NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 21-2291 _____________
EDIN DONELSY MADRID-MANCIA, Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Case No. A206-643-376) Immigration Judge: David Cheng _______________
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States on June 24, 2024 Submitted on Remand July 26, 2024
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 2, 2025) _____________
OPINION * _____________
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, *
does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
This case returns to us for reconsideration in light of Campos-Chaves v. Garland,
144 S. Ct. 1637 (2024), so we again address Edin Donelsy Madrid-Mancia’s petition for
review of the denial of her motion to reopen proceedings and to rescind the Immigration
Judge’s in absentia removal order. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals erred in
failing to weigh Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of non-receipt and was laboring at the time
under the mistaken belief that Madrid-Mancia had failed in her obligations under 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B), we will grant the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
When we originally considered this case, we were presented with two preserved
issues for review: (1) whether Madrid-Mancia failed to provide ICE with an address at
which she may be contacted, excusing the Attorney General’s notice obligations in
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B), and if not, whether the Notice of Hearing
that followed the defective Notice to Appear was sufficient under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A); and (2) if the Notice of Hearing sufficed, whether Madrid-Mancia had
rebutted the presumption that it was delivered to her. See Madrid-Mancia v. Att’y Gen.,
72 F.4th 508, 514 n.6, 516 (3d Cir. 2023), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.
Garland v. Madrid-Mancia, 144 S. Ct. 2677 (2024).
At that time, we granted relief on the first ground, explaining that the BIA erred in
holding that the requirement for notice was excused by Madrid-Mancia’s failure to
provide “an address . . . at which [she] may be contacted” because designating her
cousin’s home as her mailing address satisfied that obligation. Id. at 520 (quoting 8
2 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)). We also explained that the mailing of a “Notice of Hearing”
did not cure the defective NTA or satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)’s notice
requirements. Id. at 516, 519–20. As “[o]ur decision on the first issue [was] sufficient to
resolve this petition,” we had no need to reach the second. Id. at 514 n.6.
On remand, that is no longer the case, as Campos-Chavez held that a subsequent
Notice of Hearing, on its own, satisfies § 1229a(b)(5)(A) and can defeat recission under
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). See 144 S. Ct. at 1643, 1647–48. Thus, we now reach Madrid-
Mancia’s second argument and consider whether the BIA erred in holding that she failed
to rebut the presumption of delivery.
II. DISCUSSION 1
In evaluating whether a respondent has rebutted the presumption of delivery via
mail, the BIA must consider “all relevant evidence submitted,” Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 665, 674 (BIA 2008), including the respondent’s actions after learning of the
order and her diligence in seeking to redress the situation, which the BIA has
characterized as a “significant factor,” id. at 676. Here, the BIA recognized that, because
the Attorney General sent Madrid-Mancia’s notice by regular mail and not certified mail,
the presumption of delivery was relatively weak. A.R. 3 (citing Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. at 665); see also Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir.
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021). We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Id. 3 2007). But the BIA erred in two respects when considering whether that weak
presumption was rebutted.
First, neither the BIA’s opinion, nor the IJ’s opinion on which it relied, evaluated
the full range of Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of non-receipt, even though the BIA’s own
precedent required it do so. See Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 674. And as we
explained in Santana Gonzalez, “submission of an affidavit by an alien claiming non-
receipt” with “circumstantial evidence corroborating the alien’s claims of non-receipt” is
“ordinarily [] sufficient to raise a factual issue requiring an evidentiary hearing before the
IJ.” 506 F.3d at 280. There, we concluded that the evidence—petitioner’s affidavit
asserting non-receipt; her lack of “motive to avoid the scheduled hearing” and how “[s]he
had little to gain by failing to appear”; her incentive to appear given the prospect of
statutory relief from removal; her attempt “to acquaint the DHS with her change of
address”; her voluntary appearance in subsequent proceedings; and her “affirmative
action to have her counsel inquire” and move to reopen—sufficed for us to “remand to
the BIA, with directions to reopen the in absentia order of removal.” Id. at 280–81.
