Eduardo G. Camacho, Trustee v. Luis W. Camacho

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: July 13, 2019
• Docket: CV0294-19
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

FILED 1

2 7U9 DEC 26)( l 2

supmoRQouR 4 Oi GAM 5

$ 9 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT Of GUAM 10 EDUARDO G. CAMACHO, CIVIL CASE NO. CV0294-19 As Trustee of the Eduardo G. Camacho 12 Trust, DECISION AND ORDER 13 PLAINTIFF, [1] Defendant Luis’s Motion to Dismiss 14 vs. [2] Plaintiff Trust’s Motion to Strike or, 15 in the Alternative, to Dismiss LUIS W. CA1VIACHO, Request for Equitable Relief 16 DEFENDANT. 17

18 INTRODUCTION 19 This matter came before the Honorable Anita A. Sukola on September 24, 2019, upon a 20 Motion to Dismiss brought by LUIS W. CAMACHO (“Luis”), who appear ed pro se. Attorney 21 Leslie A. Travis of Civille & Tang, PLLC, appeared on behalf of EDUA RDO 0. CAMACHO, as 22 Trustee of the Eduardo G. Camacho Trust (“Trust”). Upon review of the pleadin gs, oral arguments 23 and legal authorities presented by the Parties, the Court hereby DENIE S Lois’s Motion to 24 Dismiss, and finds the Trust’s Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss Request for 25 Equitable Relief MOOT. 26 BACKGROUND 27 This matter concerns Luis’s and the Trust’s real property interests that were devised 28 through the will of Alfonsina Sgambelluri Walters (“Alfonsina”). Alfons ina was married to Joseph

CV0294- 19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho Page 1 of 8 DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Met. Dismiss, P1. Trust MotQrR4iGijsN AL 1 Walters (“Joseph”), who passed away on August 14, 1981. Alfonsina had two daughters: Janet 2 Walters Camacho (“Janet”) and Irene Walters Camacho (“Irene”). Irene was married to Eduardo 3 Camacho (deceased), the owner of the estate. On November 11, 1998, Alfonsina passed away, 4 surviving her husband, Joseph, and her daughter, Janet. Alfonsina’s will devised her real and 5 personal property to Irene (25%) and her ten grandchildren (75%). The grandchildren relevant to 6 this Decision are Luis, Janet’s son; and Michael Camacho (“Michael”), Irene’s son. Michael was 7 appointed executor of Alfonsina’s estate. 8 In January 2010, Michael negotiated a contract with Luis to purchase his inherited interest 9 in Alfonsina’s estate. Luis signed and executed the contract (“Assignment Agreement”), which 10 provided as follows: 11 [TIn consideration for the payment of the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND AND NO/CENTS DOLLARS ($50,000.00) by Assignee, does hereby assign, sell, 12 transfer and convey unto Assignee, its successors and assigns, all of Assignor’s right title and interest that he now or may be provided for or contained in the Last 13 Will and Testament of Joseph A. Walters and Alfonsina S. Walters [t]ogether . . .

will all of the Assignors right, title and interest that he may later have in and to the 14 Alfonsina S. Walters’ estates whether real or personal or mixed, of which ,

Alfonsina S. Walters may die seized or possessed. 15 (Assignment Agreement, Trust Ex. A.) In addition to the sale, Luis also signed and executed a 16 release agreement (“Release Agreement”), which states: 17 voluntarily, knowingly and in good faith, and with specific intent and express 1$ intent, do forever release and discharge Irene Camacho, Eduardo Camacho and Michael Camacho . .from any and all causes of actions, suits, debts, claims .

