Edward R. Serrata v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, et al.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided March 27, 2026·No. 4:24-cv-02421·Unknown

Opinion

EDWARD R. SERRATA, Case No. 24-cv-02421-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AND v. DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF AMERICA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 43, 45 Defendants. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. Dkt. Nos. 43, 45. Both motions are opposed. See Dkt. Nos. 48, 49. Plaintiff Edward R. Serrata brings a single claim to recover long-term disability benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), from April 13, 2023, which is the date on which they were terminated by Defendant Unum Life Insurance Company of America (“UNUM”), to the date of judgment. The Court held a hearing on the cross-motions, Dkt. No. 50, and for the reasons discussed below GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for judgment and DENIES Defendant’s motion. Under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B), a civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The parties agree that the Court may resolve Plaintiff’s ERISA claim on cross-motions for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. “Under Rule 52, the Court conducts what is essentially a bench trial on the record, evaluating the persuasiveness of conflicting testimony and deciding which is more likely true.” See McCulloch v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 19- CV-07716-SI, 2020 WL 7711257, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2020) (citing Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (“In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”). A denial of ERISA benefits “is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); see also Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“De novo is the default standard of review.”). Here, the parties stipulated that the de novo standard of review applies. See Dkt. No. 34. Under de novo review, “the court does not give deference to the claim administrator’s decision, but rather determines in the first instance if the claimant has adequately established that he or she is disabled under the terms of the plan.” Muniz v. Amec Const. Mgmt., Inc., 623 F.3d 1290, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that, in an ERISA action for the denial of disability benefits, the burden of proof is on the claimant when the standard of review is de novo). “When a district court reviews de novo a plan administrator’s determination of a claimant’s right to recover long term disability benefits, the claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was disabled under the terms of the plan.” Armani v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 840 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2016). The burden of proof remains on the claimant even “when disability benefits are terminated after an initial grant.” See Muniz, 623 F.3d at 1296. // II. FACTUAL FINDINGS1 A. Plaintiff’s Background and Overview of Claim History Plaintiff started working for Sherwin Williams Company (“SW”) as a salesman in 1991. AR2855. 2 In 2005, Plaintiff began to experience problems with his vision and energy, and in 2006, he was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (“MS”) at the age of 45 following an episode of optic neuritis. Id. Despite his diagnosis, Plaintiff continued to work for six more years, during which his MS symptoms progressively worsened. Id. Eventually, in 2011, his MS symptoms, which included fatigue, leg pain and discomfort, leg weakness, leg paresthesias, vision problems, and loss of balance, made it difficult for him to perform the duties of his job. AR2855; AR129- 30; AR109-10; AR2653. At that point, his doctors recommended that he stop working. AR2856. Plaintiff’s last day of work was July 7, 2011. AR109. Plaintiff’s last position at SW was National Account Sales Manager, which required frequent travel by air and car; coordinating sales strategy for obtaining new customers on a national scale; giving presentations to clients; and attending trade shows. AR2855. Plaintiff applied for short-term disability benefits, which were approved and paid by Defendant until November 10, 2011, when his disability benefits claim was converted into a claim for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits. AR65. Based on the MS-related symptoms he was experiencing, Plaintiff’s claim for LTD benefits was approved as of January 4, 2012 “to the maximum duration,” meaning that the benefits were approved through May 24, 2026 and would be paid so long as Plaintiff continued to meet the Plan’s definition of disability. See AR298, AR317. For more than eleven years, Defendant

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Edward R. Serrata v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, et al., (N.D. Cal. 2026).

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