Eddie Ford, Jr. v. Frank Griswald

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: May 22, 2023
• Docket: 22-11774
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-11774 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 05/22/2023 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11774 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

EDDIE FORD, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, versus FRANK GRISWALD, A. GARRETT,

Defendants-Appellees,

LOVELESS JOHNSON,

Defendant. USCA11 Case: 22-11774 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 05/22/2023 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 22-11774

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00083-MHT-SRW ____________________

Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Eddie Ford, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing as time-barred his complaint alleging that prison officials violated his due process rights by removing his good-time earning status. Specifically, Ford alleges that prison officials vio- lated his civil rights in 1991 when the Alabama Department of Cor- rections removed his good-time earning status. He argues that he timely filed his complaint because he was entitled to tolling of the two-year statute of limitations while he pursued related relief in state court. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and ap- plication of the applicable statute of limitations. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). All constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are considered tort actions that are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the Section 1983 claim is filed. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (holding that state law also determines statutory tolling rules in Section 1983 USCA11 Case: 22-11774 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 05/22/2023 Page: 3 of 3

22-11774 Opinion of the Court 3

actions). In Alabama, the governing statute of limitations is two years. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173. In general, after a limitations period has run, the action is barred, regardless of the merits of the plain- tiff’s claims. Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006). But, under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations is paused “when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently, but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” Fedance v. Harris, 1 F.4th 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021) (quo- tation marks omitted). Assuming without deciding that pursuing relief in state court tolls the Section 1983 statute of limitations, the district court did not err in concluding that Ford’s complaint was time-barred. “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Construed liberally, Ford argues that he is entitled to equitable toll- ing based on litigation in state court. But he filed this complaint nearly 30 years after the events that triggered the statute of limita- tions. The record also establishes that he was not pursuing any state court remedies between 1996 and 2008. Accordingly, Ford’s state court actions do not render the late complaint timely within Ala- bama’s two-year statute of limitations. AFFIRMED.