Eddie Dunbar v. K. Coffman, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-08898
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 EDDIE DUNBAR, Case No. 24-cv-08898-AMO (PR)

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 9 v. AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; AND DENYING HIS MOTION FOR 10 K. COFFMAN, et al., PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION & TRO Defendants. Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 15 11

12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff Eddie Dunbar, who is self-represented and currently incarcerated at Kern Valley 14 State Prison (“KVSP”), has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional 15 violations at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) where he was formerly incarcerated. The claims 16 in Dunbar’s complaint stem from allegations that, following an unsubstantiated suspicion of drug 17 concealment, Defendants PBSP Officers K. Coffman, J. Sweet, and L. Deters subjected Dunbar to 18 prolonged contraband watch conditions that were carried out with deliberate indifference to his 19 constitutional rights and in violation of his First Amendment right to observe a religious fast. See 20 Dkt. 1 at 4-6. 21 Before the Court are Dunbar’s motion to compel discovery responses and request for 22 sanctions, as well as his motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order 23 (“TRO”) seeking to prevent his transfer from his current location, KVSP, back to PBSP. Dkts. 14, 24 15. Defendants have opposed these motions. Dkts. 17, 18. 25 For the reasons set forth below, his motions are DENIED. 26 II. BACKGROUND 27 On or around April 26, 2022, as Dunbar was being released from administrative 1 scan, Dunbar had drugs concealed in his intestines. Dkt. 1 at 5. As a result, Dunbar was placed on 2 contraband watch and confined to a small cell without a bed until after 8:00 PM daily for two to 3 three days. Id. During this period, Dunbar was required to eat food to produce three bowel 4 movements in compliance with contraband watch procedures, which he alleges violated his 5 religious rights as he is a Muslim and was observing a Ramadan fast. Id. at 5-6. Dunbar was 6 handcuffed and required to defecate in the presence of PBSP officials, causing him significant 7 distress, and these officials allegedly refused to count his bowel movements as sufficient, 8 prolonging his confinement. Id. Upon further examination, PBSP officials found no drugs or 9 contraband. Id. Dunbar alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference and reckless 10 disregard for his constitutional rights. Id. 11 On November 7, 2025, Dunbar filed the instant motion to compel Defendants to provide 12 responses to his first set of requests for the production of documents, requests for admissions, and 13 interrogatories, asserting that he had served his discovery requests on July 1, 2025 but received no 14 response. Dkt. 14 at 2. 15 On November 24, 2025, Dunbar filed a motion for preliminary injunction and TRO to 16 prevent the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) from transferring 17 him from KVSP to PBSP. Dkt. 15. The record shows that Dunbar was placed in KVSP’s 18 Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”) on May 13, 2025 after being found to have committed battery 19 on a peace officer. See Dkt. 18 at 7. The classification committee determined that Dunbar’s 20 conduct and history required placement at a Level IV/180 institution. Id. Although the committee 21 considered Dunbar’s preferences and initially recommended transfer to either Salinas Valley State 22 Prison or California State Prison - Sacramento, neither institution had the requisite program 23 availability or housing capacity. Id. Dunbar was accordingly designated for transfer to PBSP. Id. 24 Dunbar alleges that transferring him to PBSP would put him in imminent danger of irreparable 25 harm due to possible retaliation from PBSP staff and would disrupt access to his medical and 26 mental health treatment. Dkt. 15 at 1, 3-4. 27 III. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 1 aspects of discovery. Thus, before filing a motion to compel, the moving party must first attempt 2 to resolve the dispute informally with the opposing party. It is only when the parties are unable to 3 resolve the dispute after making a good faith effort to do so should they seek the Court’s 4 intervention. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B); N.D. Cal. Local Rule 37-1. 5 Here, the record makes clear that Dunbar’s motion to compel discovery should be denied 6 as moot. Dunbar filed his motion on November 7, 2025, asserting that he had served his discovery 7 requests on July 1, 2025 but received no response. Dkt. 14 at 2. However, pursuant to Dunbar’s 8 legal mail logs and his August 14, 2025 meet and confer letter, he had served his requests directly 9 to the California Attorney General in San Francisco rather than to Defendants’ counsel in San 10 Diego. Id. at 25-28. Thus, the record shows that Defendants’ counsel never received those 11 requests and was unaware that they had been sent. Id. at 28. Defendants accordingly asked 12 Dunbar to serve his requests to the address listed for service. Id. On September 23, 2025, 13 Defendants were properly served in San Diego. Dkt. 17 at 5. On October 24, 2025, Defendants 14 timely responded, which was within thirty days of service. Id. at 7; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 33, 34, 15 and 36. 16 Because Dunbar’s legal mail logs show his motion to compel was mailed on November 5, 17 2025—the same day he received mail from the Attorney General’s Office—he likely received 18 Defendants’ responses shortly after filing his motion to compel. Dkt. 17 at 9. Thus, the record 19 shows that Defendants timely responded once they were properly served, and that Dunbar has 20 since received those responses. Therefore, the Court DENIES as moot Dunbar’s motion to 21 compel discovery. Dkt. 14. Dunbar’s request for sanctions is likewise DENIED as moot, and, in 22 any event, there is no basis for sanctions. Dkt. 14. 23 IV. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TRO 24 A. Jurisdiction 25 As a threshold matter, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction to grant the requested relief 26 Dunbar seeks because he seeks a preliminary injunction and TRO against a non-party, the CDCR. 27 An injunction is binding only on parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, 1 65(d). In order to enforce an injunction against an entity, the district court must have personal 2 jurisdiction over that entity. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 94 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 The court should not issue an injunction that it cannot enforce. Id. 4 As mentioned above, Dunbar requests the Court to prevent the CDCR from transferring 5 him from KVSP to PBSP. Dkt. 15 at 4. Authority over inmate housing assignments rests with 6 CDCR as an institution, exercised through the classification committee process. See Cal. Code 7 Regs. tit. 15, § 3375, et seq.; Cal Pen. Code § 5068; CDCR Dep’t Ops. Manual 15000.10. 8 Because the CDCR has not been named as a defendant or served in this action, the Court has no 9 jurisdiction over the CDCR to issue, much less enforce, a restraining order. 10 In light of this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to enjoin the CDCR from transferring Dunbar to 11 PBSP, the motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO is DENIED. 12 B. Merits 13 In any event, even if the Court had jurisdiction to enjoin the CDCR from transferring 14 Dunbar to PBSP, he has failed to establish all the factors under Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 15 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), to warrant a preliminary injunction and TRO. 16 “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 17 granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” Lopez v. 18 Brewer, et al., 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The standard for issuing a 19 TRO is similar to that required for a preliminary injunction. See Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. 20 U.S. Dist. Ct., 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). “A plaintiff seeking 21 a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 22 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 23 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Irreparable harm 24 must be likely, not merely possible. Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of State of Cal., 739 25 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). Where the court concludes the movant has failed to show a 26 likelihood of success on the merits, the court, in its discretion, need not consider whether the 27 movant would suffer irreparable injury. Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 the scope of available injunctive relief. Before a court may grant a prisoner’s request for an 2 injunction, the PLRA requires that the court find “that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no 3 further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means 4 necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Courts must also 5 “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal 6 justice system caused by the relief.” Id. Consistent with these principles, inmates do not have a 7 constitutional right to be housed at a particular facility or institution or to be transferred, or not 8 transferred, from one facility or institution to another.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244 9 (1983). 10 1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 11 Dunbar contends in a conclusory manner that he is likely to succeed on the merits because 12 he has served discovery requests asking Defendants to admit they violated CDCR policy and 13 asserts “documented evidence will supplement the claims.” Dkt. 15 at 3. The service of discovery 14 requests does not establish a likelihood of success on the merits particularly where, as here, 15 Defendants denied all allegations of CDCR policy violation in their responses. However, even if 16 Defendants had admitted policy violations, such an admission would not carry Dunbar’s burden, 17 as violations of “state departmental regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation.” 18 Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). Dunbar’s theoretical assertion—that 19 documentary evidence will eventually materialize—is insufficient. He fails to demonstrate that 20 success on his claims is likely—rather than just theoretically possible—and, therefore, he fails to 21 satisfy the first Winter factor. Accordingly, Dunbar’s motion may be denied on this basis alone. 22 2. Irreparable Harm 23 Dunbar alleges that transfer to PBSP would place him in imminent danger of “physical 24 assault, physiological harm, and potential death” at the hands of PBSP staff and that it would 25 disrupt his ongoing mental health. Dkt. 15 at 3-4. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff 26 must show a presently existing, actual threat of harm; injury need not be certain, but it must be 27 more than speculative. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 ] Procedure 65’s “irreparable injury” requirement, Dunbar must do more than simply allege 2 |} imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 3 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This requires Dunbar to allege “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified 4 || complaint [which] clearly show” a credible threat of “immediate and irreparable injury, loss or 5 || damage.” Fed R. Civ. P. 65(b)(A). 6 Dunbar has not met this standard. His assertions regarding retaliation by PBSP staff are 7 || vague and conclusory, unsupported by specific facts or evidence and are insufficient to establish a 8 likelihood of irreparable harm. See Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commce’ns, Inc., 750 F.2d 9 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding irreparable harm not established by statements that “are 10 || conclusory and without sufficient support in facts”). Dunbar’s speculative concerns regarding the 11 transfer leading to the “sever[ing] [of] access to ongoing medical and mental health treatment” are 12 || similarly unsubstantiated. See Dkt. 15 at 3. He provides no information about the nature of such 13 || treatment, whether comparable services are unavailable at PBSP, or why any disruption would be 14 || irreparable. Dunbar has therefore failed to satisfy the second Winter factor. 3 15 Because Dunbar would need to establish all four Winter factors but cannot establish those 16 || discussed, his motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO is DENIED. Dkt. 15. 17 |) V. | CONCLUSION Zz 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 19 1. Dunbar’s motion to compel discovery and request for sanctions are DENIED as 20 || moot. Dkt. 14. 21 2. Dunbar’s motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO is DENIED. Dkt. 15. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: 7/2/2026 24 ( eacel Med □□ CELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 25 United States District Judge 26 27 28