Edward Phillip McKenna v. Cisneros, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 7, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00607
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EDWARD PHILLIP MCKENNA, Case No. 1:24-cv-00607-KES-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 13 v. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 14 CISNEROS, et al., (ECF No. 71) 15 Defendants. FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiff Edward Phillip McKenna (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was 19 transferred from the Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern 20 District of California on May 21, 2024. (ECF No. 75.) Prior to transfer, the Sacramento Division 21 granted Plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint only “with respect to the excessive force 22 and failure to protect claims as well as any supplemental state law claim of assault and battery 23 against defendants Cisneros, Leahy, Garcia, Tyler, Coronado, Sayama, Diaz, Brown, Dunn, 24 Valdez and Knudson.” (ECF No. 53, p. 11.) Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, limited to 25 “only those defendants employed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 26 (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California,” is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF Nos. 29, 27 75.) 28 /// 1 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 5 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 6 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 7 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 8 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 9 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 11 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 12 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 13 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 15 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 16 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 17 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 18 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 19 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 20 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 21 Plaintiff is currently housed at Mule Creek State Prison in Ione, California. Plaintiff 22 alleges the events in the third amended complaint occurred while he was housed at the California 23 Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names as 24 defendants: (1) T. Cisneros, Warden; (2) J. Leahy, Sergeant; (3) J. Garcia, Sergeant; (4) N. Tyler, 25 Lieutenant; (5) D. Coronado, Correctional Officer; (6) T. Sayama; (7) E. Diaz, Correctional 26 Officer; (8) C. Brown, Lieutenant; (9) T. Dunn, Associate Warden; (10) Valdez, Correctional 27 Officer; and (11) D. Knutson, Correctional Officer. All defendants are employed at CSATF. 28 /// 1 Plaintiff alleges that on February 18, 2021, while he was housed in Administrative 2 Segregation, Cell #185, prison officials, at the direction of Defendant Warden T. Cisneros, used 3 excessive force and committed assault and battery against Plaintiff. Someone threw grenades in 4 Plaintiff’s cell, burning his arm. Someone sprayed chemicals in through the tray slot and the hole 5 in the wall above the toilet, choking Plaintiff. Someone hit Plaintiff in the face, chest, and 6 stomach with a battering ram, a huge metal pipe. Plaintiff thought he was going to die. These 7 were deliberate acts on orders of their boss, Defendant Cisneros, to start a calculated campaign of 8 harassment and failure to protect actions towards Plaintiff by prison officials at multiple 9 institutions, to put Plaintiff’s life in danger. The excessive force was used to punish Plaintiff for 10 not giving up his First Amendment rights to file a lawsuit against CDCR and to destroy evidence 11 for the lawsuit. 12 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants J. Leahy, J. Garcia, and Tyler fabricated a Rules 13 Violation Report for 2-18-2021. Defendant D. Coronado, assigned as the investigative employee 14 on the RVR, and Defendants T. Sayama and E. Diaz, assigned as staff assistants, never spoke to 15 Plaintiff and all wrote fraudulent facts to destroy evidence against their boss, Defendant Cisneros, 16 and to cover up what really took place. Defendant Lieutenant C. Brown, the hearing official, 17 threatened Plaintiff with C-Status and loss of property if Plaintiff did not plead guilty to the RVR. 18 Defendants C. Brown, T. Dunn, M. Valdez, and D. Knutson all covered up for Defendant 19 Cisneros. 20 Plaintiff also includes allegations regarding further alleged retaliation that he suffered 21 while housed at other institutions, including a March 26, 2021 attack by prisoners at CSP- 22 Corcoran and a May 28, 2022 attack by five Correctional Sergeants at CMF-Vacaville. Plaintiff 23 alleges that these incidents were also directed by Defendant Cisneros as part of her campaign of 24 harassment and to destroy Plaintiff’s evidence and prevent him from suing CDCR. 25 Plaintiff states that he suffered physical and mental torture from the chemicals and 26 grenades and from being beaten by prison officials and gang members. Plaintiff suffered burnt 27 eyes and flesh and alleges that he has glaucoma because of chemicals repeatedly sprayed in his 28 eyes. 1 As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages. 2 III. Discussion 3 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18, and 20 4 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 5 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 6 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 7 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 8 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 9 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 10 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 11 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 12 at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also 13 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 14 Plaintiff’s third amended complaint is neither short nor a plain statement of his claims. 15 Plaintiff’s allegations are repetitive, conclusory, and include lengthy descriptions of events that 16 are not properly joined in this action. Despite the length of the complaint, Plaintiff fails to 17 provide sufficient factual allegations to support a cognizable claim for relief against any 18 defendant. 19 B. Linkage Requirement 20 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

