Educational Testing Service v. Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc.

739 F. Supp. 847, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1865, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7128, 1990 WL 80687
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 6, 1990
Docket90 Civ. 2985 (GLG)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 739 F. Supp. 847 (Educational Testing Service v. Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Educational Testing Service v. Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 847, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1865, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7128, 1990 WL 80687 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

Opinion

OPINION

GOETTEL, District Judge:

The plaintiff, Educational Testing Service, Inc. (“ETS”), seeks a preliminary injunction against defendant Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc. (“TASA”) enjoining it from using an allegedly infringing trademark pending a trial on the merits of the plaintiff’s trademark infringe *849 ment action. The relevant facts are as follows.

I.FACTS

Prior to 1987, ETS undertook the development of a reading program that would encourage children to read and help them select books to their liking. In 1987, ETS introduced a computer-based reading program bearing the trademark BOOKWHIZ. In 1989, ETS obtained federal trademark registration for BOOKWHIZ and BOOK-WHIZ and design. 1

On October 2,1989, the defendant’s president, Dr. Bertram L. Koslin, presented a paper at a meeting of the College Board which introduced “two whole language programs, Browzer and its companion, Book-wize.” Affidavit of Janet Williams, Ex. G at 1. BROWZER is a computerized card catalog that “helps students find suitable materials to read for different purposes.” Id. at 4. 2 BOOKWIZE is a series of journals “that contain activities that guide students through reading and writing processes that will enhance comprehension.” Id. at 5.

In April 1990, ETS learned that the defendant was coming to market with BOOK-WIZE. On May 4, 1990, the plaintiff commenced this action asserting claims of federal trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988), federal unfair competition and false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, deceptive practices under New York Gen. Bus.Law § 349 (1988) and dilution under New York Gen.Bus.Law § 368-d (1984). The plaintiff, on the same date, filed an order to show cause seeking an order temporarily restraining the defendant from introducing BOOKWIZE at an International Reading Association convention in Atlanta Georgia on May 7, 1990. Temporary relief was denied on May 4, 1990 and a hearing was held on the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction on May 11, 1990.

II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD

The standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief in this circuit is well settled. To justify the issuance of an injunction, the plaintiff must show “(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.” Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam).

III. LANHAM ACT, COMMON LAW TRADEMARK AND COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIMS

The plaintiff has asserted two separate claims under the Lanham Act; one under section 32 for trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988), and one under section 43 for false designation of origin. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988). “[I]n either a claim of trademark infringement under § 32 or a claim of unfair competition under § 43, a prima facie case is made out by showing the use of one’s trademark by another in a way that is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the product.” Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986). The same analysis governs the plaintiff’s common law trademark and unfair competition claims. See Andy Warhol Enter., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 700 F.Supp. 760, 673 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 477, 482 (S.D.N.Y.1983). Thus, our inquiry into the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits of these *850 claims begins with an analysis of the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the two products. See Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116, 99 S.Ct. 1022, 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979).

The well-known test for determining likelihood of confusion was enunciated by Judge Friendly in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S.Ct. 36, 7 L.Ed.2d 25 (1961).

Where the products are different, the prior owner’s chance of success is a function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers.

Id. at 495. We will consider each factor in turn.

A. Strength of the Mark

The strength of a mark is its tendency to identify goods sold as radiating from a particular source. Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir.1979)). A determination of the strength of a mark can be facilitated by placing the trademark into one of four categories. As set forth in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1976), those categories, ranging from least to most protective, are: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.

The plaintiff contends that the mark BOOKWHIZ is arbitrary as applied to its computer-based reading program. In contrast, the defendant contends that the “whiz” suffix is commonly used among computer software disk producers and entitled to little protection. It is clear that the term is not generic; it certainly suggests more than a genus or species. Id.

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739 F. Supp. 847, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1865, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7128, 1990 WL 80687, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/educational-testing-service-v-touchstone-applied-science-associates-inc-nysd-1990.