NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-26
EDWARD G. WRIGHT
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, then an inmate in the custody of the
Department of Correction (department), brought this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief under G. L. c. 231A, claiming
that the department unlawfully withheld his nonprivileged mail,
and provided him with only photocopies, from April 3, 2021, to
July 14, 2022. The department filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on several grounds, including pendency of a prior
action. Concluding that "this suit is a form of claim
splitting," a Superior Court judge allowed the department's
motion, and judgment entered dismissing the complaint. The
plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order denying
his motion for reconsideration. We reverse. 1. Background. This is one of several cases that the
plaintiff has brought concerning the department's processing of
inmate mail. In 2018 the plaintiff filed a complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the department and a
department official in his official capacity (2018 lawsuit),
challenging the department's then applicable standard operating
procedure that allowed photocopying of nonprivileged mail. The
2018 lawsuit was successful, and as a result the department was
ordered to give the plaintiff his original mail received prior
to April 2, 2021. See Wright v. Massachusetts Dep't of
Correction, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1134 (2022) (Wright I)
(unpublished memorandum and order).1
Meanwhile, in 2020, the plaintiff brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for damages against various department officials
in their individual capacities (2020 lawsuit), claiming they
violated his constitutional rights by administering the policy
at issue in the 2018 lawsuit. A Superior Court judge allowed
the department's motion to dismiss on the ground that the 2018
lawsuit precluded the plaintiff's claims, but on appeal a panel
1 The significance of April 2, 2021, is that that was the date the department purported to adopt a regulation to replace the standard operating procedure. But in Wright I, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1134, a panel of this court concluded that the regulation was not validly promulgated because the department failed to publish notice in compliance with G. L. c. 30A, § 2.
2 of this court reversed. In an unpublished memorandum and order,
the panel held that claim preclusion did not apply because
government officials sued in their individual capacities are not
in privity with the government. See Wright v. Turco, 100 Mass.
App. Ct. 1133 (2022) (Wright II). On remand, summary judgment
on the merits entered in favor of the defendants, and a
different panel of this court affirmed that judgment in a
subsequent appeal. See Wright v. Turco, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 1105
(2024) (unpublished memorandum and order).
Next, in February 2023, the plaintiff and three other
inmates brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for damages against various department officials in their
individual capacities (February 2023 lawsuit). The complaint
alleged that the defendants violated the class members'
constitutional rights by withholding their original
nonprivileged mail between April 3, 2021, and July 14, 2022.
The February 2023 lawsuit was docketed in the Suffolk Superior
Court as No. 2384CV00343 and remained pending as of October
2024, when judgment entered in this case.
The plaintiff filed this case in January 2023, a few weeks
before the February 2023 lawsuit. The complaint names the
department as the only defendant. As relief, the plaintiff
seeks a declaration that by withholding his original
3 nonprivileged mail from April 3, 2021, to July 14, 2022, the
department violated the regulation in effect during that time
period. He also seeks an injunction ordering the department to
deliver the withheld mail.
2. Mootness. Following the completion of briefing, the
department filed two letters with this court stating that the
appeal is moot because the plaintiff has now been released from
custody and the department has given him all of the original
mail at issue. In response the plaintiff filed a letter stating
that the department still has some of his mail and has not
returned it even though he made several telephone calls to
prison officials. At oral argument the parties continued to
maintain these respective positions. As we are unable to
resolve this factual dispute on the record before us, we cannot
dismiss the appeal as moot on this basis.
The department further argues, as it did below, that the
underlying claims are moot because in November 2022 the
department promulgated a new regulation governing the processing
of inmate mail. We disagree. The plaintiff seeks the return of
mail that the department withheld under the regulatory regime
that was previously in effect. If the department still has some
of that mail (a factual question that must be resolved in the
trial court), the case is not moot. Indeed, the judge declined
4 to dismiss the case as moot for this reason. Not only does the
department fail to acknowledge the judge's ruling, it also
misleadingly suggests that the judge dismissed the complaint for
lack of an actual controversy. As we agree with the judge that
the new regulation did not moot the case, we will address the
merits of the plaintiff's arguments.