Madrid-Mancia has presented similar evidence of non-receipt. Like Santana
Gonzalez, she submitted her own affidavit. And as attested in that document, she
provided ICE with her then-current address at 307 Ashmore Avenue when she was
presented the original NTA in April 2014; she went to the Mt. Laurel ICE office within
one month of moving to a new address to update her address and was told she was not in
their system; between 2014 and October 2019, she checked for mail every three days at
the 307 Ashmore house and did not receive any mailing from the Immigration Court;
4 when she received an ICE letter sent to the 307 Ashmore house in October 2019
requesting her appearance on November 4, 2019, she voluntarily presented herself and
learned for the first time that an in absentia removal order had been issued in August
2017; she promptly retained counsel who moved to reopen the case in February 2020;
and when the IJ denied relief, she promptly appealed to the BIA.
Also like Santana Gonzalez, Madrid-Mancia had little to gain and much to lose in
failing to appear, particularly given her intent to petition for relief; she too attempted to
update her residential address with ICE, only to be told it was not possible; and she too
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 21-2291 _____________
EDIN DONELSY MADRID-MANCIA, Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Case No. A206-643-376) Immigration Judge: David Cheng _______________
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States on June 24, 2024 Submitted on Remand July 26, 2024
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 2, 2025) _____________
OPINION * _____________
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, *
does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
This case returns to us for reconsideration in light of Campos-Chaves v. Garland,
144 S. Ct. 1637 (2024), so we again address Edin Donelsy Madrid-Mancia’s petition for
review of the denial of her motion to reopen proceedings and to rescind the Immigration
Judge’s in absentia removal order. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals erred in
failing to weigh Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of non-receipt and was laboring at the time
under the mistaken belief that Madrid-Mancia had failed in her obligations under 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B), we will grant the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
When we originally considered this case, we were presented with two preserved
issues for review: (1) whether Madrid-Mancia failed to provide ICE with an address at
which she may be contacted, excusing the Attorney General’s notice obligations in
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B), and if not, whether the Notice of Hearing
that followed the defective Notice to Appear was sufficient under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A); and (2) if the Notice of Hearing sufficed, whether Madrid-Mancia had
rebutted the presumption that it was delivered to her. See Madrid-Mancia v. Att’y Gen.,
72 F.4th 508, 514 n.6, 516 (3d Cir. 2023), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.
Garland v. Madrid-Mancia, 144 S. Ct. 2677 (2024).
At that time, we granted relief on the first ground, explaining that the BIA erred in
holding that the requirement for notice was excused by Madrid-Mancia’s failure to
provide “an address . . . at which [she] may be contacted” because designating her
cousin’s home as her mailing address satisfied that obligation. Id. at 520 (quoting 8
2 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)). We also explained that the mailing of a “Notice of Hearing”
did not cure the defective NTA or satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)’s notice
requirements. Id. at 516, 519–20. As “[o]ur decision on the first issue [was] sufficient to
resolve this petition,” we had no need to reach the second. Id. at 514 n.6.
On remand, that is no longer the case, as Campos-Chavez held that a subsequent
Notice of Hearing, on its own, satisfies § 1229a(b)(5)(A) and can defeat recission under
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). See 144 S. Ct. at 1643, 1647–48. Thus, we now reach Madrid-
Mancia’s second argument and consider whether the BIA erred in holding that she failed
to rebut the presumption of delivery.
II. DISCUSSION 1
In evaluating whether a respondent has rebutted the presumption of delivery via
mail, the BIA must consider “all relevant evidence submitted,” Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 665, 674 (BIA 2008), including the respondent’s actions after learning of the
order and her diligence in seeking to redress the situation, which the BIA has
characterized as a “significant factor,” id. at 676. Here, the BIA recognized that, because
the Attorney General sent Madrid-Mancia’s notice by regular mail and not certified mail,
the presumption of delivery was relatively weak. A.R. 3 (citing Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. at 665); see also Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir.
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021). We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Id. 3 2007). But the BIA erred in two respects when considering whether that weak
presumption was rebutted.
