Edward Jarzombek, Jr. v. Boone Maurer
This text of Edward Jarzombek, Jr. v. Boone Maurer (Edward Jarzombek, Jr. v. Boone Maurer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice
Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice
Catherine Stone, Justice
Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 29, 2000
REVERSED AND RENDERED
This case arises out of a well conversion project. Boone Maurer sued Edward Jarzombek for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") after Jarzombek's company unsuccessfully tried to convert Maurer's oil well to a water-producing well. Following a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of Maurer. On appeal, Jarzombek challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment and complains about certain evidentiary rulings. Because we find that Jarzombek's complained-of conduct is not actionable under the DTPA, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render a take-nothing judgment in favor of Maurer.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1994, Maurer contacted Jarzombek, president of J-B Drilling Company, about the possibility of converting his existing oil well to a water-producing well. According to Maurer, Jarzombek indicated he was familiar with Maurer's well, a Carrizo formation oil well, because he had "done a lot of work in the Carrizo formations." Maurer testified Jarzombek told him that such wells historically "produce a lot of water." Maurer further testified Jarzombek told him that he would "probably have more water than [he would know] what to do with." Shortly after this initial conversation, Jarzombek surveyed Maurer's well and determined that a ten-horsepower single phase 230 volt motor pump should be installed to extract water. Based on Jarzombek's apparent experience and familiarity with the well, Maurer hired J-B Drilling to complete the conversion work and paid J-B Drilling $5,000 for the project. The recommended ten-horsepower pump, however, never worked properly. Ultimately, Maurer hired other well servicers, who discerned the source of the problem - the wrong size motor and pump and improper installation - and made the well operational.
Litigation ensued. Maurer brought a DTPA action against Jarzombek individually, claiming that Jarzombek misrepresented the well's potential production, the necessity of the ten-horsepower pump, his familiarity with the area, and his level of skill and experience in water well conversion work.(1) Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Jarzombek violated the DTPA by misrepresenting the type of equipment needed for Maurer's project. The trial court determined that Jarzombek's misrepresentations regarding the proper equipment were a producing cause of actual damages of $1,242, the additional expense Maurer incurred to make the well operational. In total, the trial court awarded Maurer $1,242 in actual damages, $7,800 in attorneys fees, and $2,000 in additional damages under section 17.50 (b)(1), plus prejudgment interest. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment.
False, Deceptive, or Misleading Acts or Practices
In his first point of error, Jarzombek challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings that he engaged in any false, deceptive, or misleading act or practice. Jarzombek's argument under this point of error is three-fold: First, Jarzombek contends the trial court erred in rendering judgment against him individually because he was, at all times during the events which form the basis of Maurer's claims, acting as a corporate agent of J-B Drilling Company. In that capacity, Jarzombek argues he is shielded from personal liability absent Maurer's attempt to disregard the corporate entity through a claim to pierce the corporate veil or similar theory. Next, to the extent he can be held individually liable for actions taken in his corporate capacity, Jarzombek argues that his alleged misrepresentations are not actionable under the DTPA. Third, Jarzombek challenges the trial court's findings that his statements, if considered misrepresentations, are the producing cause of Maurer's damages. We discuss these arguments in the order presented.
Individual Liability
Jarzombek's first contention rests upon a misconception about the nature and scope of the protections afforded by the corporate entity. As this court explained in Leitch v. Hornsby, 885 S.W.2d 243, 250 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 935 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1996), the nature of the corporate entity shields agents from liability for certain corporate acts. The corporate entity, however, does not insulate an agent from liability for fraudulent or tortious acts committed while working for the corporation. See id.; see also Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985); Light v. Wilson, 663 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1983) (J. Spears, concurring); Guilbeau v. Anderson, 841 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). Stated differently, an individual is always responsible for his or her own tortious conduct. This rule also applies when the agent is a shareholder of the principle corporation. Light, 663 S.W.2d at 815. Because an agent may be sued individually for his own wrongdoing, it is not necessary to disregard the corporate entity in order to reach the individual. Leitch, 885 S.W.2d at 250; Barclay v. Johnson, 686 S.W.2d 334, 337-38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). That is, it is necessary to disregard the corporate entity only where the individual's liability is merely derivative of the corporation's liability. Leitch, 885 S.W.2d at 249-50. Because Jarzombek can be liable in his individual capacity for tortious conduct committed while working in his corporate capacity, we turn to the question of whether Jarzombek engaged in any false, deceptive, or misleading acts or practices that were a producing cause of Maurer's damages.
Misrepresentations
In order to recover damages under the DTPA, Maurer had the burden to prove that Jarzombek committed false, misleading, or deceptive acts which were a producing cause of actual damages to him. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.46 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Misrepresentations constitute false, misleading, or deceptive acts within the meaning of section 17.46 of the DTPA. See Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995). Whether the facts about which Maurer complains rise to the level of misrepresentations is a question of law. Chilton Ins. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877
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Edward Jarzombek, Jr. v. Boone Maurer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edward-jarzombek-jr-v-boone-maurer-texapp-2000.