Edariel Melendez v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: A-1355-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1355-24

EDARIEL MELENDEZ,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent. __________________________

Submitted February 2, 2026 – Decided March 10, 2026

Before Judges Sabatino and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Edariel Melendez, self-represented appellant.

Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Dorothy M. Rodriguez, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Appellant Edariel Melendez appeals from a November 22, 2024 final

administrative decision of defendant New Jersey Department of Corrections

("Department") upholding a disciplinary hearing officer's ("DHO") finding of

guilt for possession of a SIM card and imposition of sanctions related to his

guilty plea to possession of a cell phone, prohibited acts under *.009 (misuse,

possession, distribution, sale or intent to distribute or sell an electronic

communication device) in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(1)(viii). We

affirm.

We discern the following facts from the record. On September 17, 2024,

while Melendez was an inmate at New Jersey State Prison, Officers W. Gorman

and L. Jovanovic entered his holding cell and observed him with a cellular

phone. Instead of complying with officers' instructions to raise his hands,

Melendez made an unsuccessful attempt to flush the phone down the toilet.

A subsequent search of his holding cell revealed a SIM card, which

Officer Gorman found hidden in a sock behind a vent grate.1

1 A SIM card is a card that is inserted into a cell phone, used for identification of the phone on a communications network, and to store data. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/SIM%20card (defining "SIM card") (last visited Feb. 18, 2026). A-1355-24 2 Melendez was charged with two counts of prohibited acts *.009, for

possessing the phone and the SIM card, both under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-

4.1(a)(1)(viii). 2 The charges were delivered to Melendez the next day and the

matter was referred to a DHO for further action. According to Melendez, "when

the investigating sergeant came to deliver the charge on September 18, 2025,

[he] immediately accepted responsibility for his actions. He admitted the cell

phone was his." He further clarified that he admitted to possessing the phone,

but was clear in stating that "he never used the phone for any illegal activity nor

did he ever allow anyone else to use the phone."

A separate hearing was scheduled on September 30, 2024 before a DHO

on the possession of the SIM card charge. Melendez was present for the hearing

accompanied by a counsel substitute.3 According to Melendez, at the

disciplinary hearing, he admitted that he used the phone to speak with his family

and when the hearing officer inquired why the phone was necessary, he

2 Melendez was also charged with one count of *.203 (possession or introduction of any prohibited substance, such as drugs, intoxicants, or related paraphernalia). N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(6)(i). However, while the *.203 charge is related to the same incident, it was delayed and adjudicated separately. Therefore, it is not at issue in this appeal. 3 Counsel substitute served as a New Jersey State Prison Law Library paralegal. A-1355-24 3 explained that his daughter was having a sweet sixteen party and that he wanted

to attend via the cell phone.

At this hearing, the Department presented the reports of Officers Gorman

and Jovanovic. Melendez, however, did not testify or offer any written

statements and declined to call or cross-examine any witnesses.

Following the hearing, the DHO found Melendez guilty of possessing an

unauthorized SIM card, reasoning that it is "'a device that is capable of storing

information [and] data[,]'" and memorialized the decision in an adjudication

report reasons for the decisions.

The adjudication reports show that the DHO relied on the following

evidence: (1) the authorization for prehearing disciplinary housing placement;

(2) the incident and special custody reports; (3) Melendez's medical evaluation;

(4) the seizure of contraband report and accompanying photographs; and (5) e-

mail correspondence pertaining to seized items. In imposing sanctions, the DHO

noted that she considered the statements offered by Melendez's counsel

substitute, Melendez's plea and disciplinary history, the seriousness of the

offense, and the need to deter similar acts in the future.

Melendez requested leniency in the imposition of sanctions based on his

guilty plea to the phone charge and history of only two prior disciplinary charges

A-1355-24 4 spanning his sixteen years' incarceration.4 The DHO imposed aggregate

sanctions of: (1) 365 days' loss of commutation time; (2) 365 days confined to

restorative housing unit ("RHU"); (3) 300 days' loss of phone, television, and

radio privileges; (4) permanent loss of contact visits; (5) 30 days' loss of Canteen

(luxury items only); (6) 30 days' loss of recreational privileges ("LORP"); and

(7) a referral of appellant's charges "to the Mercer County Prosecutor pursuant

to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:29-10."

