Edgar Solis v. County of Riverside

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 31, 2023
Docket5:23-cv-00515
StatusUnknown

This text of Edgar Solis v. County of Riverside (Edgar Solis v. County of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edgar Solis v. County of Riverside, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP TONY M. SAIN, SB# 251626 2 E-Mail: Tony.Sain@lewisbrisbois.com TORI L.N. BAKKEN, SB# 329069 3 E-Mail: Tori.Bakken@lewisbrisbois.com ABIGAIL J. R. McLAUGHLIN, SB# 313208 4 E-Mail: Abigail.McLaughlin@lewisbrisbois.com 633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000 5 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: 213.250.1800 NOTE: CHANGES MADE BY THE COURT 6 Facsimile: 213.250.7900

7 Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE and SALVADOR 8 WALTERMIRE

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 EDGAR SOLIS, Case No. 5:23-CV-00515-HDV-JPRx

13 Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 14 vs. ORDER

15 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, SALVADOR WALTERMIRE, et al., Judge: Hernán D. Vera, 16 Mag: Jean P. Rosenbluth Defendants. 17 Setting Conf: May 8, 2023 Trial Date: None Set 18 DISCOVERY MATTER 19

20 21 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS. 22 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, or 23 private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use 24 for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. 25 Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the 26 following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does 27 not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that 1 information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable 2 legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, 3 below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential 4 information under seal; local rules set forth the procedures that must be followed 5 and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court 6 to file material under seal. 7 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 8 1.1. Contentions re Harm from Disclosure of Confidential Materials. 9 Defendant contends that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 10 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace 11 officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for 12 the following reasons. 13 First, Defendant contends that peace officers have a federal privilege of 14 privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 15 that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective 16 procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 17 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies 19 to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege 20 law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying 21 [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 22 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based 23 “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. 24 Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendant further 25 contends that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can 26 threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their 27 families/associates. 1 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 2 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client 3 privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of 4 their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files 5 that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or 6 evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering 7 legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to 8 evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, 9 evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports 10 prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering 11 legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. 12 United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 13 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. 14 Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. 15 Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United 16 States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendant further 17 contends that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 18 entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 19 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 20 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements 21 and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling 22 of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged 23 misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or 24 implement any remedial measures that may be required. 25 Third, Defendant contends that, since peace officers do not have the same 26 rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to 27 the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 1 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 2 Accordingly, Defendant contends that, without a protective order preventing 3 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 4 impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 5 frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, 6 preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace 7 officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, 8 and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 9 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does 10 result in litigation. 11 1.2. Plaintiff does not agree with and does not stipulate to Defendant’s 12 contentions herein above, and nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall 13 resolve the parties’ disagreement, or bind them, concerning the legal statements and 14 claimed privileges set forth above. 15 However, plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so 16 as to preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need to further 17 burden the Court with such issues. Specifically, the parties jointly contend that, 18 absent this Stipulated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege interests may 19 be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulated Protective Order may avoid such 20 harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk that 21 privileged and/or sensitive/confidential information will become matters of public 22 record. 23 1.3. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need 24 for protection as to any medical records and autopsy photographs, because of the 25 privacy interests at stake therein. Because of these sensitive interests, a Court Order 26 should address these documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. 27 1.4. The parties therefore stipulate that there is Good Cause for, and hereby 1 confidential documents consistent with the terms and provisions below.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Edgar Solis v. County of Riverside, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edgar-solis-v-county-of-riverside-cacd-2023.