Edward Urrutia v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 19, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00650
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 EDWARD URRUTIA, Case No. 2:25-cv-00650-EJY

5 Plaintiff,

6 v. ORDER

7 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Edward Urrutia’s Complaint for Review of Final 11 Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and his Brief in support thereof. ECF Nos. 1, 8. 12 The Court reviewed Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 8), the Commissioner’s Brief (ECF No. 12), and 13 Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 13). The Court finds as follows. 14 I. Background 15 Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability and disability insurance benefits with an 16 alleged onset date of October 31, 2019. Administrative Record (“AR”) 551-552. The Social 17 Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s application initially and upon reconsideration. AR 417- 18 20; 430-32. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”), which 19 was held on March 13, 2024. AR 360-390; 447-448. The ALJ issued her decision finding Plaintiff 20 was not disabled on April 1, 2024. AR 36-46. Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision that 21 was denied by the Appeals Counsel on February 20, 2025. AR 1-4; 546-547. Plaintiff now seeks 22 judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 23 II. Standard of Review 24 The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the decision is based on 25 correct legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 26 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 1 (1971) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the Commissioner’s alleged 2 errors, the Court must weigh “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the 3 [Commissioner’s] conclusions.” Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 4 “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we 5 must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198, citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 6 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A reviewing court, however, “cannot affirm the decision of an agency 7 on a ground that the agency did not invoke in making its decision.” Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 8 Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). Finally, the court may not 9 reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 10 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful 11 normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 12 396, 409 (2009). 13 To establish whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, there must be substantial evidence 14 that:

15 (a) the claimant suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be 16 expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months; and

17 (b) the impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the work that the claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other 18 substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 19 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). “If a claimant 20 meets both requirements, he or she is disabled.” Id. 21 The ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant 22 is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. 23 § 404.1520(a). Each step is potentially dispositive and “if a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or 24 ‘not-disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett, 25 180 F.3d at 1098; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant carries the burden of proof at steps one 26 through four, and the Commissioner carries the burden of proof at step five. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 27 1098. 1 The five steps include:

2 Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act 3 and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step 4 one and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

5 Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s 6 impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 7 Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments 8 described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor 9 equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 10 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

11 Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance 12 benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to the 13 fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

