Eddie Cargile v. Secretary, Dept. of Correction

349 F. App'x 505
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 21, 2009
Docket09-10875
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 349 F. App'x 505 (Eddie Cargile v. Secretary, Dept. of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eddie Cargile v. Secretary, Dept. of Correction, 349 F. App'x 505 (11th Cir. 2009).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Eddie G. Cargile, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district *506 court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief challenging his life sentences following a jury conviction for sexual battery of a child under the age of 12 and lewd and lascivious acts in the presence of a child. In his petition, Cargile claimed, inter alia, that Florida violated his due process rights because he was tried and convicted in Hillsborough County, Florida, an allegedly improper venue, for conduct that allegedly occurred in Polk County, Florida. The district court found that Cargile failed to exhaust his remedies in state court by not raising the improper venue issue on direct appeal and was consequently procedurally barred from raising the issue in federal court.

We granted a certificate of appealability on the following issue only: Whether the district court erred by finding that Car-gile’s challenge to the trial court’s venue was not exhausted, where it was raised in a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Cargile argues that the district court erred in determining that his venue claim was not exhausted because, even though he did not raise the issue on direct appeal or in a post-conviction motion, he raised the issue in his state habeas corpus petitions.

I. BACKGROUND

The record shows that Cargile did not challenge venue in Hillsborough County at any time before trial or during trial. See R. Ex. 23. After being convicted and sentenced, Cargile filed a direct appeal to Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140. However, Cargile did not raise a venue challenge in his direct appeal. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction without opinion. Cargile then filed a pro se Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief (“Rule 3.850 motion”) that raised four issues, none of which included a venue challenge. Cargile does not dispute that he failed to challenge venue on direct appeal or in his Rule 3.850 motion.

Next, Cargile filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court where he raised his venue issue for the first time. The Florida Supreme Court determined that relief was unauthorized and dismissed the petition. Cargile filed a second writ of habeas corpus in Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal alleging that the State failed to establish proper venue in Hillsborough County. The court dismissed Cargile’s petition, stating that “a petition for writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to collaterally attack a conviction.” Cargile v. State, 902 So.2d 142, 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing State v. Broom, 523 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)).

After both of Cargile’s state habeas corpus petitions were dismissed, Cargile filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida alleging, inter alia, that he was tried and convicted in an improper venue. The district court denied Cargile’s petition, holding that his venue claim was procedurally defaulted because Cargile failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Cargile v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 2009, 2009 WL 248183, *2 (No. 8:05-cv-919-T-23MSS, M.D.Fla. Jan. 30, 2009). The district court further found that Cargile neither alleged cause and prejudice for the procedural default, nor did he show a manifest injustice. Id. at *2-3. We agree with the district court and affirm the denial of Cargile’s petition for habeas corpus relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitioner for habeas corpus relief is procedurally barred from raising a particular claim is a mixed question of law and fact that we *507 review de novo. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (citing Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1997)).

III. DISCUSSION

Generally, a habeas corpus petitioner cannot raise a claim in federal court if he did not first exhaust the claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Kelley v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corrs., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343 (11th Cir.2004). A federal claim is exhausted only if fairly presented to the state courts. McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). A petitioner has not fairly presented his claim to the state court if such claim is presented for the first and only time in a procedural context where the merits are not considered. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989).

In Florida, certain claims are barred from being raised outside a direct appeal, and venue is one of those claims. See Lambrix v. State, 559 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla.1990) (per curiam) (stating that a claim of error “based on information which was contained in the original record of the case ... must be raised on direct appeal.”). Cargile had the opportunity to raise his venue challenge on dii-ect appeal and failed to do so. Because Cargile failed to challenge venue on direct appeal, he was barred from raising it in both a Rule 3.850 motion and in a state habeas corpus petition.

Cargile was barred from raising his venue claim in a Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief because the Florida Supreme Court explained in Baker v. State:

The purpose of the Rule 3.850 motion is ... not to review ordinary trial errors cognizable by means of a direct appeal. The motion procedure is neither a second appeal nor a substitute for appeal---- [A]ny matters which could have been presented on appeal are similarly held to be foreclosed from consideration by motion under the Rule. Therefore, a Rule 3.850 motion based upon grounds which either were or could have been raised as issues on appeal may be summarily denied.

878 So.2d 1236, 1242 (Fla.2004) (per cu-riam) (quoting McCrae v. State, 437 So.2d 1388, 1390 (Fla.1983) (per curiam)). Thus, because Cargile did not raise his venue challenge on direct appeal, he was barred from raising the same issue in a Rule 3.850 motion.

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349 F. App'x 505, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eddie-cargile-v-secretary-dept-of-correction-ca11-2009.