3. Claim splitting. The department contends that the
plaintiff's claims are precluded because he could and should
have raised them in the February 2023 lawsuit. In so arguing,
the department appears to be relying on a hybrid of two distinct
doctrines: claim preclusion and pendency of a prior action
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (9), as amended, 450 Mass. 1403
(2008). We conclude that neither doctrine applies.
To the extent the department relies on claim preclusion,
that doctrine does not apply for the basic reason that the
February 2023 lawsuit had not gone to final judgment when the
judgment of dismissal entered in this case. See Laramie v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass. 399, 405 (2021) (claim
preclusion requires that there be prior final judgment on
merits). And to the extent the department relies on the
pendency of a prior action, it fails to mention that the
plaintiff filed the February 2023 lawsuit several weeks after he
filed this case.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-26
EDWARD G. WRIGHT
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, then an inmate in the custody of the
Department of Correction (department), brought this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief under G. L. c. 231A, claiming
that the department unlawfully withheld his nonprivileged mail,
and provided him with only photocopies, from April 3, 2021, to
July 14, 2022. The department filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on several grounds, including pendency of a prior
action. Concluding that "this suit is a form of claim
splitting," a Superior Court judge allowed the department's
motion, and judgment entered dismissing the complaint. The
plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order denying
his motion for reconsideration. We reverse. 1. Background. This is one of several cases that the
plaintiff has brought concerning the department's processing of
inmate mail. In 2018 the plaintiff filed a complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the department and a
department official in his official capacity (2018 lawsuit),
challenging the department's then applicable standard operating
procedure that allowed photocopying of nonprivileged mail. The
2018 lawsuit was successful, and as a result the department was
ordered to give the plaintiff his original mail received prior
to April 2, 2021. See Wright v. Massachusetts Dep't of
Correction, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1134 (2022) (Wright I)
(unpublished memorandum and order).1
Meanwhile, in 2020, the plaintiff brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for damages against various department officials
in their individual capacities (2020 lawsuit), claiming they
violated his constitutional rights by administering the policy
at issue in the 2018 lawsuit. A Superior Court judge allowed
the department's motion to dismiss on the ground that the 2018
lawsuit precluded the plaintiff's claims, but on appeal a panel
1 The significance of April 2, 2021, is that that was the date the department purported to adopt a regulation to replace the standard operating procedure. But in Wright I, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1134, a panel of this court concluded that the regulation was not validly promulgated because the department failed to publish notice in compliance with G. L. c. 30A, § 2.
2 of this court reversed. In an unpublished memorandum and order,
the panel held that claim preclusion did not apply because
government officials sued in their individual capacities are not
in privity with the government. See Wright v. Turco, 100 Mass.
App. Ct. 1133 (2022) (Wright II). On remand, summary judgment
on the merits entered in favor of the defendants, and a
different panel of this court affirmed that judgment in a
subsequent appeal. See Wright v. Turco, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 1105
(2024) (unpublished memorandum and order).
Next, in February 2023, the plaintiff and three other
inmates brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for damages against various department officials in their
individual capacities (February 2023 lawsuit). The complaint
alleged that the defendants violated the class members'
constitutional rights by withholding their original
nonprivileged mail between April 3, 2021, and July 14, 2022.
The February 2023 lawsuit was docketed in the Suffolk Superior
Court as No. 2384CV00343 and remained pending as of October
2024, when judgment entered in this case.
The plaintiff filed this case in January 2023, a few weeks
before the February 2023 lawsuit. The complaint names the
department as the only defendant. As relief, the plaintiff
seeks a declaration that by withholding his original
3 nonprivileged mail from April 3, 2021, to July 14, 2022, the
department violated the regulation in effect during that time
period. He also seeks an injunction ordering the department to
deliver the withheld mail.
