Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Nov 26 2014, 10:22 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KRISTIN A. MULHOLLAND GREGORY F. ZOELLER Appellate Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Crown Point, Indiana CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
EDGAR N. SINGLETON, JR., ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 45A05-1404-CR-172 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LAKE COUNTY The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, Judge Cause No. 45G01-1308-MR-9
November 26, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge Case Summary
Edgar N. Singleton, Jr. (“Singleton”) appeals his conviction for Murder, a felony.1
He presents the sole issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting two
autopsy photographs. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
During the evening of August 8, 2013, Singleton was driving on Indianapolis
Boulevard in Hammond, Indiana, as was Montrell Moss (“Moss”). Singleton drove his
van from the right lane into the center lane, causing Moss to hit his brakes. Singleton
returned his van to the right lane but then, shortly thereafter, again drove the van in front
of Moss’s vehicle and caused Moss to hit his brakes a second time.
Moss then told passenger Shimeka Robinson (“Robinson”), that he intended to
throw a fast food cup at the van. When the van moved alongside Moss’s vehicle, Moss
called the driver a “bitch,” threw the cup, and sped away. (Tr. 333.) The two vehicles
came to a stop at the same stop-light. Robinson heard Singleton refer to Moss as “a bitch”
and then she heard a gunshot. (Tr. 342.)
Moss fell back in his seat and lost control of his vehicle. Robinson tried in vain to
stop the vehicle; it crashed into a gas pump. Police officers arrived within moments and
Robinson provided information that led to pursuit of Singleton. However, Singleton was
apparently already turning back toward the crash site. He exited his van, identified himself
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
2 as a Cook County Deputy Sheriff “peace officer,”2 and claimed to have shot Moss because
Moss was reaching for a gun. (Tr. 99.)
Moss died of a gunshot wound to his chest. No gun was found on Moss’s person,
in his vehicle, or in the gas station trash bins. Singleton was charged with Murder. At trial,
the jury was instructed on Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, and self-defense. Singleton
was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Singleton argues that the trial court admitted into evidence exhibits that had little or
no probative value but great prejudicial effect, specifically, State’s Exhibits 77 and 79
(autopsy photographs of Moss’s lungs and his right chest cavity after removal of the lungs,
respectively). According to Singleton, the photographs were so gruesome that they likely
caused the jury to unfairly reject evidence that Singleton was acting in self-defense or
sudden heat.
The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and
we will disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.
Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 675 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it. Id.
2 Singleton had been a corrections officer for twenty-two years.
3 “Relevant evidence, including photographs, may be excluded only if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Swingley v. State,
739 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Ind. 2000) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 403). Evidence is relevant if
it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Ind. Evid. Rule 401.
Photographs depicting the crime scene and victim’s body are generally admissible,
provided they are relevant and competent aids to the jury. Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 676.
“However, manipulation of a corpse leads to concern that the work of a pathologist could
be attributed to a defendant.” Jackson v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied (citing Swingley, 739 N.E.2d at 133). Accordingly, autopsy
photographs depicting the body in an altered state are generally inadmissible. Id.
Nonetheless, Swingley recognized that “there are situations where some alteration of the
body is allowed where necessary to demonstrate the testimony being given.” 739 N.E.2d
at 134.
As such, autopsy photographs of a victim have been found ‘“relevant not only to
prove his or her identity, but serve as an aid to understanding the pathologist’s findings on
the cause of death.”’ Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 677 (quoting Woods v. State, 677 N.E.2d
499, 504 (Ind. 1997)). For example, in Fentress v. State, 702 N.E.2d 721 (Ind. 1998), the
Court held admissible two photographs that depicted the victim’s skull with the hair and
skin pulled away from it. Because the pathologist had explained what he had done and the
alteration was necessary to determine the extent of the injuries, the “potential for
4 confusion” was minimal and the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. Id. at
722.
Dr. John Cavanaugh, the pathologist who testified regarding the cause of Moss’s
death, referenced States Exhibits 77 and 79 in explaining the fatal wound and its trajectory.
Singleton insists the photographs were unnecessary because the trajectory could have been
fully explained without graphic photographs and because Singleton offered to stipulate that
Moss died of a gunshot wound.
Singleton directs our attention to our supreme court’s language in Corbett v. State,
764 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 2002), a case in which two photographs of the hollow shell of the
victim’s body had been admitted into evidence. The Court observed that the photographs
“greatly and unnecessarily enhance[d] the gruesomeness of the pictures” and concluded
“[t]hese two photographs, although relevant to the cause of death and the disputed issue of
the number of blows, were so prejudicial that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
them to be admitted.” Id. at 627. Reversal was not warranted, however, because the
admission was found not to have affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 628
(citing Ind. Trial Rule 61, which provides in relevant part: “The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.”))
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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Nov 26 2014, 10:22 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KRISTIN A. MULHOLLAND GREGORY F. ZOELLER Appellate Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Crown Point, Indiana CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
EDGAR N. SINGLETON, JR., ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 45A05-1404-CR-172 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LAKE COUNTY The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, Judge Cause No. 45G01-1308-MR-9
November 26, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge Case Summary
Edgar N. Singleton, Jr. (“Singleton”) appeals his conviction for Murder, a felony.1
He presents the sole issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting two
autopsy photographs. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
During the evening of August 8, 2013, Singleton was driving on Indianapolis
Boulevard in Hammond, Indiana, as was Montrell Moss (“Moss”). Singleton drove his
van from the right lane into the center lane, causing Moss to hit his brakes. Singleton
returned his van to the right lane but then, shortly thereafter, again drove the van in front
of Moss’s vehicle and caused Moss to hit his brakes a second time.