19 demands, damages, losses, costs, expenses and attorneys fees and liability of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, which [Luis] may have or may hereafter 20 have against the Releasee Parties . now existing or which may later arise or . .,

relate to the Claims, the Probate Action, and the Estate of Alfonsina S. Walters. 21 (Release Agreement, Trust Ex. B 3.) The Assignment Agreement executed on December 8, 2010, 22 and the Release Agreement on December 9, 2010. 23 Eight years later, Luis sent a letter — dated June 7, 2018 (“June 2018 Letter”) — claiming 24 Michael and the Trust fraudulently induced him to sign the Assignment Agreement and the 25 Release Agreement. Luis alleges that Michael and the Trust purposefully misled and uninformed 26 Luis as to the true property interests devised by Alfonsina’s will. The main property at issue is Lot 27 No. 5048 in Harmon (“Harmon Property”), to which the ownership and value was undisclosed to 28 Luis. The June 2018 Letter was the Trust’s notice of Luis’s rescission of the earlier contracts and

CV0294-19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho Page 2 of S DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Mot. Disrnis. Pt. Trust Mot. Strike/Dismiss) 1 his assertion of direct interest in the Harmon Property. 2 The Harmon Property derives from the Estate of Marcello Sgambelluri (“Marcello”), 3 Alfonsina’s father, which initially closed on March 5, 1964, via a Decree of Distrib ution. On 4 March 16, 2006, Marcello’s probate case (PR0004-61) was reopened when reversionary interest 5 from the Government of Guam was acquired. The final distribution of the Estate of Marcello, 6 which included the Harmon Property, was set for April 4, 2019. Luis became aware of the hearing 7 by his cousin because Luis was not given notice. As a result, Luis filed his objections on March 8 23, 2019. At the final distribution hearing, Luis appeared via tele-conference and objecte d to the 9 proposed distribution; he instead sought division among all of Marcello’s living heirs. Ultimately, 10 the property was sold and distributed to Marcello’s his nine children — which includes Alfonsina —

11 as they were his direct heirs. Although all nine of his children were deceased, the distrib ution was 12 found to be the most judicially efficient method. (Notice of Decision, Sep. 23, 2019.) 13 On March 26, 2019, the Trust filed a Complaint against Luis, alleging breach of contrac t, 14 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. In lieu of 15 filing an Answer, Luis filed a Motion for Dismissal of Entire Action With Prejud ice and an 16 accompanying Memorandum on April 26, 2019. The Trust filed its Opposition on May 14, 2019. 17 Luis filed his Reply on May 30, 2019. Concurrent with its Opposition, the Trust also filed a 1$ Motion to Strike or in the Alternative to Dismiss Request for Equitable Relief on May 14, 2019. 19 Luis filed his Opposition to the Trust on June 11, 2019. The Trust filed its Reply on June 25, 2019. 20 On September 24, 2019, the matter was heard and subsequently taken under advise ment. The 21 Court now issues its Decision and Order on both Motions for the reasons set forth below. 22 DISCUSSION 23 I. DISMISSAL UNDER ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 24 Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) are lawsuits intended to 25 “censor, chill, intimidate, or punish citizens, businesses and organizations for involving themselves 26 in public affairs.” 7 Guam Code Annotated (“GCA”) § 17102(a)(6). SLAPP lawsuit “masquerade 27 as ordinary lawsuits but are brought to deter common citizens from exercising their political or 28 legal rights or to punish them from doing so.” Batzei v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir.

CV0294-19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho Page 3 of 8 DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Mot. Dismiss, P1. Trust Mot. Strike/Dismiss) . 1 2003). Thus, I Lilzeslaturan Guâhan adopted the anti-SLAPP statute to, inter cilia, protect and 2 encourage citizen participation in government. Guam’s anti-SLAPP statute is codified as the 3 Citizen Participation in Government Act (“CPGA”), which provides as follow s: 4 § 17104. Immunity. Acts in furtherance of the Constitutional rights to petition, including seeking relief, influencing action, informing, comm unicating and 5 otherwise participating in the processes of government, shall be immun liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except where not aimed at procur e from government or electoral action, result or outcome. ing any 6