Melendez filed an administrative appeal, arguing that the DHO's decision

and sanctions "were grossly disproportionate when compared to other persons

who had the same type charge," citing specifically two cases involving other

inmates who were found guilty of cell phone infractions, and who he maintained

received far more lenient sentences of ninety and one-hundred-days RHUs,

compared to his 365 days. He further asserted that his sentence was unfair and

discriminatory. In his brief, Melendez admitted that "*.009 is an extremely

serious offense" but explained "that an inmate can commit an extremely serious

act with a less-culpable motive."

4 Melendez argued his last disciplinary charge occurred in 2020, though the record does not detail the underlying offense or infraction. A-1355-24 5 Approximately six weeks later, Acting Administrator J. Crothers 5 denied

the appeal, concluding that after reviewing all of the reports and disciplinary

history, Melendez was afforded the appropriate procedural safeguards, the

"extenuating circumstances [did] not outweigh the substantial evidence against"

him, the sanctions were "appropriately applied," and upheld the disciplinary

decision and sanctions.6

Before us, Melendez raises the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I

THE [DHO] VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, WHEN SHE IMPOSED SANCTIONS TWO AND THREE TIMES GREATER THAN THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON OTHERS, SIM[IL]ARLY SITUATED, FOUND GUILTY OF THE SAME PROHIBITED ACT, WHEN SAID SANCTIONS WERE NOT BASED ON SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. []

POINT II

THE [DHO] DID NOT PROVIDE A BASIS IN THE RECORD WHY SHE RECOMMENDED ["]ENHANCED SANCTIONS,["] NOR DO GUIDELINES EXIST TO EXPLAIN HOW AND/OR WHAT CONDITIONS PREC[E]DENT MUST EXIST TO SUPPORT A RECOMMENDATION FOR

5 The Acting Administrator's first name was omitted from the record before us. 6 Melendez asserts it was three months before he received the decision denying his appeal. A-1355-24 6 ["]ENHANCED SANCTIONS.["]

POINT III

THE PRISON CLASSIFICATION COMMITTEE . . . DID NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR IMPOSING ["]ENHANCED SANCTIONS,["] NOR DO WRITTEN GUIDELINES EXIST EXPLAINING HOW OR WHEN ["]ENHANCED SANCTIONS["] ARE WARRANTED.

POINT IV

(NOT RAISED BELOW) PRISON OFFICIALS VIOLATED MR. MELENDEZ'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.

On appeal, the judicial role in reviewing all administrative action is

generally limited to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's action violates

express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2)

whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on

which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative

policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could

not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. Allstars

Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018)

(quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). Our role in reviewing a

prison disciplinary decision is limited. Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J.

Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). Despite those limitations, we do not perform

A-1355-24 7 a perfunctory review of the agency's findings but engage in a careful and

principled examination. Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 203-

04 (App. Div. 2000).

A reviewing court "may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's,

even though the court might have reached a different result." Blanchard v. N.J.

Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 238-39 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting In re

Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194). We review agency decisions under an arbitrary

and capricious standard. Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n,

237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019); see also Melnyk v. Bd. of Educ. of Delsea Reg'l High

Sch. Dist., 241 N.J. 31, 40 (2020). "An agency's determination on the merits

'will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious,

or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone v. Bd. of

Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo v.

Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)).

Melendez challenges the Department's final agency decision, arguing it

was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because it was not based on

substantial credible evidence in the record. In this vein, he also raised due

process concerns, arguing he was found guilty even though "there are no

A-1355-24 8 published guidelines that establish criteria for imposing enhanced sanctions

under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(t)."7

Relatedly, Melendez challenges the imposition of sanctions on equal

protection grounds, asserting the sanctions were disproportionate when

compared to those imposed on other inmates who engaged in similar prohibited

activity. Melendez further avers that the DHO did not provide a basis for the

recommended sanctions, the prison classification committee did not provide a

basis for imposing enhanced sanctions, and there are no written guidelines

explaining how or when sanctions are warranted.