Moss then told passenger Shimeka Robinson (“Robinson”), that he intended to
throw a fast food cup at the van. When the van moved alongside Moss’s vehicle, Moss
called the driver a “bitch,” threw the cup, and sped away. (Tr. 333.) The two vehicles
came to a stop at the same stop-light. Robinson heard Singleton refer to Moss as “a bitch”
and then she heard a gunshot. (Tr. 342.)
Moss fell back in his seat and lost control of his vehicle. Robinson tried in vain to
stop the vehicle; it crashed into a gas pump. Police officers arrived within moments and
Robinson provided information that led to pursuit of Singleton. However, Singleton was
apparently already turning back toward the crash site. He exited his van, identified himself
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
2 as a Cook County Deputy Sheriff “peace officer,”2 and claimed to have shot Moss because
Moss was reaching for a gun. (Tr. 99.)
Moss died of a gunshot wound to his chest. No gun was found on Moss’s person,
in his vehicle, or in the gas station trash bins. Singleton was charged with Murder. At trial,
the jury was instructed on Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, and self-defense. Singleton
was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Singleton argues that the trial court admitted into evidence exhibits that had little or
no probative value but great prejudicial effect, specifically, State’s Exhibits 77 and 79
(autopsy photographs of Moss’s lungs and his right chest cavity after removal of the lungs,
respectively). According to Singleton, the photographs were so gruesome that they likely
caused the jury to unfairly reject evidence that Singleton was acting in self-defense or
sudden heat.
The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and
we will disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.
Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 675 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it. Id.
2 Singleton had been a corrections officer for twenty-two years.
3 “Relevant evidence, including photographs, may be excluded only if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Swingley v. State,
739 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Ind. 2000) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 403). Evidence is relevant if
it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Ind. Evid. Rule 401.
Photographs depicting the crime scene and victim’s body are generally admissible,
provided they are relevant and competent aids to the jury. Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 676.
“However, manipulation of a corpse leads to concern that the work of a pathologist could
be attributed to a defendant.” Jackson v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied (citing Swingley, 739 N.E.2d at 133). Accordingly, autopsy
photographs depicting the body in an altered state are generally inadmissible. Id.
Nonetheless, Swingley recognized that “there are situations where some alteration of the
body is allowed where necessary to demonstrate the testimony being given.” 739 N.E.2d
at 134.
As such, autopsy photographs of a victim have been found ‘“relevant not only to
prove his or her identity, but serve as an aid to understanding the pathologist’s findings on
the cause of death.”’ Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 677 (quoting Woods v. State, 677 N.E.2d
499, 504 (Ind. 1997)). For example, in Fentress v. State, 702 N.E.2d 721 (Ind. 1998), the
Court held admissible two photographs that depicted the victim’s skull with the hair and
skin pulled away from it. Because the pathologist had explained what he had done and the
alteration was necessary to determine the extent of the injuries, the “potential for
4 confusion” was minimal and the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. Id. at
722.
Dr. John Cavanaugh, the pathologist who testified regarding the cause of Moss’s
death, referenced States Exhibits 77 and 79 in explaining the fatal wound and its trajectory.
Singleton insists the photographs were unnecessary because the trajectory could have been
fully explained without graphic photographs and because Singleton offered to stipulate that
Moss died of a gunshot wound.
Singleton directs our attention to our supreme court’s language in Corbett v. State,
764 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 2002), a case in which two photographs of the hollow shell of the
victim’s body had been admitted into evidence. The Court observed that the photographs
“greatly and unnecessarily enhance[d] the gruesomeness of the pictures” and concluded
“[t]hese two photographs, although relevant to the cause of death and the disputed issue of
the number of blows, were so prejudicial that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
them to be admitted.” Id. at 627. Reversal was not warranted, however, because the
admission was found not to have affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 628
(citing Ind. Trial Rule 61, which provides in relevant part: “The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.”))
Here, the probative value of the challenged photographs was arguably lessened
because Singleton admitted shooting Moss and the cause of death was not contested. This
is not to say, however, that the trial court was required to reject the photographs because
5 Singleton offered to stipulate to causation. Our Indiana Supreme Court recently reiterated,
in Halliburton, that there is no rule limiting the facts in issue when one party unilaterally
concedes or offers to stipulate to a fact. 1 N.E.3d at 677 (citing Butler v. State, 647 N.E.2d
631, 634 (Ind. 1995)). The Halliburton Court rejected the appellant’s contention that
autopsy photographs were inadmissible merely because there was no dispute concerning
the victim’s identity and cause of death. Id.
Ultimately, as discussed in Corbett, an appellant challenging autopsy photographs
bears the burden to “demonstrate how the erroneous admission of some of the photographs
affected his substantial rights.” 764 N.E.2d at 628. Singleton admitted that he shot Moss
but claimed to believe that Moss had a gun. The jury was instructed to decide whether
Singleton acted knowingly or intentionally, in sudden heat, or in self-defense. As the
controversy focused on Singleton’s intent, the admission of photographs showing Moss’s
body in an altered state was of limited value. That said, however, their prejudicial impact
was also limited. Singleton had admitted causing the fatal injury to Moss’s body and the
pathologist explained the process of the autopsy. It is unlikely that the jury attributed the
work of the pathologist to Singleton when trying to determine his state of mind and
perceptions at the time of the shooting.
Conclusion
Singleton did not demonstrate that the admission of two challenged autopsy
photographs affected his substantial rights.
Affirmed.
6 NAJAM, J., and PYLE, J., concur.