Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-11971 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-05853-SCJ
EDDIE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS SERVICE, et al., MIKE ROBY, Commissioner, CRALETA ROBINSON, Coach, Employee, GA Dept. Vet. SVC., RONDA WILSON, Employee, GA Dept. of Vet. SVC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(October 31, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Eddie Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals (1) the sua sponte dismissal of his
civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and (2) denial of his
motion to amend the complaint. After review of the record, we affirm.
I
On December 21, 2018, Mr. Johnson sued the Georgia Department of
Veterans Service, its commissioner, and two of its employees under § 1983 for
violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Johnson claimed that the
defendants illegally interfered in his administrative hearing before the Board of
Veterans Appeals (“BVA”) as a part of a conspiracy to deny him compensation for
injuries suffered during military service. Specifically, Mr. Johnson alleged that the
defendants illegally represented to the BVA that the Georgia Department of
Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) was his legal representative without standing to do so.
Mr. Johnson asserted that he submitted several pro se claims for compensation
to the DVA and never let the Georgia Department of Veterans Service, or any other
entity authority, represent him. Several letters from the DVA corroborate that it
had no record of appointing a representative for any of Mr. Johnson’s claims. See
D.E. 2-2 at 12, 14, 22, 23, 29, 31, 42, 45.
To further bolster his claim, Mr. Johnson also submitted an affidavit and
2 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 3 of 7
several letters of correspondence from the DVA. Two letters from the DVA,
however, listed the Georgia Department of Veterans Service as his representative in
his current dispute. Id. at 64, 65. The first letter—dated September 24, 2014—
informed Mr. Johnson that his pending appeal file was “forwarded to the Georgia
Department of Veterans Services, your power of attorney for VA claims.” Id. at 64.
The second letter—dated March 2, 2015—informed Mr. Johnson of his upcoming
May 15, 2015, hearing and advised that his personal representative, listed as the
Georgia Department of Veterans Service, was also provided a copy of the letter. Id.
at 65–66.
After filing suit, Mr. Johnson moved to amend his complaint. He asserted
the same underlying claim, while raising other legal arguments and minor assertions.
On its own, the district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred by
Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations. The court determined that Mr. Johnson
knew that he was injured, and by whom, when the Georgia Department of Veterans
Service did not make an appearance on his behalf at the May 15, 2015, hearing. Mr.
Johnson, however, did not file his complaint until December 21, 2018. The court
also held that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because Mr. Johnson
did not provide a more carefully drafted complaint that might state a claim. The
court therefore dismissed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and denied Mr.
3 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 4 of 7
Johnson’s motion to amend the complaint.
II
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), “viewing the allegations in the complaint as
true.” Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). We also review
de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the pertinent statute of
limitations. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334
(11th Cir. 2006). We review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an
abuse of discretion. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d
1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
III
On appeal, Mr. Johnson combines the dismissal of his action and the denial
of his motion to amend the complaint into a single issue. He argues that the district
court abused its discretion because his claim was meritorious, and the court declined
to address the merits.
If a plaintiff moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the district
court determines that the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” it must dismiss the action. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
At the same time, a district court may properly dismiss a § 1983 complaint for
4 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 5 of 7
failure to state a claim if the applicable statute of limitations bars the lawsuit. See
Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2011) (dismissing a § 1983
action for noncompliance with Alabama’s two-year statute of limitation for tort
actions). Because § 1983 actions are akin to constitutional tort claims, they are
subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state in
which the federal court sits. Id. The governing statute of limitations in Georgia is
two years and begins to run when the plaintiff knows of the injury and is aware of
who caused it. See Ledford v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 856 F.3d 1327, 1330
(11th Cir. 2017) (noting that the applicable statute of limitations in Georgia is two
years).
Here, we conclude that the court properly dismissed the amended complaint
because the claim was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Accepting
the allegations in the complaint and supporting attachments as true, the latest that
Mr. Johnson could have first discovered interference in his BVA proceeding was
June 9, 2015, when he wrote a letter to the Department of Veteran Service stating
that the DVA was not authorized to represent him. See D.E. 2-2 at 49–54. Yet Mr.
Johnson did not file his action until December 21, 2018. D.E. 2 at 1. Accordingly,
Georgia’s two-year-statute of limitations barred Mr. Johnson’s § 1983, and the
district court correctly dismissed his original complaint.
5 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 6 of 7
Mr. Johnson also argues that the district court should have allowed him to
amend his complaint. But his proposed amendments would fail for the same
reasons that called for dismissal of his original complaint.
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Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-11971 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-05853-SCJ
EDDIE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS SERVICE, et al., MIKE ROBY, Commissioner, CRALETA ROBINSON, Coach, Employee, GA Dept. Vet. SVC., RONDA WILSON, Employee, GA Dept. of Vet. SVC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(October 31, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Eddie Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals (1) the sua sponte dismissal of his
civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and (2) denial of his
motion to amend the complaint. After review of the record, we affirm.