21 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 22 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 23 redress. 24 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 25 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 26 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 27 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional 28 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 1 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 2 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 3 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to provide sufficient factual allegations to link any 4 defendant to his excessive force or assault and battery claims. With respect to Defendant 5 Cisneros, Plaintiff provides only conclusory statements that Defendant Cisneros ordered and 6 directed other unknown prison officials to use excessive force against Plaintiff, but these 7 statements are not supported by any factual allegations. 8 As to the remaining defendants, it is not sufficient for Plaintiff to provide a list of 9 defendants and state that they all participated in an incident, or to generally state that “prison 10 officials” used excessive force against Plaintiff. Plaintiff must link each individual defendant to a 11 specific act or omission that violated Plaintiff’s rights. 12 C. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 13 Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. 14 R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 15 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so 16 long as (1) the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and 17 occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); 18 Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). The “same transaction” requirement 19 refers to similarity in the factual background of a claim. Id. at 1349. Only if the defendants are 20 properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court review the other claims to determine if they may 21 be joined under Rule 18(a), which permits the joinder of multiple claims against the same party. 22 Plaintiff was previously warned that claims arising from other institutions based on 23 conclusory allegations that all are linked in a campaign of harassment were improperly joined to 24 this action. (ECF No. 53, p. 8.) Further, the claims in the third amended complaint are limited 25 only to Plaintiff’s excessive force claims and any supplemental state law claims of assault and 26 battery. (ECF No. 75.) To the extent Plaintiff alleges that any of the named defendants violated 27 his constitutional rights by including fraudulent statements during the issuance or review of the 28 February 18, 2021 Rules Violation Report or threatening Plaintiff with a loss of property or C- 1 Status, those claims are not properly joined in this action. 2 D. Supervisory Liability 3 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Cisneros, or any other defendant, based 4 solely upon their supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on 5 supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of 6 respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 7 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 8 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 10 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 11 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. 12 Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established 13 when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably 14 should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at 15 570. Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 16 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 17 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 18 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other 19 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). When a defendant holds a supervisory 20 position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be 21 specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 22 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement 23 of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 24 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 25 “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or 26 inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates[.]” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. 27 However, a failure to train theory can be the basis for a supervisor’s liability in only limited 28 circumstances, such as where the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of 1 persons with whom the subordinates are likely to come into contact. See Canell v. Lightner, 143 2 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 1998). To impose liability under a failure to train theory, a plaintiff 3 must demonstrate the subordinate’s training was inadequate, the inadequate training was a 4 deliberate choice on the part of the supervisor, and the inadequate training caused a constitutional 5 violation. Id. at 1214; see also City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989); Lee v. 6 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001). “A pattern of similar constitutional 7 violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference 8 for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation omitted). 9 Plaintiff fails to allege, beyond conclusory statements, that Defendant Cisneros directly 10 participated in the alleged violations. Plaintiff does not make a sufficient showing of any 11 personal participation, direction, or knowledge on Defendant Cisneros’ part regarding any other 12 prison officials’ actions. Plaintiff must do more than allege, in a conclusory fashion, that any 13 constitutional violation was the result of Defendant Cisneros’ orders or alleged campaign of 14 harassment against Plaintiff. 15 E. Eighth Amendment – Excessive Force 16 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 17 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 18 2006). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 19 Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) 20 (citations omitted). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must 21 provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. 22 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994) (quotations omitted). 23 For claims of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied in a good- 24 faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 25 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Relevant factors for this consideration include “the extent of injury . . . [,] 26 the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, 27 the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the 28 severity of a forceful response.’” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 1078, 1085 (1986)). 1 Although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use 2 of force to cause harm always violates the Eighth Amendment, regardless of whether or not 3 significant injury is evident. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10; Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th 4 Cir. 2002). 5 Although Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries after grenades and chemicals were 6 released into his cell and he was beaten with a metal battering ram, Plaintiff has failed to link any 7 defendant to this incident. Plaintiff specifically states only that “someone” took these actions 8 against him. Despite being provided an opportunity to link any defendant to these claims, 9 Plaintiff has been unable to do so. 10 F. State Law Claims – Assault and Battery 11 California’s Government Claims Act1 requires that a claim against the State2 or its 12 employees “relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person” be presented to the 13 Department of General Services’ Government Claims Program no more than six months after the 14 cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. Presentation 15 of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are conditions precedent to suit. State 16 v. Super. Ct. of Kings Cty. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1245 (Cal. 2004); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. 17 Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public entity 18 or employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Bodde, 32 Cal. 19 4th at 1245; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 20 627 (9th Cir. 1988). 21 Plaintiff alleges a state law claim for assault and battery. For a civil battery claim in 22 California, a plaintiff must prove “(1) defendant intentionally performed an act that resulted in a 23 harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the 24 contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to plaintiff.” 25

1 This Act was formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 26 730, 741–42 (Cal. 2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than California Tort Claims Act). 27

2 “ ‘State’ means the State and any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the 28 State claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 900.6. 1 Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 526 (2009). Where the defendant is a peace officer, 2 the plaintiff must also prove that the use of force was unreasonable. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 3 4th at 526. 4 For an assault claim under California law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant 5 threatened to touch him in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) it reasonably appeared to the 6 plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the 7 conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in 8 causing the harm. Tekle v. U.S., 511 F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 9 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original 10 jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the 11 action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 12 Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “The district court may decline to 13 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has 14 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The 15 Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state 16 claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 17 726 (1966). 18 It is not clear from the third amended complaint whether Plaintiff complied with the 19 Government Claims Act in presenting his assault and battery claims to the Government Claims 20 Program. However, even if Plaintiff did comply with the requirements of claim presentation, the 21 Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for assault or battery. As discussed 22 above, Plaintiff fails to provide factual support linking any defendant to the incident at issue. 23 Furthermore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable federal claim, and 24 therefore the Court would also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any cognizable 25 state law claims. 26 IV. Findings and Recommendation 27 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint fails to 28 comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18, and 20 and fails to state a cognizable claim 1 for relief. Despite being provided with multiple opportunities to amend and provided with the 2 relevant legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in his complaint. 3 Further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed, with 5 prejudice, for failure to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 6 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 7 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 8 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file 9 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 10 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages 11 or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in 12 the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be 13 considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 14 result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 15 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 16 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18

19 Dated: November 6, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20

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