2. Mootness. Following the completion of briefing, the
department filed two letters with this court stating that the
appeal is moot because the plaintiff has now been released from
custody and the department has given him all of the original
mail at issue. In response the plaintiff filed a letter stating
that the department still has some of his mail and has not
returned it even though he made several telephone calls to
prison officials. At oral argument the parties continued to
maintain these respective positions. As we are unable to
resolve this factual dispute on the record before us, we cannot
dismiss the appeal as moot on this basis.
The department further argues, as it did below, that the
underlying claims are moot because in November 2022 the
department promulgated a new regulation governing the processing
of inmate mail. We disagree. The plaintiff seeks the return of
mail that the department withheld under the regulatory regime
that was previously in effect. If the department still has some
of that mail (a factual question that must be resolved in the
trial court), the case is not moot. Indeed, the judge declined
4 to dismiss the case as moot for this reason. Not only does the
department fail to acknowledge the judge's ruling, it also
misleadingly suggests that the judge dismissed the complaint for
lack of an actual controversy. As we agree with the judge that
the new regulation did not moot the case, we will address the
merits of the plaintiff's arguments.
3. Claim splitting. The department contends that the
plaintiff's claims are precluded because he could and should
have raised them in the February 2023 lawsuit. In so arguing,
the department appears to be relying on a hybrid of two distinct
doctrines: claim preclusion and pendency of a prior action
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (9), as amended, 450 Mass. 1403
(2008). We conclude that neither doctrine applies.
To the extent the department relies on claim preclusion,
that doctrine does not apply for the basic reason that the
February 2023 lawsuit had not gone to final judgment when the
judgment of dismissal entered in this case. See Laramie v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass. 399, 405 (2021) (claim
preclusion requires that there be prior final judgment on
merits). And to the extent the department relies on the
pendency of a prior action, it fails to mention that the
plaintiff filed the February 2023 lawsuit several weeks after he
filed this case. The department cites no authority for the
5 proposition that "prior" should not be given its ordinary
meaning for purposes of rule 12 (b) (9).
In any event, neither doctrine applies for the independent
reason that the department has failed to show that the
defendants in the February 2023 lawsuit (department officials
sued in their individual capacities) are identical to or in
privity with the department, the only defendant in this case.
See Laramie, 488 Mass. at 405 (party invoking claim preclusion
has burden of proving identity or privity of parties to present
and prior actions); Thaddeus v. Secretary of the Executive
Office of Health & Human Servs., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 413, 419
(2022), quoting Lyons v. Duncan, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 770-771
(2012) ("For a rule 12 [b] [9] defense to succeed, 'the parties
and the issues [must be] the same as those in a prior action
still pending'"). As mentioned, in one of the appeals in the
2020 lawsuit, a panel of this court held that government
officials sued in their individual capacities are not in privity
with the government for purposes of claim preclusion. See
Wright II, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1133. The panel gave detailed
reasoning in support of its conclusion, relying on a body of
caselaw from Federal circuit courts and other State courts. The
department does not acknowledge the panel's reasoning or explain
6 why it is wrong, and has otherwise failed to show that the
requirement of identity or privity of parties is satisfied.
Finally, we note that the department is incorrect that
"[t]o grant relief in [this case], the court would necessarily
have to find that [the] plaintiff's constitutional rights were
violated -- the very same determination that underlies the claim
for damages in [the February 2023 lawsuit]." Although the
constitutional issues raised in this case might overlap with
those in the February 2023 lawsuit, the complaint also alleges
that the department's actions of withholding the plaintiff's
mail violated the regulation that was then in effect. Thus, a
judge would not need to find a constitutional violation to grant
the declaratory and injunctive relief that the plaintiff seeks.
Judgment reversed.
Order denying motion for reconsideration reversed.
By the Court (Desmond, Shin & Walsh, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: December 10, 2025.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.