, 516 (D.C. 2023) (“Conclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment.” (citation modified)).
When liberally construing Ms. Edwards’s argument, see Black, 188 A.3d at 847, it appears that she is gesturing towards a contention that she could defeat Wilmington’s motion notwithstanding the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by showing that Wilmington was nevertheless not “entitled to judgment as a matter
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of law[,]” see Garner, 317 A.3d at 338. Even under this understanding of Ms. Edwards’s argument, however, we find her position unavailing because she neither cites nor identifies any legal authority that supports her contentions. See Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267, 272 n.2 (D.C. 2016) (“We have held repeatedly that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” (citation modified)); Smith v. United States, 837 A.2d 87, 100 n.9 (D.C. 2003) (“Generally, an assertion of an issue without argument or authority will not be considered on appeal.”); see also Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Moreover, perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived . . . .” (citation modified)). We decline to develop Ms. Edwards’s “skeletal” arguments by putting “flesh on [their] bones” in the form of legal authority that supports her position. See Gabramadhin v. United States, 137 A.3d 178, 187 (D.C. 2016) (“[I]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” (citation modified)).
Second, Ms. Edwards contends that the defect in Wilmington’s notice of default (listing the incorrect amount to cure her default) is a material error that made Wilmington’s foreclosure of her property improper and created a genuine dispute of fact that precludes summary judgment. Ms. Edwards is correct that D.C. Code
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§ 42-815.02(a)(11) requires a “[n]otice of default [for a] residential mortgage” to contain “[t]he amount of the principal balance and outstanding interest owed;” “[a]ll past due payments;” “[p]enalties;” and “[t]he amount required to cure the default and reinstate the loan, including all past due payments, penalties, and fees.” That statute, however, is inapplicable in the case before us where Wilmington moved for judicial foreclosure under D.C. Code § 42-816. Indeed, D.C. Code § 42-815.04 explicitly states that the requirements created by Section 42-815 “shall not apply to actions for judicial foreclosure under § 42-816, or any other action for judicial foreclosure permitted under existing laws.” See Rogers v. Advance Bank, 111 A.3d 25, 29 (D.C. 2015) (holding that “§ 42-815 controls when dealing with ‘power of sale’ foreclosures under an instrument such as a deed of trust and § 42-816 refers to judicial sales, where the sale is requested by a lender then ordered by the court or an officer acting under court order”). Moreover, unlike Section 42-815.02(a)(11), neither Section 42-816 nor the deed of trust securing the promissory note against Ms. Edwards’s property has an equivalent provision mandating that a breakdown of the “amount required to cure the default,” “[a]ll past due payments,” and “[p]enalties” be included in notices of default. See Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794, 796 (D.C. 1994) (“Deeds, like contracts, are construed in accordance with the intention of the parties insofar as it can be discerned from the text of the instrument.” (citation modified)); Giant Food, Inc. v. Jack I.
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Bender & Sons, 399 A.2d 1293, 1303 (D.C. 1979) (holding that contractual provisions govern the parties’ conduct “unless contrary to law or public policy”). 6 Given the above, we are unconvinced by Ms. Edwards’s argument that the absence of such an itemization in Wilmington’s notice of default created a genuine dispute of material fact. See Garner, 317 A.3d at 338.
Finally, and most crucially, Ms. Edwards does not bring to our attention any evidence, such as “affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories,” that “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine” dispute over the amount she was required to pay to cure her mortgage default. Tolu, 945 A.2d at 600 (citation modified). Instead, her position rests upon conclusory allegations that Wilmington’s 2018 notice of default “stated the wrong amount owed” because it “allowed interest to accrue on an improper acceleration of the loan and then continue[d] to charge interest at the higher acceleration rate.” See id. While this theory offers a possible reason why Wilmington’s 2018 notice of default could be deficient, Ms. Edwards “presented no actual evidence that inaccurate [calculation] methods were in fact
6 See also Shea v. Dulin, 3 MacArth. 339, 343 (D.C. 1877) (“Deeds of trust to secure debts are recognized in law as valid, and the authority granted to the trustees and its exercise are matters which rest wholly upon the convention of the parties thereto, and the contract and the rights of the parties thereunder cannot be disturbed by either a court of equity or of law, except upon certain well-known principles which govern all contracts.”).
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used.” See Kibunja v. Alturas, L.L.C., 856 A.2d 1120, 1128 (D.C. 2004) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, because Ms. Edwards did not meet her “burden” as the nonmovant to show “the existence of genuine issues of material fact,” granting summary judgment in Wilmington’s favor was appropriate. Tolu, 945 A.2d at 600; see Garner, 317 A.3d at 338.
2. Ms. Jones
Ms. Jones also argues that the trial court erred in granting Wilmington’s motion for summary judgment against her. In addition to “incorporat[ing]” Ms. Edwards’s arguments, she contends that we should reverse the trial court for five reasons: (1) she has a competing interest in the property with Wilmington because she is not a party to the promissory note or deed of trust that Ms. Edwards executed; (2) Wilmington does not have a superior interest in the property that permits it to foreclose on her title based on Ms. Edwards’s default; (3) she alleged fraud in her counterclaim and courts “rarely” grant summary judgment when “motive or intent is alleged”; (4) the trial court denied her motion to amend the scheduling order after Wilmington added her as a party, which prevented her from participating in discovery; and (5) Wilmington does not have the right to foreclose on her interest without giving her notice of its intent or affording her the “opportunity to challenge,
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dispute, settle or cure the amount” allegedly owed. We have considered all five arguments and find none of them compelling.
Starting with Ms. Jones’s first two assertions, we understand her to be arguing that she could defeat Wilmington’s summary judgment motion by showing that Wilmington was not “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Garner, 317 A.3d at 338; Black, 188 A.3d at 847. From what we can discern, she contends that the law prevents Wilmington from foreclosing on her property interest. Even when viewed through this lens, Ms. Jones’s understanding of mortgage law is simply incorrect.
