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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 EDWARD JAMES HILLS, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01207-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR v. DISQUALIFICATION 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 14 SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16
17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Edward James Hills’s motion that seeks the 18 disqualification of the undersigned. Dkt. No. 32. Having reviewed the motion and the relevant 19 record, the Court DENIES the motion and REFERS the matter to the Honorable David G. Estudillo, 20 Chief Judge of the Western District of Washington, in accordance with Local Civil Rule 3(f). 21 I. LEGAL STANDARD 22 “[J]udges are as bound to recuse [them]selves when the law and facts require as [they] 23 are to hear cases when there is no reasonable factual basis for recusal.” United States v. Holland, 24 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). A judge must voluntarily recuse 1 herself if, inter alia, her “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” or she “has a personal 2 bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 3 concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). But “[s]uch bias must derive from an 4 extrajudicial source.” Nelson v. Wash. Bd. of Indus. Appeals, No. C25-5551, 2025 WL 1888125,
5 at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2025) (citing Agha-Khan v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 6 No. 18-16553, 2022 WL 504564, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022)). And “[a]bsent a factual 7 showing of a reasonable basis for questioning his or her impartiality, or allegations of facts 8 establishing other disqualifying circumstances, a judge should participate in cases assigned. 9 “Conclusory statements are of no effect. Nor are . . . unsupported beliefs and assumptions.” 10 Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (9th Cir. 1985). 11 Once a party has made a timely and sufficient showing that a district court judge has a 12 bias or prejudice “against [them] or in favor of any adverse party,” the case must be reassigned. 13 28 U.S.C. § 144. In close cases, the balance tips in favor of recusal. Holland, 519 F.3d at 912 14 (internal citation omitted). Under this Court’s Local Civil Rules, if a judge challenged under 28
15 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455 declines to voluntarily recuse herself from a case, “she will direct the clerk 16 to refer the motion to the chief judge, or the chief judge’s designee.” LCR 3(f). 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of disqualification, which the Court will 19 discuss in turn. 20 A. Race and Ethnicity 21 Plaintiff’s first argument is that the undersigned “exhibited no respect for brown Indian 22 people like [Plaintiff] . . . . This may have something to do with President Donald J. Trump and 23 his imposing Tariffs on China as her way of getting back at Americas [sic]. Particularly black
24 and brown Indians in America.” Dkt. No. 32 at 1. Plaintiff asserts further that the undersigned 1 “knows not to do what she has done in Plaintiff’s case to any individual of European person.” Id. 2 Plaintiff does not present any evidence of bias, however, and refers only to the Court’s 3 November 6, 2024, Order (Dkt. No. 16) that remanded this case to the Social Security 4 Administration for further administrative proceedings. See Dkt. No. 32 at 1. In his motion,
5 Plaintiff asserts that remanding the case was “frivolous.” 6 “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 7 motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 8 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that “prior adverse rulings of a judge” are insufficient to show bias 9 or prejudice); Nelson, 2025 WL 1888125, at *2 (holding that rulings in a case are not 10 “extrajudicial” sources). Moreover, because the time has come and gone for Plaintiff to have 11 sought reconsideration of this decision—the appropriate avenue for challenging the Court’s 12 orders—the Court will not engage in substantive analysis of already-settled issues. See LCR 7(h) 13 (providing that a motion for reconsideration “shall be filed within fourteen days after the order to 14 which it relates is filed”).1 Therefore, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s remand order
15 cannot provide a basis for disqualification. 16 As to Plaintiff’s race- and ethnicity-based arguments, these are speculative and have been 17 presented without any concrete evidence of bias. Accordingly the Court rejects them. 18 B. Conspiracy 19 Plaintiff appears to allege a conspiracy between, among others, the undersigned, an 20 administrative law judge of the Social Security Administration, and a United States Magistrate 21 Judge in this District. See Dkt. No. 32 at 3. The narrative that Plaintiff provides in his motion is 22 difficult to follow. At its heart, however, Plaintiff asserts substantial disagreement with the 23 1 Plaintiff appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit (see Dkt. No. 17). The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack 24 of jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 20 (USCA Order). 1 Court’s November 16, 2024, Order, as well as with an order issued by the Honorable David W. 2 Christel, United States Magistrate Judge, on August 8, 2024. See id. at 3–4 (citing Dkt. Nos. 4, 3 16). A party’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s rulings, however vehement, is not indicative of 4 criminal activity, and such disagreement is not grounds for disqualification. See Liteky, 510 U.S.
