Edelmira Salayes Araiza v. William Barr
This text of Edelmira Salayes Araiza v. William Barr (Edelmira Salayes Araiza v. William Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 12 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDELMIRA BACA NORIEGA SALAYES No. 16-71000 ARAIZA, Agency No. A087-244-853 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 10, 2019** Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and CALLAHAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Edelmira Salayes Araiza, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions
for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal
challenging the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of a continuance to prepare the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). case and file an application for relief from removal. Specifically, Salayes Araiza
argues that the IJ should have granted her motion for a continuance so that her
attorney, whom she had retained the day before her final hearing, could prepare for
the case and locate and submit her written application for relief. She also argues
that a continuance was warranted in light of her pending collateral attack in state
court on her criminal conviction, which, if successful, would impact her eligibility
for forms of relief from removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and
we deny the petition.
“The question whether denial of a continuance in an immigration proceeding
constitutes an abuse of discretion cannot be decided through the application of
bright-line rules; it must be resolved on a case by case basis according to the facts
and circumstances of each case.” Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir.1988)
(citation omitted). When evaluating an IJ’s denial of a motion for continuance, we
have considered factors such as the number of prior continuances and their
duration, the reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, the inconvenience to the
immigration court, the nature of the evidence to be presented and its importance to
the alien’s claim, and whether the denial of the continuance violates the
immigrant’s rights. See id. at 91-93.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the IJ’s denial of a continuance was
not an abuse of discretion. See Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir.
2 1985) (“[T]he decision to grant or deny continuances is in the sound discretion of
the trial judge and will not be overturned except on a showing of clear abuse.”).
The IJ had previously granted Salayes Araiza a total of five continuances in the
five months that had elapsed since her initial hearing, and she had repeatedly failed
to comply with his directives and deadlines, particularly in regard to the
submission of her application for relief.
Moreover, Salayes Araiza has not shown how the denial of the continuance
violated her rights or caused her prejudice. With regard to her right to present
evidence, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B), Salayes Araiza does not specify what
evidence or witnesses she would have presented if her requested continuance had
been granted. The IJ questioned Salayes Araiza about her claims and fairly
developed her testimony during the hearing, and Salayes Araiza has not challenged
any of his actual findings of fact or legal conclusions. While a delay presumably
would have allowed counsel to locate and submit Salayes Araiza’s written
application, she does not explain what relevant information the application would
have contained, or how it would have differed from her in-hearing testimony or
changed the outcome of her immigration proceeding.
Salayes Araiza likewise has not explained how the denial of the continuance
might have affected her right to counsel, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). In some
cases, where a retained attorney has failed to appear at the merits hearing, we have
3 found that the IJ’s denial of a requested continuance effectively denied the
immigrant’s right to counsel. See, e.g., Hernandez-Gil v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 803
(9th Cir. 2007); Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012). Here,
however, Salayes Araiza’s counsel was present for the hearing and given an
opportunity to ask questions and elucidate her client’s claims for relief. As such,
the IJ’s decision to proceed with the merits hearing did not deny Salayes Araiza
her right to counsel.
As Salayes Araiza fails to demonstrate any violation of her rights, she is also
unable to show she suffered any prejudice due to the denied continuance. See
Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2018) (“As a general rule,
an individual may obtain relief for a due process violation only if he shows that the
violation caused him prejudice, meaning the violation potentially affected the
outcome of the immigration proceeding.”). Thus, we affirm the agency’s denial of
a continuance and deny the petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
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