First, neither the BIA’s opinion, nor the IJ’s opinion on which it relied, evaluated
the full range of Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of non-receipt, even though the BIA’s own
precedent required it do so. See Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 674. And as we
explained in Santana Gonzalez, “submission of an affidavit by an alien claiming non-
receipt” with “circumstantial evidence corroborating the alien’s claims of non-receipt” is
“ordinarily [] sufficient to raise a factual issue requiring an evidentiary hearing before the
IJ.” 506 F.3d at 280. There, we concluded that the evidence—petitioner’s affidavit
asserting non-receipt; her lack of “motive to avoid the scheduled hearing” and how “[s]he
had little to gain by failing to appear”; her incentive to appear given the prospect of
statutory relief from removal; her attempt “to acquaint the DHS with her change of
address”; her voluntary appearance in subsequent proceedings; and her “affirmative
action to have her counsel inquire” and move to reopen—sufficed for us to “remand to
the BIA, with directions to reopen the in absentia order of removal.” Id. at 280–81.
Madrid-Mancia has presented similar evidence of non-receipt. Like Santana
Gonzalez, she submitted her own affidavit. And as attested in that document, she
provided ICE with her then-current address at 307 Ashmore Avenue when she was
presented the original NTA in April 2014; she went to the Mt. Laurel ICE office within
one month of moving to a new address to update her address and was told she was not in
their system; between 2014 and October 2019, she checked for mail every three days at
the 307 Ashmore house and did not receive any mailing from the Immigration Court;
4 when she received an ICE letter sent to the 307 Ashmore house in October 2019
requesting her appearance on November 4, 2019, she voluntarily presented herself and
learned for the first time that an in absentia removal order had been issued in August
2017; she promptly retained counsel who moved to reopen the case in February 2020;
and when the IJ denied relief, she promptly appealed to the BIA.
Also like Santana Gonzalez, Madrid-Mancia had little to gain and much to lose in
failing to appear, particularly given her intent to petition for relief; she too attempted to
update her residential address with ICE, only to be told it was not possible; and she too
voluntarily appeared and promptly sought to redress the situation. Within weeks, she
retained counsel, who took affirmative action to inquire after her case files in January
2020, and, in February 2020, moved to reopen proceedings. Substantially similar
evidence persuaded us to vacate and remand in Santana Gonzalez. Id. at 281; see also
Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 674, 676 (holding that “respondent’s actions upon
learning of the in absentia order” is a relevant factor, and that “obtaining counsel and
requesting reopening” is “significant”). Here, where the BIA and IJ declined even to
acknowledge Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of due diligence, we will take the same course.
Our second concern with the BIA’s opinion is that when it concluded Madrid-
Mancia had not rebutted the presumption of delivery, it was laboring under a
misapprehension of the law concerning the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).
Specifically, the BIA expressed the view that Madrid-Mancia had failed to comply with
§ 1229a(b)(5)(B) by “mov[ing] to a new address and never submitt[ing] a change of
address” form. A.R. 4. It also asserted that she was “on actual notice . . . of the
5 obligation to keep the Immigration Court informed of any changes of address, and of the
consequences for failure to do so,” and explained its refusal to disturb the in absentia
removal as one of “[t]he consequences for failing to follow the address notification
requirements [that] are outlined in section 240(b)(5)(B) of the Act.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(B)).
This was legal error. As we explained in our prior opinion, § 1229a(b)(5)(B) does
not require that a current residential address be on file, as the BIA’s analysis assumed.
Madrid-Mancia, 72 F.4th at 520; see also Renaut v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2015). Rather, it requires provision of “an address . . . at which the alien may be
contacted respecting proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i). And “‘[a]n address’
where the alien ‘may be contacted’ means just that: a place where a person can be
contacted. The alien’s current residential address. Or her cousin’s. Or a PO box. So long
as that address exists, it is sufficient.” Madrid-Mancia, 72 F.4th at 520. Madrid-Mancia
provided such an address, so to the extent that the BIA may have declined reopening
based on the belief that she did not, it was mistaken.
III. CONCLUSION 2
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Madrid-Mancia’s petition for review and
remand to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2 Judge Matey would deny the petition because he reads the record to contain insufficient corroboration of Madrid Mancia’s affidavit to direct reopening of the proceedings, or the lesser remedy of an evidentiary hearing. Nor is the BIA’s misinterpretation of § 1229a(b)(5)(B) significant because it was not central to the agency’s decision. 6