Edward Louis Burris v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
NUMBER 13-25-00058-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
EDWARD LOUIS BURRIS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca
Appellant Edward Louis Burris pleaded guilty to two separate offenses of trafficking
of persons with intent to engage that person in forced prostitution, which are second-
degree felonies (Counts Two and Three).1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.02(a). The
1 The other counts were dismissed by the State of Texas. trial court found appellant guilty and following a bench trial for punishment on December
12, 2024, sentenced him via two judgments to twenty-years’ imprisonment for Count Two
and twenty-years’ imprisonment for Count Three, set to run consecutively with credit for
time served. See id. §§ 12.33(a); 20A.02(b).
On December 17, 2024, appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant’s court-
appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no arguable grounds
for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We affirm as modified.2
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Counsel states in her brief that she has diligently reviewed the entire record and
that no non-frivolous basis for appeal exists. See id.; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813
(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as
it presents a thorough, professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable
grounds for advancing an appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically
advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record
references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”);
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),
counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible
error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that she has:
(1) notified appellant that she has filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw;
2 This appeal was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a docket-
equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are required to follow the precedent of the transferor court to the extent it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 (2) provided appellant with copies of these pleadings; (3) informed appellant of his rights
to file a pro se response,3 to review the record prior to filing that response, and to seek
discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant
with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires appellant’s
signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386
U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20. In this case, appellant filed neither a timely
motion seeking pro se access to the appellate record nor a motion for extension of time
to do so. Nor did appellant file a pro se response.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found
no arguable reversible error. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the
issues raised in the brief and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the
court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”);
Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed
a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d
at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no
3 An appellant’s pro se response following the filing of an Anders brief “need not comply with the
rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.
3 pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing
the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion
to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is
frivolous.” (citations omitted))). We grant the motion to withdraw.
Counsel is ordered to send a copy of this memorandum opinion and its
accompanying judgment to appellant, and to advise him of his right to file a petition for
discretionary review, within five days of the date of this memorandum opinion. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206
S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
IV. MOTION TO APPOINT ATTORNEY
On September 9, 2025, appellant filed a letter which we have interpreted as a
motion to appoint counsel. Specifically, appellant requests appointment of alternate
appellate counsel if his first appellate counsel has withdrawn. But because appellant’s
court-appointed appellate counsel has met the requirements of Anders, appellant is not
entitled to appointment of alternate appellate counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see
also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. Therefore, appellant’s motion is denied,
and no substitute counsel will be appointed.
Should appellant wish to seek further review by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, he must either retain his own attorney to file a petition for discretionary review
or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must
be filed within thirty days from the date of either this memorandum opinion or the last
timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2.
Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of
4 Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3(a), and must comply with the requirements of
Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.
V. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
We note that appellant’s brief mentioned the trial court’s judgments were
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