7 7GCA17104. 8 A SLAPP suit is treated like a motion for summary judgment. § 17 106(a). In an anti- 9 SLAPP motion, the movant must first establish, prima fade, that his actions were based on 10 protected petitioning activity. Enriquez v. Smith, 2015 Guam ¶ 12 (citing Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 11 P.3d 713, 717 (Cal. 2006); Bleavis v. Demarest, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 580, 585 (Ct. App. 2011)). Once 12 proven, the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, 13 that the actions at issue do not warrant immunity. Enriquez, 2015 Guam ¶ 12; see also 7 GCA § 14 17106(c). 15 Luis purports his petitioning activity to be: (1) attempting to rescind the Assignment and 16 Release Agreement and (2) objecting, orally and in writing, to the final distribution of the Estate of 17 Marcello Sgambelluri. (Litis Motion to Dismiss JO.) Under Guam law, petitioning activities 1$ include “seeking relief, influencing action, informing, communicating, and otherwise participating 19 with government bodies, officials, or employees of the electorate.” Enriqctez, 2015 Guam ¶ 1; 7 20 GCA § 17102(a)(3). 21 (1) Rescinding of the Contract 22 Luis’s actions do not constitute petitioning activity. Although Luis claims to have 23 rescinded the contract, he has not actually done so. The law controlling a unilateral rescission of a 24 contract is codified under 18 GCA § 89204, which states as follows:

25 § 89204. How Rescission Effected. Rescission, when not effected by consent, can be accomplished only by the use, on the part of the party rescinding, of reasonable 26 diligence to comply with the following rules:

27 1. He must rescind promptly, upon discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind, if he is free from duress, menace, undue influence, or disabil ity, and is 28 aware of his right to rescind; and,

CV0294-19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Mot. Dismiss, P1. Trust Mot. Strike/ Pare 4 of 8 Dismiss) . 1 2. He must restore to the other party everything of value which he has receive from him under the contract; or must offer to restore the same, upon condition d 2 such party shall do likewise, unless the latter is unable or positively refuses that to do so. 3 18 GCA § 89204. Outside judicial rescission, a rescission without consent require 4 s adherence to the aforesaid law. 5 It is undisputed that Luis has not returned the $50,000.00 dollars, stating that 6 he has no duty to do so under 18 GCA § 89204(2). (Lttis Mat. Dismiss 16.) However, 7 there is no indication he had exercised reasonable diligence in returning the money. Luis states 8 the Complaint filed against him was the only response he was given from the Trust. IcL at 13; 9 (Luis Rep!)’ Dccl. 2.) Despite this claim, there are no interactions — even slight mentioning the return of the money in 10 —

his June 9, 2018 Letter, exhibits or motion. In fact, Luis did interact with the 11 Trust after sending his letter; yet the letters do not contain any statements about attempting or compl 12 eting rescission. (Luis Ex. 2.) At present, Luis has not restored the consideration given, offered 13 to restore or even initiated discussions to restore. Thus, Luis’s actions do not constitute petitioning 14 activity. (2) Objecting to the Final Distribution 15 Luis alleges his written and oral objections to the final distribution of Marce 16 llo’s Estate were also petitioning activity attacked in the Trust’s Complaint. Howev 17 er, like above, the Complaint does not reference the final distribution hearing; it only referen 18 ces statements in Luis’s June 9, 2018 Letter. Naturally, the SLAP? suit could not challenge petitioning 19 activity that was not addressed in the Complaint. Luis has failed to prove a prima Jade showin 20 g of a SLAPP action; therefore, he is not entitled to a dismissal pursuant to CPGA. 21 II. Dismissal Under GRCP 12 22 Luis seeks dismissal under Rule 12 of the Guam Rules of Civil Proced 23 ure (“GRCP”), which provides in relevant part: 24 Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 25 counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the respon sive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . (6) failure to state a claim upon . .

27 which relief can be granted[.]

28 GRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court of Guam clarified GRCP 12(b) by adopting the

CV0294- 19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho Page 5 of 8 DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Mot. Dismiss, P1. Trust Mot. Strike/Dismis s) 1 United States Supreme Court Notice Pleading Standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 2 41 (1957). See Ukau v. Wang, 2016 Guam 26 ¶9[ 30-33. The U.S. Supreme Court holds that a 3 complaint “need only provide fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon 4 which it rests.” Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Contey, 355 U.S. at 45-47). Thus, under the notice pleading 5 standard, “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond 6 doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 7 relief.” U/cart, 2016 Guam ¶ 22 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46). The facts of the complaint are $ taken as true, and the complaint is construed in the light most favora ble to the plaintiff. First 9 Hawaiian Bank v. Manley, 2007 Guam 2 9[ 9. 10 As stated in the Trust’s Opposition, Luis has not asserted the Complaint was defective or 11 deficient as to its pleadings on the causes of action. (Trust Opp’n 19.) The standard for pleading is 12 relatively small. See GRCP 8(e). A pleading need only contain: 13 [A] short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdi depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs ction no grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the new 14 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgm claim ent for 15 the relief to which the pleader seeks.