14 Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 15 404.1520(f)(1). If the claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy 16 that claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is other work in “significant numbers” in the national 17 economy that claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert [(“VE”)], or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 18 subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 19 §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits. See id. 20 21 Id. at 1098-99 (internal alterations omitted). 22 III. Discussion 23 A. Summary of ALJ’s Findings. 24 The ALJ applied the 5-step sequential analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and determined 25 Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2024. 26 AR 38. The ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 31, 27 2019, his alleged disability onset date (step one). Id. The ALJ determined Plaintiff has severe 1 fasciitis, bilateral heel spurs and obstructive sleep apnea (step two). AR 38-39. The ALJ then stated 2 Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria in the Listing of Impairments found at 20 3 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (step three). AR 39. The ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the 4 residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following limitations: (1) never 5 climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; (2) occasional stoop; (3) occasionally climb ramps or stairs; (4) 6 frequent kneeling, crouching and crawling; (4) avoid extreme cold, vibration, or pulmonary irritants 7 defined as atmospheric conditions, and (5) hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous 8 moving machinery like chainsaws and jackhammers. Id. After considering past relevant work 9 within the last 15 years, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as an 10 office machine servicer/repairer (step 4), and thus, Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 44-45. 11 B. The Parties’ Arguments. 12 Plaintiff’s argument hinges on the actions of the Appeals Council. During the pendency of 13 Plaintiff’s appeal, the Social Security Administration amended the definition of past relevant work 14 to shorten the relevant timeframe and explained the new rule would apply to claims filed or pending 15 on or after June 22, 2024. ECF No. 8 at 5, see SSR 24-2p, 2024 WL 2846571, at n.1. Because 16 Plaintiff’s appeal was pending as of June 22, 2024, Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council was 17 required to apply the new timeframe, and to the extent that it did, the Appeals Council erred. ECF 18 No. 8 at 6. 19 In opposition, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff could 20 perform past relevant work under the old timeframe. ECF No. 12 at 4. The Commissioner does not 21 appear to argue the applicability of the new timeframe. Instead, the Commissioner says that “even 22 indulging Plaintiff’s legal position for the sake of argument,” Plaintiff cannot show a reversible error 23 under either timeframe. Id. at 5. 24 C. Analysis. 25 On June 22 2024, the Social Security Administration’s amended regulations regarding the 26 definition of “past relevant work” went into effect. See Dodge v. Dudek, Case No. 24-2899, 2025 27 WL 1099705, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025), see also 89 Fed. Reg. 48138 (June 5, 2024). 1 years to 5 years. Id. The Social Security Administration explained the amendment would apply 2 prospectively to claims filed or pending from June 22, 2024, onward. SSR 24-2p, 2024 WL 3 2846571, at n.1. In accord with the Commissioner’s guidance, the Ninth Circuit has declined to 4 apply the 5-year lookback period to cases finalized before June 22, 2024. E.g. Dodge, 2025 WL 5 1099705 at *2. Since Plaintiff’s claim was pending before the Appeals Council on June 22, 2024, 6 the Court must analyze the administrative decision under the 5-year lookback period. Mary C. E. v. 7 Bisignano, Case No. ED CV 25-1269-E, 2025 WL 2970248, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2025), see 8 also Ruiz v. Bisignano, Case No. SA-24-CV-1039-XR-HJB, 2025 WL 2046416, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 9 June 26, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, Case No. SA-24-CV-01039-XR, 2025 WL 10 2042773 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2025). 11 The Court finds the Commissioner did not commit reversible error. There have been few 12 occasions for courts to review similar cases. In Mary C.E., the Court applied the 5-year lookback 13 period and remanded because it was unclear whether the plaintiff’s only employment within the 5- 14 year period would qualify as a substantial gainful activity. 2025 WL 2970248, at **10-12. Similarly 15 in Ruiz, the Court remanded because in applying the 5-year lookback period—as the Appeals 16 Council averred it had—the Court found it was unclear if any of the plaintiff’s jobs would qualify 17 as past relevant work for the 5-year period. 2025 WL 2046416 at *5. 18 Unlike Mary C.E. and Ruiz, there is no dispute that Plaintiff had a job in October 2019 that 19 could be considered past relevant work. E.g. ECF No. 8 at 2. Instead, the parties dispute when the 20 5-year lookback period begins. See ECF No. 13 at 4. Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ’s decision 21 was not final until the Appeals Council denied review on February 20, 2025, the 5-year lookback 22 period begins from that date. Id. In opposition, the Commissioner argues the lookback period begins 23 with the date of the ALJ’s decision: April 1, 2024. ECF No. 12 at 5; AR 46. Which date governs is 24 determinative because Plaintiff would only have past relevant work under the latter’s proposed time 25 period. 26 The Court agrees with the Commissioner and finds that the 5-year lookback period begins 27 from the date of the ALJ’s decision. In Obrien v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 687, 702 (9th Cir. 2025), the 1 past relevant work began on the date of the ALJ’s decision despite the Appeals Council’s later denial 2 of review. Id. Although the length of the lookback period is different from what was before the 3 Ninth Circuit in Obrien, Plaintiff has not shown why Obrien, and the Court finds no reason to 4 conclude, the change in the regulation would lead to a change in the date from which the lookback 5 period would commence. That is, whether an ALJ is to lookback five or fifteen years to determine 6 whether a claimant can perform past relevant work changes what information is considered, this 7 change does not implicate the start date for that period, which was recently determined by the Ninth 8 Circuit. Further, this analysis conforms with decisions by the Central District of California. Mary 9 C.E., 2025 WL 2970248 at *10 (applying the lookback window to include plaintiff’s work in 2019, 10 implying the court applied the lookback period from the ALJ’s decision, rather than the Appeals 11 Council’s denial of review in 2025); Cathy M. v. Bisignano, Case No. CV 25-01822-DFM, 2025 12 WL 2390843 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025) (noting that the lookback period appears to start from the 13 ALJ’s decision per Obrien, but remanding because plaintiff did not have relevant work experience 14 within 5 years of either the date of the ALJ’s decision or the Appeals Council’s denial of review). 15 Finding 5-year lookback period commences with the date of the ALJ’s decision, the Court 16 finds there is substantial, undisputed evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff 17 could perform past relevant work. 18 IV. Order 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint and Brief seeking 20 reversal and remand (ECF Nos. 1, 8) are DENIED. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must close this case and enter judgment 22 accordingly. 23 DATED this 19h day of November, 2025.

25 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27