Edmisten v. Henry Herpolsheimer Co.

92 N.W. 138, 66 Neb. 94, 1901 Neb. LEXIS 393
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 4, 1901
DocketNo. 10,671
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 92 N.W. 138 (Edmisten v. Henry Herpolsheimer Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edmisten v. Henry Herpolsheimer Co., 92 N.W. 138, 66 Neb. 94, 1901 Neb. LEXIS 393 (Neb. 1901).

Opinions

Albert, C.

On Friday, May 28, 1897, J. H. Edmisten executed and delivered to Henry Herpolsbeimer and another, doing business under tbe name of H. Herpolsbeimer Company, bis check, drawn on tbe Merchants’ Bank of Lincoln, for $200.62, in payment of an account, at their place of business in said city. On tbe following day the defendants in error deposited tbe check, with others, in tbe American Exchange National Bank, with which they transacted their banking business. Tbe Merchants’ Bank was open for tbe transaction of business at tbe date of tbe delivery of tbe check and the day following. Tbe following Monday was a legal holiday, and tbe next, morning tbe Merchants’ Bank failed, to open, and has never since opened for tbe transaction of business, and passed into.tbe bands of tbe state banking board. It was wholly insolvent, and nothing was realized from its assets. Tbe check was never presented. This action was brought by tbe payees against tbe maker of tbe check to recover tbe amount due thereon. A trial was. bad to tbe court, which resulted in a finding and judgment for tbe plaintiffs. Tbe defendant brings tbe case here on error.

Tbe only disputed fact in tbe case is whether tbe check was delivered during banking hours oh tbe date of its delivery. This-question was submitted to tbe court on con[96]*96flicting evidence, and the court having found that it was delivered after banking hours, under the well known rule of this court its finding on that point will not he disturbed. Therefore, for the purpose of this case, we shall assume as one of the facts in the case that the check was delivered to the payees after banking hours on May 28, 1897.

This leaves but one question in the case, and that is whether the failure to present the check for payment on the day after its receipt relieves the defendant from liability thereon. It will be observed that the payees were doing business and received the check in the city where the bank on which it was drawn was located. The rule is that in the absence of special circumstances, in order to hold the drawer liable on his check, it must be presented not later than the day following its receipt, where the payee receives it in the same place in which the bank on which it is drawn is situated. Tiedeman, Commercial Paper, sec. 443, and the cases there cited; Norton, Bills & Notes [3d ed.], 388 et seq; Anderson v. Rodgers, 53 Kan., 542, 27 L. R. A., 248; 2 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments [4th ed], sec. 1590; 2 Randolph, Commercial Paper [2d ed.], sec. 1105; Holmes v. Roe, 28 N. W. Rep. [Mich.], 864; Grange v. Reigh, 67 N. W. Rep. [Wis.] 1130; Murphy v. Levy, 50 N. Y. Supp., 682. Counsel concede this to be the rule, but urge that under the special circumstances in this case the plaintiffs were not required to present the check on the day following its receipt. The special circumstances relied on are that the collection of such paper in the city of Lincoln is made through the agency of a clearing-house, and' that the check, having been received after banking hours, could not, in the usual course of business, pass through the clearing-house and be presented for payment on the day following its receipt by them. This position is sustained by two opinions, both from the same court, and delivered by the same judge. Loux v. Fox, 33 Atl. Rep. [Pa.], 190; Willis v. Finley, 34 Atl. Rep. [Pa.], 213. In the opinions referred to a departure from the settled rules of the law merchant is impliedly admitted. An at[97]*97tempt to justify such departure is made on the grounds of a custom among banks, and the impossibility, owing io the great volume of business, of conforming to the established rule. The reasoning does not commend itself to our judgment. We do not believe a party should be permitted to excuse a lack of diligence by showing that such lack is customary among those engaged in. like business in the same city, nor to plead the magnitude of his business as an excuse for a failure to prosecute it with diligence. The special circumstances that will excuse delay in presentment have generally been held to be such as are beyond the holder’s control, or arise from some agreement or understanding between the drawer and some one or more of the other parties to the paper.

In Holmes v. Roe,

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Bluebook (online)
92 N.W. 138, 66 Neb. 94, 1901 Neb. LEXIS 393, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edmisten-v-henry-herpolsheimer-co-neb-1901.