5 at 555. 6 C. Redaction 7 Plaintiff argues that the Court’s September 17, 2024, Order, which sealed several 8 documents that included “Plaintiff’s social security number and/or financial accounting 9 information” (Dkt. No. 10 at 2) and: (1) “direct[ed] the Clerk of Court to return the documents 10 and attachments filed at Docket Numbers 8 and 9 to Plaintiff so that he may properly redact and 11 re-file them”; and (2) “order[ed] Plaintiff to file appropriately redacted versions of Dkt. Nos. 8-1, 12 9, 9-1 and 9-2 within twenty-one (21) days of th[e] Order” (id. at 3), was improper and, from 13 Plaintiff’s position, illegal. See Dkt. No. 32 at 5–6. The Court rejects this as a basis for 14 disqualification.
15 First, Plaintiff’s assertion that the Court “intentionally misstated Local Rule 5.2 to justify 16 sealing, contrary to the text allowing the last four digits” (id. at 5), is incorrect. The Court’s 17 Order stated that the basis for invoking Local Civil Rule 5.2 was the inclusion of “Plaintiff’s 18 social security number and/or financial accounting information” in several Court filings. Dkt. 19 No. 10 at 2. Local Civil Rule 5.2(a)(3) requires that social security numbers be “redact[ed] in 20 their entirety.” Second, Plaintiff’s assertion that “[t]he judge deprived me of access to my own 21 trust records, harming property and procedural rights without lawful basis” (Dkt. No. 32 at 5), is 22 unreasonable on its face. Plaintiff provided these records to the Court himself. See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9, 23 9-1, 9-2. To the extent that Plaintiff was “deprived of access” to his own records, it is because
24 Plaintiff opted to mail them to the Court without first making the required redactions.
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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 EDWARD JAMES HILLS, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01207-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR v. DISQUALIFICATION 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 14 SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16
17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Edward James Hills’s motion that seeks the 18 disqualification of the undersigned. Dkt. No. 32. Having reviewed the motion and the relevant 19 record, the Court DENIES the motion and REFERS the matter to the Honorable David G. Estudillo, 20 Chief Judge of the Western District of Washington, in accordance with Local Civil Rule 3(f). 21 I. LEGAL STANDARD 22 “[J]udges are as bound to recuse [them]selves when the law and facts require as [they] 23 are to hear cases when there is no reasonable factual basis for recusal.” United States v. Holland, 24 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). A judge must voluntarily recuse 1 herself if, inter alia, her “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” or she “has a personal 2 bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 3 concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). But “[s]uch bias must derive from an 4 extrajudicial source.” Nelson v. Wash. Bd. of Indus. Appeals, No. C25-5551, 2025 WL 1888125,
5 at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2025) (citing Agha-Khan v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 6 No. 18-16553, 2022 WL 504564, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022)). And “[a]bsent a factual 7 showing of a reasonable basis for questioning his or her impartiality, or allegations of facts 8 establishing other disqualifying circumstances, a judge should participate in cases assigned. 9 “Conclusory statements are of no effect. Nor are . . . unsupported beliefs and assumptions.” 10 Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (9th Cir. 1985). 11 Once a party has made a timely and sufficient showing that a district court judge has a 12 bias or prejudice “against [them] or in favor of any adverse party,” the case must be reassigned. 13 28 U.S.C. § 144. In close cases, the balance tips in favor of recusal. Holland, 519 F.3d at 912 14 (internal citation omitted). Under this Court’s Local Civil Rules, if a judge challenged under 28
15 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455 declines to voluntarily recuse herself from a case, “she will direct the clerk 16 to refer the motion to the chief judge, or the chief judge’s designee.” LCR 3(f). 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of disqualification, which the Court will 19 discuss in turn. 20 A. Race and Ethnicity 21 Plaintiff’s first argument is that the undersigned “exhibited no respect for brown Indian 22 people like [Plaintiff] . . . . This may have something to do with President Donald J. Trump and 23 his imposing Tariffs on China as her way of getting back at Americas [sic]. Particularly black
24 and brown Indians in America.” Dkt. No. 32 at 1. Plaintiff asserts further that the undersigned 1 “knows not to do what she has done in Plaintiff’s case to any individual of European person.” Id. 2 Plaintiff does not present any evidence of bias, however, and refers only to the Court’s 3 November 6, 2024, Order (Dkt. No. 16) that remanded this case to the Social Security 4 Administration for further administrative proceedings. See Dkt. No. 32 at 1. In his motion,