Ms. Jones’s obligations under the deed of trust turn on whether she assumed Ms. Edwards’s mortgage when she acquired her share of the property. See Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68, 73 (D.C. 1979). As neither Wilmington nor the record suggests that Ms. Jones agreed to assume any liability for Ms. Edwards’s mortgage—indeed, the premise of her argument is that she did not—we proceed under the assumption that she purchased her portion of the property free of any obligations under the deed of trust.
While her purchase of a stake in the property does not necessarily create a requirement for her to pay the mortgage, the property “remains ‘subject to’ [Ms. Edwards’s] mortgage, that is, bears the principal burden of the mortgage.” Id. Therefore, although Ms. Jones was not a party to the promissory note or deed of trust
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when she purchased her fifteen percent share, her interest in the property was “subject to” Wilmington’s prior interest. See id.; OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 n.3 (D.C. 2011) (“A mortgage is enforceable whether or not any person is personally liable for that performance.” (citation modified)); see also Stuart v. Am. Sec. Bank, 494 A.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C. 1985) (“The general rule is that a foreclosure purchaser takes a property subject to prior liens and interests accruing prior to consummation of the sale.”). Consequently, Ms. Jones’s partial title to the property came with the risk that she could lose that title if Ms. Edwards did not perform her obligations under the deed of trust. See Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166, 173 (D.C. 2014) (“A valid foreclosure of a mortgage terminates all interests in the foreclosed real estate that are junior to the mortgage being foreclosed . . . .” (citation modified)); Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 5.2 (2025) (“A non-assuming transferee has the risk of loss of title to the real estate by foreclosure if the secured obligation is not performed, but is subject to no further liability.”); see also Esplendido Apartments v. Metro. Condo. Ass’n of Ariz. II, 778 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Ariz. 1989) (“A purchaser who buys real property subject to a mortgage . . . takes the land subject to the encumbrances without a personal obligation to pay the mortgage, but subjects himself to loss of the property if the mortgage debt is not paid.” (citing Shepherd v. May, 115 U.S. 505, 512 (1885))).
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Turning to who has the superior interest and its effect on this case, “[i]t is axiomatic that a prior lien gives a prior legal right (first in time, first in right).” Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Tillerson, 2 A.3d 198, 201 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified); see also Robinson v. Georgetown Ct. Condo., LLC, 39 A.3d 1286, 1291 n.17 (D.C. 2012) (affirming the legal principle that “if the recording of a lien complied with the recording statute and the recording was first in time, it created an interest in the property that was superior to later-recorded interests” (citation modified)); Watergate West, Inc. v. Barclays Banks, S.A., 759 A.2d 169, 180 (D.C. 2000) (“[A] mortgagee’s security interest generally has priority over subsequent claims or liens attaching to the property.” (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983))). It is undisputed that the deed of trust executed between Ms. Edwards and Wilmington’s predecessor in interest was recorded in 2007 and that Wilmington assumed all rights and interests in the deed of trust in 2015. All parties also recognize that Ms. Jones did not record her interest in the property until 2022. Thus, there is no doubt that Wilmington has the superior interest. 7 See Tillerson, 2 A.3d at 199. Considering Ms. Edwards’s default and Wilmington’s superior interest, Ms. Jones’s first two arguments neither establish that
7 Ms. Jones does not contend that Wilmington or its predecessors failed to comply with the recording statute. See Robinson, 39 A.3d at 1291 n.17.
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Wilmington was not “entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Garner, 317 A.3d at 338, nor otherwise advance her cause.
Ms. Jones’s third argument is easily disposed of because, although we have previously said that summary judgment “should be granted sparingly in cases involving motive or intent,” Spellman v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 504 A.2d 1119, 1122 (D.C. 1986), as we have already concluded, Ms. Jones’s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. Moreover, the legal principle she relies on is relevant at the summary judgment stage where a party’s state of mind is crucial to the ultimate factual issue, which is not the case with respect to judicial foreclosure. See, e.g., Leeks v. Leeks, 570 A.2d 271, 274-76 (D.C. 1989). Thus, her dismissed counterclaim had no bearing on Wilmington’s motion for summary judgment.
Regarding Ms. Jones’s last two contentions, Wilmington argues—and we agree—that they were not adequately preserved because Ms. Jones did not raise them in her opposition to its motion for summary judgment. It is well established that “[p]oints not raised and preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal, except in exceptional circumstances.” Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 75 (D.C. 2005). Because we do not discern any exceptional circumstances that would warrant our consideration of Ms. Jones’s last two arguments, see id., and she failed
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to raise them prior to the trial court issuing its summary judgment ruling, we hold that Ms. Jones has forfeited those arguments on appeal. 8 See MP PPH, 339 A.3d at 146.
In sum, we are unpersuaded by Ms. Jones’s arguments and conclude that she has raised “no genuine issues of material fact.” Garner, 317 A.3d at 338. As we have already determined that it is uncontested that Wilmington has met its burden as the moving party regarding its foreclosure claim, see Tolu, 945 A.2d at 600, we hold that Wilmington “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[,]” Garner, 317 A.3d at 338.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.
So ordered.
8 Ms. Jones did raise her argument related to the court’s denial of her motion to amend the scheduling order in her Rule 59 motion following the trial court’s summary judgment ruling. This, however, does not change our analysis because we generally treat “arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration as forfeited.” MP PPH, LLC v. District of Columbia, 339 A.3d 132, 146 (D.C. 2025); see id. at 145-46 (“Motions for reconsideration are not designed to enable a party to complete presenting its case after the court has ruled against it . . . .” (citation modified)).