Edgar Ruiz v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 6, 2008
• Docket: 01-07-00963-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued November 6, 2008

Opinion issued November 6, 2008

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-07-00963-CR

EDGAR RUIZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1091698

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Edgar Ruiz pleaded not guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery.  A jury found Ruiz guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years confinement.  In one issue, Ruiz challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.  We affirm.

Background

          On the night of November 6, 2006, Clarence Bertrand, while driving to Prairie View A&M University to meet a friend, stopped to use the restroom at a Chevron station located at the intersection of F.M. 1960 and Stuebner Airline.  Bertrand found the bathroom door of the gas station locked, so he stepped into a corner of the car wash to relieve himself.  As he walked back toward his car, Ruiz ran toward Bertrand, pointing a gun.  Bertrand put his hands in the air and asked, “Is this for real?”  Ruiz responded “Yeah, this is for real.”  Ruiz then circled around Bertrand’s car to the back door and tried to open it, but the door was jammed.  Ruiz screamed at Bertrand to open the door, and started to hit the back glass window of the car with the butt of his gun.  Bertrand offered Ruiz the car, but Ruiz refused to take it and instead said: “No bitch, you’re going to drive me.”

          Bertrand got into the car and acted like he was going to unlock the door for Ruiz, but instead “mashed the gas,” slammed the door, and accelerated the car out of the parking lot.  As Bertrand drove away, he heard gunshots behind him.  He eventually stopped at a fast food parking lot, and, upon discovering that he had a flat tire, called his family.  Bertrand’s sister arrived and picked him up, and he called the police upon arriving at her house.

          At the time of the incident, Deputy J. George was on duty nearby.  He heard gunshots, got into his patrol car, and drove to the back of the gas station.  Deputy George observed a male wearing a white shirt and white hat, and holding a handgun, get into a Chevrolet Avalanche at a nearby intersection.  Deputy George followed the vehicle and turned on his lights and sirens in an attempt to stop it.  When the driver did not pull over, Deputy George pursued him.  Approximately eight other police cars joined in the chase.  The vehicle eventually exited Interstate 59 and stopped at 3000 Staples Street.  Ruiz then exited the vehicle, and tried to run away, but Deputy Jones apprehended Ruiz after he ran forward approximately 60–70 feet.

While the officers were controlling the scene, they received a call about an attempted robbery at the same Chevron station, where Deputy George had first heard the gunshots.  The officers took Ruiz and Johnny Castillo, another person the police apprehended, to the Chevron station, where they asked witnesses if they could identify Ruiz or Castillo.  Bertrand identified Ruiz as the person who had pointed the gun in his face earlier that night.

At trial, Ruiz testified that he was at his brother’s house on the night of the incident and decided to give his brother’s friend Jose a ride home.  Ruiz stated that he dropped off Jose at the Chevron station.  As Ruiz then drove back toward Interstate 45, he stopped at a red light directly in front of the gasoline station.  After hearing multiple gunshots, Ruiz saw a police officer to his left and a person running in front of the police officer.  A moment later, Ruiz saw Jose in the back passenger seat of his vehicle with a gun in his hand.  Ruiz also saw that Castillo was in the front passenger side of his vehicle.  Ruiz testified that due to his fear of Jose, Ruiz panicked and followed Jose’s request to drive.  He continued to drive while the police were in pursuit of his vehicle and eventually stopped the car where Jose told him to stop.   

Legal Sufficiency

Standard of Review

When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases.  King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).  We do not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this was the function of the trier of fact.  See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 

Aggravated Robbery

A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003).  The Texas Penal Code defines “in the course of committing theft” as conduct that occurs in the attempt to commit theft, during the commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after attempt or commission of theft.  Tex. Penal Code. Ann. § 29.01(1) (Vernon 2003).  A person commits theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.  Id. § 31.03(a).  A robbery is aggravated when a person commits robbery as defined in section 29.02, and he uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.  Id. § 29.03(a)(2). 

          Ruiz contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that he was in the course of committing theft of property and that he had the intent to deprive Bertrand of his property.  He focuses on Bertrand’s testimony that Ruiz did not demand that Bertrand give the car to him, but that he instead tried to force Bertrand, at gunpoint, to drive him.  Ruiz claims that he never withheld or attempted to permanently withhold property from Bertrand.

The evidence, however, does not support that conclusion.  Although Ruiz did not accept Bertrand’s offer of the car, he attempted to exercise control over it, to the exclusion of Bertrand’s possession, by demanding that Bertrand get in the car with him and drive it according to his demands.  Robbery does not require a completed theft; an attempt is sufficient.  Robinson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).  Likewise, robbery does not require a specific demand for a piece of property; an intent to steal can be inferred from a person’s actions or conduct.  Banks v. State, 471 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Chastain v. State, 667 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d) (holding that defendant pointing gun at service station attendant and attendant insisting that he did not have key to cash register were sufficient to prove charge of robbery even though no one heard defendant demand money); see also Autry v. State, 626 S.W.2d 758, 762–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that defendant’s statement that he had entered store to rob it, even though he did not actually demand money before shooting victim nor take any money upon leaving store, was sufficient to establish that he was guilty of murder during attempted robbery); Johnson v. State, 541 S.W.2d 185, 186–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that defendant’s possession of gun in supermarket and his companion pointing gun at store manager were enough to support his conviction of aggravated robbery even though there was no evidence of demand for or taking of money).  “A verbal demand is not the talisman of an intent to steal.”  Johnson, 541 S.W.2d at 187.  We hold that a rational juror could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that Ruiz was attempting to deprive Bertrand of his property.  The evidence is therefore legally sufficient for a jury to have found Ruiz guilty of aggravated robbery.  See id. (stating that the cumulative weight of the evidence and circumstances together can be enough establish guilt).

Conclusion

          We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                          Jane Bland

                                                          Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Hanks, and Bland.

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.