5 Plaintiff asserts that remanding the case was “frivolous.” 6 “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 7 motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 8 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that “prior adverse rulings of a judge” are insufficient to show bias 9 or prejudice); Nelson, 2025 WL 1888125, at *2 (holding that rulings in a case are not 10 “extrajudicial” sources). Moreover, because the time has come and gone for Plaintiff to have 11 sought reconsideration of this decision—the appropriate avenue for challenging the Court’s 12 orders—the Court will not engage in substantive analysis of already-settled issues. See LCR 7(h) 13 (providing that a motion for reconsideration “shall be filed within fourteen days after the order to 14 which it relates is filed”).1 Therefore, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s remand order
15 cannot provide a basis for disqualification. 16 As to Plaintiff’s race- and ethnicity-based arguments, these are speculative and have been 17 presented without any concrete evidence of bias. Accordingly the Court rejects them. 18 B. Conspiracy 19 Plaintiff appears to allege a conspiracy between, among others, the undersigned, an 20 administrative law judge of the Social Security Administration, and a United States Magistrate 21 Judge in this District. See Dkt. No. 32 at 3. The narrative that Plaintiff provides in his motion is 22 difficult to follow. At its heart, however, Plaintiff asserts substantial disagreement with the 23 1 Plaintiff appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit (see Dkt. No. 17). The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack 24 of jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 20 (USCA Order). 1 Court’s November 16, 2024, Order, as well as with an order issued by the Honorable David W. 2 Christel, United States Magistrate Judge, on August 8, 2024. See id. at 3–4 (citing Dkt. Nos. 4, 3 16). A party’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s rulings, however vehement, is not indicative of 4 criminal activity, and such disagreement is not grounds for disqualification. See Liteky, 510 U.S.
5 at 555. 6 C. Redaction 7 Plaintiff argues that the Court’s September 17, 2024, Order, which sealed several 8 documents that included “Plaintiff’s social security number and/or financial accounting 9 information” (Dkt. No. 10 at 2) and: (1) “direct[ed] the Clerk of Court to return the documents 10 and attachments filed at Docket Numbers 8 and 9 to Plaintiff so that he may properly redact and 11 re-file them”; and (2) “order[ed] Plaintiff to file appropriately redacted versions of Dkt. Nos. 8-1, 12 9, 9-1 and 9-2 within twenty-one (21) days of th[e] Order” (id. at 3), was improper and, from 13 Plaintiff’s position, illegal. See Dkt. No. 32 at 5–6. The Court rejects this as a basis for 14 disqualification.
15 First, Plaintiff’s assertion that the Court “intentionally misstated Local Rule 5.2 to justify 16 sealing, contrary to the text allowing the last four digits” (id. at 5), is incorrect. The Court’s 17 Order stated that the basis for invoking Local Civil Rule 5.2 was the inclusion of “Plaintiff’s 18 social security number and/or financial accounting information” in several Court filings. Dkt. 19 No. 10 at 2. Local Civil Rule 5.2(a)(3) requires that social security numbers be “redact[ed] in 20 their entirety.” Second, Plaintiff’s assertion that “[t]he judge deprived me of access to my own 21 trust records, harming property and procedural rights without lawful basis” (Dkt. No. 32 at 5), is 22 unreasonable on its face. Plaintiff provided these records to the Court himself. See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9, 23 9-1, 9-2. To the extent that Plaintiff was “deprived of access” to his own records, it is because
24 Plaintiff opted to mail them to the Court without first making the required redactions. Third, 1 || Plaintiffs assertion that “[t]h[e] sealing prejudiced the filing process, delaying or preventing 2 || adjudication, contrary to § 351(a)” (Dkt. No. 32 at 5), is merely a conclusory restatement of the 3 || law, not a substantive allegation of misconduct. Subsection 351(a) provides, in its entirety: 4 Any person alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the 5 business of the courts, or alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical 6 disability, may file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint containing a brief statement of the facts 7 constituting such conduct. 8 || Plaintiff does not identify any specific delay, nor does he demonstrate how such a delay might 9 || have “prejudiced the filing process.” Finally, Plaintiff's challenge amounts to a disagreement 10 || with a prior Court order, which cannot provide the basis for a judge’s disqualification. Liteky, 11 |{510 U.S. at 555. 12 TI. CONCLUSION 13 Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for disqualification (Dkt. No. 32) is DENIED. The Clerk of 14 || Court is DIRECTED to REFER this matter to the Honorable David G. Estudillo, Chief Judge of the 15 || Western District of Washington, as required by Local Civil Rule 3(f). 16 17 Dated this 6th day of November 2025.
19 ana Lin United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24