Edward Joseph Jarvis v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 26, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00131-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00131-CR

EDWARD JOSEPH JARVIS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 8 Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 1788705, Honorable Charles L. Vanover, Presiding

August 26, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Edward Joseph Jarvis, appeals his conviction for driving while

intoxicated with an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more.2 The trial court assessed

Appellant’s punishment at 120 days’ incarceration but suspended the sentence and

1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court

by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a), (d). placed him on community supervision for a period of fifteen months. By his appeal,

Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible jury charge error. We affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

As Appellant’s sole challenge relates to the jury charge, we will not address the

facts of the case. Appellant was charged by information with the offense of driving while

intoxicated with an alcohol concentration of equal to or more than 0.15. After the evidence

was presented to the jury, the trial court held a charge conference outside the presence

of the jury. The trial court’s proposed jury charge included the following application

paragraph:

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in Tarrant County, Texas, on or about the 24th day of June 2023, the defendant, Edward Joseph Jarvis, did then and there operate a motor vehicle in a public place while the said defendant was intoxicated and that an analysis of a specimen of the defendant’s blood or breath in this case showed an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more at the time the analysis was performed, then you will find the defendant guilty as charged.

Appellant objected to the trial court’s proposed jury charge and presented an alternative

charge that would first ask the jury to determine whether Appellant was guilty of driving

while intoxicated and then present a special issue instructing the jury that if it finds

Appellant guilty, it must then determine whether his blood or breath showed an alcohol

concentration level of 0.15 or more at the time of the analysis. The trial court overruled

Appellant’s objection and charged the jury in the manner initially proposed.

When addressing a claim of jury charge error, an appellate court must first

determine whether the jury charge is erroneous. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If the charge is not erroneous, our analysis ends. Knight v. State,

2 504 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d). If error occurred, whether

it was preserved determines the degree of harm required for reversal. Id.

The same argument advanced by Appellant was addressed by the Fort Worth

court in Johnson v. State, No. 02-17-00120-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3750, at *6–9

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

There, as here, the appellant did not identify any record evidence that the jury was

confused by the charge. Id. at *7. The Johnson court noted that the Class A and B

offenses of driving while intoxicated are two separate offenses with different elements.

Id. at *8; see Navarro v. State, 469 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2015, pet. ref’d) (holding that showing of alcohol concentration over 0.15 creates new

offense and is not an enhancement). Appellant has not cited any authority requiring that

the showing of a 0.15 alcohol concentration be separately charged.3 We have found no

such authority. See Moore v. State, No. 10-09-00386-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 6762,

at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 18, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (error to submit jurisdictional elements of felony assault with bodily injury on

a family member as special issues). Finally, the jury charge here, like in Johnson,

properly tracks the statute under which Appellant was charged. 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS

3750, at *8 (citing Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc), as

stating that “[a] jury charge which tracks the language of a particular statute is a proper

3 Appellant cites Madrid v. State, No. 01-15-00977-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3979, at *29–33

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), to support his claim of error in the jury charge. However, the court in Madrid expressly avoided determining whether submission of a jury charge in the way Appellant advocates would be erroneous and certainly did not determine that the failure to do so would constitute reversible error. Id. at *32. Madrid is the only case cited by Appellant in the argument portion of his brief.

3 charge on the statutory issue”). We conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling

Appellant’s jury charge objection. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice

Do not publish.