Edward Thompson Jr. v. Planet Home Lending, LLC, Logs Legal Group, LLP, Grant Tabor, Any Substitute Trustee or Foreclosure Trustee Identified in the July 7 2026 Notice of Sale, and John Does 1-10

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

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No. 02-26-00461-CV

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EDWARD THOMPSON JR., Appellant V.

PLANET HOME LENDING, LLC, LOGS LEGAL GROUP, LLP, GRANT TABOR, ANY SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEE OR FORECLOSURE TRUSTEE IDENTIFIED IN THE JULY 7 2026 NOTICE OF SALE, AND JOHN DOES 1-10, Appellees

On Appeal from the 477th District Court Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. 26-6864-477

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this interlocutory appeal, Appellant Edward Thompson Jr. attempts to appeal the trial court’s denials of his applications for a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction. But as Thompson has acknowledged in his notice of appeal, the trial court has not signed any order denying his requests from which he can appeal.

Generally, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing final judgments.

Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 319 n.1 (Tex. 2007); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). We may also review interlocutory orders when authorized by statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014; Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001). A person may appeal from an interlocutory order that refuses a temporary injunction, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4), and such an appeal, when allowed, is accelerated, see Tex. R. App. P. 28.1. In an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days after the judgment or order is signed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b).

Although “an interlocutory appeal from the [signed] grant or denial of a temporary injunction is allowed, no statutory provision permits an appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order.” Westbrook v. Fondren, No. 2-09-173-CV, 2009 WL 2914311, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 10, 2009, no pet.) (first citing Lesikar v. Rappeport, 899 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex. 1995); and then citing Nikolouzos v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 680-81 (Tex. App.—

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Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). “Thus, the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order is generally not appealable.” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, the record contains no signed appealable order.1 We called this issue to Thompson’s attention, and we gave him 20 days to show grounds for continuing his appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. But that deadline has passed, and Thompson has not responded.

Because we generally lack jurisdiction over appeals from denied temporary restraining orders, see Westbrook, 2009 WL 2914311, at *2, and the record does not contain a signed appealable order concerning the requested temporary injunctive relief, see Gause v. Parker, No. 09-08-205 CV, 2008 WL 2521910, at *1 (Tex. App.— Beaumont June 26, 2008, no pet.), we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, see Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

1 The record contains three proposed orders that are each unsigned. All three proposed orders, however, include brief, typed notations on the top left corners of the first page in red ink, with the judge’s name and a date. For instance, one says “Denied” without any reference to what specific request or motion was being denied. Below that word is the judge’s typed name, and below that is a typed date. We need not further consider whether such terse and informal notations could be construed as denial orders because none of the notations comply with the electronic-signature requirements in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(7). See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(7). The notations on each proposed order are therefore unsigned. See id.

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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

Elizabeth Kerr

Justice

Delivered: September 3, 2026