Melendez also challenges the DHO's determination the reporting officers'

account was credible and that his own testimony and explanation was not

credible. He further maintains that evidence relied upon—the testimony of

7 See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(t) (codifying administrative actions that may be taken in addition to sanctions including: recommending transfer to a more appropriate correctional facility; increasing custody status; changing work or housing assignments; assignment to a treatment program; assessing restitution for damage, alteration or destruction of property; recommending loss of telephone, radio, television and/or tablet or similar handheld electronic device privileges for up to one year; recommending loss of contact visit privileges for up to one year; recommending loss of recreation privileges for up to 180 calendar days; disposal of an item in accordance with; and/or placement in a "DRY" cell during prehearing discipline). A-1355-24 9 Officer Pazik—constitutes error because "there is credible evidence that

[Officer] Pazik was not even in the building the day of the search."

As a preliminary matter, we reject Melendez's argument the DHO violated

his due process rights. To the contrary, we are satisfied Melendez was afforded

due process when he was notified of the charges against him and granted an

opportunity to be heard at the administrative hearing. As set forth by our

Supreme Court, and later codified in the DOC regulations, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.1

to .28, inmates charged with disciplinary infractions are entitled to limited due

process protections and are not afforded "the full panoply of rights" guaranteed

to a defendant in a criminal prosecution. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522-23

(1975) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). These

regulations "strike the proper balance between the security concerns of the

prison, the need for swift and fair discipline, and the due-process rights of the

inmates." Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 203 (App. Div. 2000)

(citing McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 202 (1995)).

At the hearing, Melendez failed to offer testimony or evidence and he

neither challenged nor presented any contradictory evidence, leaving the DHO

to consider the uncontroverted evidence presented by Officers Gorman and

Jovanovic that he was discovered in his cell with a phone and SIM card, which

A-1355-24 10 is a clear violation of the Department's rule *.009. Accordingly, the DHO's

finding of guilt based on the uncontroverted testimony of Officers Gorman and

Jovanovic does not constitute error.

Relatedly, as to Melendez's argument that the DHO incorrectly relied on

evidence produced by Officer Pazik, who was not present when he was

discovered with the phone or when the SIM card was found,8 we are satisfied

that although the DHO inaccurately referred to Officer Pazik in her "summary

of evidence relied on," as the source of the testimony, any such error is harmless

and does not warrant reversal of the Department's determination given that the

DHO also correctly relied on the testimony of the officers who were present.

"Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of

such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result

. . . ." R. 2:10-2; State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280, 298 (2009). Because the

uncontroverted record supports the DHO's finding of guilt as to Melendez's

possession of the SIM card, the DHO's reference to Officer Pazik is not clearly

capable of producing a different result. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the

underlying, uncontroverted facts support the DHO's initial decision and the

8 Melendez states, "[Officer] Pazik was not part of the targeted search; in fact, there is a credible allegation that [Officer] Pazik was not even in the facility on that day." A-1355-24 11 Department did not abuse its discretion in relying on the observations of Officers

Jovanovic and Gorman that Melendez was holding a phone, which he attempted

to conceal by flushing it down the toilet, and the subsequent discovery of the

concealed SIM card in his cell. Based on these facts, there is substantial credible

evidence in the record to support the Department's decision.

Similarly, we reject Melendez's argument that the sanctions imposed were

too harsh, disproportionate and lacked any basis. Melendez has not

demonstrated that the DHO failed to apply the proper standard in reviewing his

appeal or that any required procedural safeguards were not followed. Melendez

argues solely that other inmates received far less sanctions than the 365 days

RHU he received. This argument, however, is insufficient to demonstrate the

Department's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See

Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194; In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007). Further,

N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(a) states "[t]he maximum [RHU] sanction for any prohibited

act or acts resulting from a single incident shall not exceed 365 days ." The

sanction imposed here comports with this regulation, therefore the claim is

without merit. Neither are we persuaded by Melendez's argument that he was

wrongfully confined to his cell twenty hours or more each day in violation of

the Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.5 to -82.11, as

A-1355-24 12 Melendez has not offered any such proof. We are thus convinced the

Department's decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence as a whole.

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

To the extent we have not addressed any of Melendez's arguments, it is

because we have determined they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in

a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-1355-24 13