Edgar v. Edgar

35 N.W.2d 181, 323 Mich. 351, 1948 Mich. LEXIS 363
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 17, 1948
DocketDocket No. 42, Calendar No. 43,947.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 35 N.W.2d 181 (Edgar v. Edgar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edgar v. Edgar, 35 N.W.2d 181, 323 Mich. 351, 1948 Mich. LEXIS 363 (Mich. 1948).

Opinion

Boyles, J.

This is a bill for divorce, with cross bill for separate maintenance. Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1926, at which time the plaintiff, a physician-psychiatrist, was an intern at Grace hospital in Detroit. Three children were born of the marriage — Joyce, now about 19, David, about 17, and Richard, about 13. The parties lived together until January, 1947, and on January 7, 1947, the plaintiff filed a bill for divorce on the ground of extreme and repeated cruelty. Contemporaneously with the filing of the bill of complaint a temporary injunction was issued by the court restraining the defendant *353 from interfering with plaintiff’s practice, coming into his office, or interfering with his nse of his personal automobile. On January 23d, on plaintiff’s petition, an order was issued requiring the defendant to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt of court for violating the injunction. The defendant was found guilty of contempt of court, and placed on probation. A similar petition filed in this Court after the appeal was perfected awaits outcome of the appeal. On January 25th the defendant filed an answer to the bill of complaint, and asked for dismissal of the case. From then on until the case was finally brought on for hearing on the merits on October 7, 1947, the case progressed through the filing of some 10 or 12 motions and petitions to dissolve injunction, for alimony and attorney fees, for orders to show cause, for rehearings, to advance cause for hearing, to modify injunction, to re-refer cause to presiding judge, to refer to the friend of the court,, for substitution of attorneys, for leave to file cross bill. During this period, plaintiff was ordered to move from their residence; defendant’s original attorney was authorized to withdraw from the case; order for temporary alimony, custody, and attorney fees was entered; the injunction was modified; reference to friend .of the court granted; and other motions denied. Three days before hearing on the merits was begun, October 7, 1947, defendant’s cross bill and an answer thereto were filed by leave of court, over plaintiff’s objection. The defendant, by said cross bill, sought a decree of separate maintenance pursuant to 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 12794 (Stat. Ann. § 25.211). The defendant also asked for custody of the minor children, temporary alimony, attorney fees and costs, and an injunction restraining the plaintiff (cross-defendant) from selling, concealing or giving away any of his property. We refer to the multiplicity of the aforesaid interlocutory mat *354 ters, and other similar situations which have arisen in this Court, as the background which confuses any attempt to reach a conclusion as to the real merits of the case.

Hearing on the merits was begun October 7th, and during the taking of over 250 record pages of testimony the plaintiff’s proofs fairly established the following facts:

The defendant was quarrelsome and nagging, on several occasions struck and scratched the plaintiff leaving permanent scars on his arms and wrists, on occasions locked him out of his room, interfered with htó practice as a physician, accused him of intimacies with his patients, made like accusations to plaintiff’s friends and other physicians, said that she would wreck the plaintiff professionally and ruin him socially, continually quarreled about money, on occasions left home for extended periods without explanation or reason. Much testimony was taken concerning the defendant’s interfering with plaintiff’s practice of his profession, and more particularly the defendant’s allegations in her cross bill that the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct with patients and other women. In that regard, considerable reference was made in the testimony concerning an alleged love affair between the plaintiff and one Madam X, later identified by name as one Mrs. Schmidt.

The circuit judge saw and heard the parties and their many witnesses. We have often said that the Court gives much consideration to the advantage which such an opportunity affords to the trial judge. When both parties had rested their case, the trial judge expressed his view of the testimony as follows:

“Upon the record as it now stands, the court is prepared to indicate that there have been no proofs which sustain the cross bill for a decree of separate *355 maintenance, and the only real contest is whether, in equity, the plaintiff has made out sufficient proofs of extreme and repeated cruelty which would require that this court grant a decree. That the plaintiff has made out proofs of cruelty, I think there can be very little ground for saying that he has not made out what would, in the absence of contradiction of some of his acts, constitute a sufficient record upon which the court might grant a decree of divorce.
“This is a court of equity. The testimony as to the doctor’s relations to one witness, Mrs. Schmidt, is in direct conflict. Neither party has seen fit to bring Mrs. Schmidt as a witness in this case. My present feeling is that to determine whether I will exercise the discretion that I have to grant a decree of divorce to the plaintiff on this bill of complaint, in the absence of the testimony of Mrs. Schmidt — I will say, that I cannot, at the present time, indicate that I will grant such a decree in the absence of the testimony of the woman that the defendant claims her husband was in love with, and has brought in — ■ * * * what the defendant testifies to, that there was illicit actions by and between the Doctor and Mrs. Schmidt. The doctor testifies positively that there was not. If Mrs. Schmidt is brought here and corroborates his testimony, it will go quite a long ways in determining whether or not he, as complainant, is in court with clean hands sufficiently that he may be given a divorce in spite of that proof relative to his claimed relations with this woman. What she would say about it, under oath, would have considerable weight with me as to whether there is any truth in this claim that he was in love with, and had illicit relations with that woman. I have heard enough in this case to indicate now, upon the record, that there will not be any decree for the defendant and cross-plaintiff on her cross bill for separate maintenance. * * *
“These people have a nice family of three children, and in view of the failure of the people to agree upon a property settlement, I am very much in doubt as to whether there are sufficient equities in this case to *356 warrant the granting of the relief in plaintiff’s bill of complaint, or in the cross bill of the defendant. There has been cruelty proven on the part of the respondent — repeated cruelty established. To review all of the proofs would require considerable time. I think the testimony of Mrs. Schmidt could be an aid to the court in determining whether or not there is sufficient cruelty proven to warrant the court in granting a decree to the plaintiff on the bill of complaint. I will take the case under advisement until one or the other of the parties indicate to me that they will arrange to bring Mrs. Schmidt here to testify.”

Thereafter Mrs. Schmidt was produced in court and her testimony is in the record at length. She fully confirms plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant seriously interfered with plaintiff in the practice of his profession.

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Related

Sparks v. Sparks
485 N.W.2d 893 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1992)
Edgar v. Edgar
115 N.W.2d 286 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
35 N.W.2d 181, 323 Mich. 351, 1948 Mich. LEXIS 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edgar-v-edgar-mich-1948.