16 GRCP 8(a). The Trust’s Complaint has been thorough in pleading the jurisdiction, causes of 17 actions, requested relief and supporting facts. Thus, the Court finds no defect or deficiency to 18 warrant a dismissal under GRCP 12(b). 19 Lastly, Luis’s motion does not warrant dismissal because he himself has failed to set forth 20 facts entitling him to relief. Luis argues that the causes of actions agains t him are all based on the 21 same petitioning activities, which are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute . He asserts that the Trust 22 lacks any claims against him because his immunization had already been established. The Court 23 finds this demonstrably false. Luis’s motion for dismissal rests on a finding of protected activity —

24 activity which he had failed to prove. Luis has failed to establish any ground for dismissal; 25 therefore, the Trust’s Complaint will not be dismissed. 26 III.THE TRUST’S MOTION TO STRIKE OR DISMISS 27 The Trust seeks to strike or dismiss Luis’s request for equitable relief under GRCP 7 and 28 13. The requests are for rescission and constructive trust and are stated as follows:

CV0294- 19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Mot. Dsmiss, P1. Trust Mot. Strike/ Page 6 of $ Dismiss) 1 B. RECISSION AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. Equitable relief is requested to make whole Luis Camacho who was damaged by 2 [the Trust] as stated above. 20 GCA § 3240 authorizes the court to rescind the release and assignment for fraudulent inducement to contract. The rescission 3 necessarily requires a constructive trust to be imposed upon the interests purchased by Eduardo under the contract and assignment. 4 (Lids Mot. Dismiss 19.) Luis had not filed any pleadings for the instant matter; all statements 5 and arguments he has made are contained in his Motion to Dismiss. On these facts, the Trust seeks 6 to strike or dismiss the above as it is impermissible under the rules. The Court agrees. 7 It is general instruction that matters of fraud are affirmative defenses which should be set 8 forth in a pleading. GRCP 8(c). Proper pleadings under GRCP 7 are codified as follows: 9 (a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim 10 denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross- claim; a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is 11 summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third- party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 12 may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.

13 GRCP 7. Luis’s requests for relief are based on the remedy of constructive trust and the 14 affirmative defense of fraud. GRCP 8. Although constructive trust is a remedy of equitable relief; 15 “constructive trust is often pled as a distinct claim.” Jacot v. Miller, No. CV 16-00074 (D. Guam 16 Sep. 28, 2017) ¶ 6. The theory of constructive trust relies on a substantive claim for fraud or 17 conversion; therefore, without overcoming the hurdle that is the underlying substantive claim, a 18 request for constructive trust would fail. Id.

19 Additionally, rescission based on fraud is a counterclaim which should be made at the time 20 of pleading. GRCP 8(c), 10(b), 12(b) and 13(a). Luis has not provided any pleadings for this 21 matter. Moreover, not only is Luis’s request a counterclaim, it is a compulsory counterclaim. 22 Counterclaims are compulsory when it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. GRCP 23 13(a). Thus, because Luis’s counterclaims are procedurally defective, any requests for relief are 24 not before the Court. Conclusively, Luis is not entitled to his requested relief based on procedure 25 or merit as he has failed to establish his burdens of proof. Therefore, the Trust’s Motion to Strike 26 or Dismiss is now moot.

27 /1/ 28 III

CV0294- 19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho Page 7 of $ DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Mot. Dismiss. P1. Trust Mot. Strike/Dismiss) 1 CONCLUSION 2 By preponderance of the evidence and based on the foregoing conclusions, the Court 3 hereby DENIES Luis’s Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the Trust’s Motion to Strike or, in the 4 Alternative, to Dismiss Request for Equitable Relief is MOOT . 5

7 SO ORDERED, this day of December 2019.

1 The Honorable Anita A. Sukola 13 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 14

1$

2$

CV0294- 19 Eduardo Camacho as Trustee v. Luis Camacho DECISION AND ORDER (Def. Luis Mot. Dismiss, P1. Trust Mot. Page $ of 8 Strike/Dismiss)