I
On December 21, 2018, Mr. Johnson sued the Georgia Department of
Veterans Service, its commissioner, and two of its employees under § 1983 for
violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Johnson claimed that the
defendants illegally interfered in his administrative hearing before the Board of
Veterans Appeals (“BVA”) as a part of a conspiracy to deny him compensation for
injuries suffered during military service. Specifically, Mr. Johnson alleged that the
defendants illegally represented to the BVA that the Georgia Department of
Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) was his legal representative without standing to do so.
Mr. Johnson asserted that he submitted several pro se claims for compensation
to the DVA and never let the Georgia Department of Veterans Service, or any other
entity authority, represent him. Several letters from the DVA corroborate that it
had no record of appointing a representative for any of Mr. Johnson’s claims. See
D.E. 2-2 at 12, 14, 22, 23, 29, 31, 42, 45.
To further bolster his claim, Mr. Johnson also submitted an affidavit and
2 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 3 of 7
several letters of correspondence from the DVA. Two letters from the DVA,
however, listed the Georgia Department of Veterans Service as his representative in
his current dispute. Id. at 64, 65. The first letter—dated September 24, 2014—
informed Mr. Johnson that his pending appeal file was “forwarded to the Georgia
Department of Veterans Services, your power of attorney for VA claims.” Id. at 64.
The second letter—dated March 2, 2015—informed Mr. Johnson of his upcoming
May 15, 2015, hearing and advised that his personal representative, listed as the
Georgia Department of Veterans Service, was also provided a copy of the letter. Id.
at 65–66.
After filing suit, Mr. Johnson moved to amend his complaint. He asserted
the same underlying claim, while raising other legal arguments and minor assertions.
On its own, the district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred by
Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations. The court determined that Mr. Johnson
knew that he was injured, and by whom, when the Georgia Department of Veterans
Service did not make an appearance on his behalf at the May 15, 2015, hearing. Mr.
Johnson, however, did not file his complaint until December 21, 2018. The court
also held that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because Mr. Johnson
did not provide a more carefully drafted complaint that might state a claim. The
court therefore dismissed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and denied Mr.
3 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 4 of 7
Johnson’s motion to amend the complaint.
II
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), “viewing the allegations in the complaint as
true.” Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). We also review
de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the pertinent statute of
limitations. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334
(11th Cir. 2006). We review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an
abuse of discretion. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d
1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
III
On appeal, Mr. Johnson combines the dismissal of his action and the denial
of his motion to amend the complaint into a single issue. He argues that the district
court abused its discretion because his claim was meritorious, and the court declined
to address the merits.
If a plaintiff moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the district
court determines that the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” it must dismiss the action. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
At the same time, a district court may properly dismiss a § 1983 complaint for
4 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 5 of 7
failure to state a claim if the applicable statute of limitations bars the lawsuit. See
Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2011) (dismissing a § 1983
action for noncompliance with Alabama’s two-year statute of limitation for tort
actions). Because § 1983 actions are akin to constitutional tort claims, they are
subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state in
which the federal court sits. Id. The governing statute of limitations in Georgia is
two years and begins to run when the plaintiff knows of the injury and is aware of
who caused it. See Ledford v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 856 F.3d 1327, 1330
(11th Cir. 2017) (noting that the applicable statute of limitations in Georgia is two
years).
Here, we conclude that the court properly dismissed the amended complaint
because the claim was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Accepting
the allegations in the complaint and supporting attachments as true, the latest that
Mr. Johnson could have first discovered interference in his BVA proceeding was
June 9, 2015, when he wrote a letter to the Department of Veteran Service stating
that the DVA was not authorized to represent him. See D.E. 2-2 at 49–54. Yet Mr.
Johnson did not file his action until December 21, 2018. D.E. 2 at 1. Accordingly,
Georgia’s two-year-statute of limitations barred Mr. Johnson’s § 1983, and the
district court correctly dismissed his original complaint.
5 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 6 of 7
Mr. Johnson also argues that the district court should have allowed him to
amend his complaint. But his proposed amendments would fail for the same
reasons that called for dismissal of his original complaint.
Under Rule 15(a), a plaintiff has the right to amend a complaint “once as a
matter of course within . . . 21 days after serving it[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
“In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave,” but “[t]he court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Although leave to amend shall be
freely given when justice so requires, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous
grounds such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the
amendment.” Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep't of Educ. Ex
rel. Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (alterations and quotations
marks omitted).
Here, Mr. Johnson never filed an amended complaint as a matter of course.
Rather, he moved for leave to amend the complaint. In doing so, he “invited the
District Court to review its proposed amendments.” Coventry First, LLC v.
McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2010). As the party seeking leave to amend
under Rule 15(a), he bore the “burden of establishing entitlement to it.” See In re
Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1119 n. 37 (11th Cir. 2014). The district court thus
6 Case: 19-11971 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 7 of 7
had discretion under Rule 15(a) to evaluate his motion.
Because nothing in the amended complaint cured the statute of limitation
deficiency that plagued the original complaint, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by finding the amended complaint futile. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510
F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a court may deny a proposed
amendment as futile “when the complaint as amended would still properly be
dismissed”). Accordingly, denying Mr. Johnson leave to file an amended
complaint was not an abuse of discretion.
IV
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Johnson’s action and the denial
of the motion to amend the complaint.
AFFIRMED.