E.D., an individual minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, CATHLEEN ANN MAGORIEN; CATHLEEN ANN MAGORIEN, an individual v. THE CITIZEN HOTEL, an entity form unknown; AIMBRIDGE HOSPITALITY, LLC, a limited liability company; MARRIOTT BONVOY BOUTIQUES, LLC, a limited liability company; MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1 to 50, Inclusive

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01062
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 E.D., an individual minor by No. 2:25-cv-01062-JAM-JDP and through his Guardian Ad 10 Litem, CATHLEEN ANN MAGORIEN; CATHLEEN ANN MAGORIEN, an 11 individual, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND REMANDING 12 Plaintiffs, THIS ACTION TO STATE COURT 13 v. 14 THE CITIZEN HOTEL, an entity form unknown; AIMBRIDGE 15 HOSPITALITY, LLC, a limited liability company; MARRIOTT 16 BONVOY BOUTIQUES, LLC, a limited liability company; 17 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1 to 18 50, Inclusive, 19 Defendants. 20 21 Plaintiff E.D., a California minor, brings negligence and 22 premises liability claims arising out of allegations he slipped 23 and fell while exiting a bathtub during his stay at The Citizen 24 Hotel in Sacramento, California. Plaintiff now seeks leave to 25 amend his Complaint to join two new defendants, the hotel’s 26 property owner and the hotel’s general manager, and to remand 27 this action to state court for lack of subject matter 28 jurisdiction as the general manager is also a California citizen. 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants 2 Plaintiffs’ motion, permits joinder of the two new defendants, 3 and remands this case to state court. 4 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 5 Plaintiff E.D., a California minor, alleges that he slipped 6 and fell on or about June 3, 2023, at Defendant The Citizen Hotel 7 (“Hotel”), located at 926 J Street, Sacramento, California 95814. 8 Compl. ¶¶ 13–15, ECF No. 1. E.D. alleges he slipped while 9 stepping out of a water-filled bathtub onto a wooden step stool 10 provided by the hotel for entering and exiting the bath, causing 11 him to fall and strike his head on the edge of the bathtub, 12 sustaining serious injuries as a result. Id. ¶ 15, 21–23. 13 E.D. and his guardian ad litem, Plaintiff Cathleen Ann 14 Migorien, brought two claims for (1) negligence and (2) premises 15 liability against the Hotel and Defendants Aimbridge Hospitality, 16 LLC; Marriott Bonvoy Boutiques, LLC; Marriott International, 17 Inc.; and Does 1 to 50 in the Sacramento County Superior Court on 18 October 3, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 12–32. Aimbridge Hospitality, LLC 19 removed the action to federal court on April 9, 2025, based on 20 diversity jurisdiction. Notice Removal, ECF No. 1. 21 Plaintiffs filed this Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 22 (ECF No. 10), seeking to add the Hotel’s property owner CL1 23 Sacramento, LLC. (“CL1”), a Delaware corporation, and the Hotel’s 24 General Manager David Shipman (“Shipman”), a California citizen, 25 as defendants in this action. Defendants filed a timely 26 Opposition (ECF No. 11), and Plaintiffs filed a Reply (ECF No. 27 12). The matter was submitted without oral argument pursuant to 28 Local Rule 230(g). ECF No. 14. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 generally governs 3 amendment of pleadings and provides that leave to amend “shall be 4 freely given when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), 5 a policy which is applied with “extreme liberality.” See 6 Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 7 2003). However, after a case has been removed, a proposed 8 amendment to join a diversity-destroying defendant is governed by 9 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), which states: “[i]f after removal the 10 plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 11 destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, 12 or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 13 U.S.C. § 1447(e); Tran v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 23cv2057- 14 GPC(BLM), 2025 WL 301293, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2025) 15 (applying section 1447(e) in a motion to amend where the 16 plaintiff sought to add a defendant that would defeat diversity). 17 The decision whether to permit joinder of a party that will 18 destroy diversity remains in the sound discretion of the district 19 court. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th 20 Cir. 1998); Walker v. Glob. Mail, Inc., No. CV 21-6546-DMG 21 (SHKx), 2021 WL 4594024, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2021). 22 III. OPINION 23 A. Sanctions 24 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ 25 Reply is 10 pages in violation of this Court’s Order re Filing 26 Requirements that “reply memoranda are limited to five (5) 27 pages.” ECF No. 2-2. Thus, the Court imposes monetary sanctions 28 of $50.00 per page, or $250.00, against Plaintiffs. 1 B. The Court Grants Joinder of Defendant CL1 2 Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their Complaint and add CL1, 3 the Hotel’s alleged property owner, arguing they were unaware of 4 CL1’s property interest until an employee of Mariott 5 International, Inc. provided a declaration identifying CL1 as the 6 Hotel’s ownership entity. Mot. Amend Compl. at 2, 4, 7, ECF No. 7 10. Adding CL1 as a defendant would not defeat diversity. Thus, 8 whether leave to amend should be granted is governed by Rule 15, 9 which requires examination of several factors, including (1) bad 10 faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) 11 futility of amendment, and (5) previous amendments. See Foman v. 12 Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court weighs prejudice to 13 the opposing party most heavily. Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 14 1052. “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the 15 remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 16 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. (emphasis in 17 original). 18 The Court grants leave to join CL1 as a defendant. 19 Defendants do not argue any bad faith or prejudice here, nor do 20 they dispute this is the Plaintiffs first-time seeking amendment. 21 Rather, Defendants focus on undue delay, arguing Plaintiffs’ 22 motion is untimely as discovery has been ongoing for months and 23 Plaintiffs could have identified CL1 as a defendant before by 24 “performing a basic internet or public records search.” Opp’n at 25 2, ECF No. 11. Defendants also argue amendment is futile as CL1 26 is not a proper defendant because, at the time of E.D.’s 27 injuries, it had delegated all its management authority to 28 Interstate Management Company (“Interstate”), a property manager, 1 and had entered into a property management agreement with an 2 indemnification clause shifting liability for any negligence to 3 Interstate. Id. at 3. 4 The Court finds no undue delay here. It is undisputed that 5 Defendants did not list CL1 in their initial disclosures, and 6 that Plaintiffs did not discover CL1 was the Hotel’s property 7 owner until a declaration submitted by Defendant Marriott 8 International, Inc. in October 2025. See Mot. Amend Compl. at 3– 9 4; Opp’n at 6. Plaintiffs promptly sought amendment to add CL1 10 thereafter in December 2025. 11 The Court also finds no futility of amendment. Amendment is 12 futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment 13 that would constitute a valid claim or defense. Miller v. 14 Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). “Denial 15 of leave to amend on [futility grounds] is rare. Ordinarily, 16 courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a 17 proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted 18 and the amended pleading is filed.” GMAC Mortg. LLC v. Nev. 19 Ass’n Servs., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01157-GMN-NJK, 2018 WL 487101, at 20 *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 5, 2018) (internal citations and quotations 21 omitted). Here, Defendants argue that CL1 is not a proper 22 defendant because it had delegated its management authority at 23 the time of E.D.’s injuries. However, California law is clear 24 that those who “own, possess, or control property generally have 25 a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in 26 order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” 27 Annocki v. Peterson Enters., LLC, 232 Cal. App. 4th 32, 37 28 (2014). The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are 1 legal questions for the court. Id. at 36. Notably here, 2 California courts have held that “a landlord cannot escape 3 liability for failure to maintain property in a safe condition by 4 delegating such duty to an independent contractor.” Srithong v. 5 Total Investment Co., 23 Cal. App. 4th 721, 726 (1994). Thus, 6 the Court finds it premature at the pleadings stage to determine 7 whether CL1’s delegation of management authority to Interstate 8 eliminates CL1’s potential liability to Plaintiffs. 9 10 C. The Court Grants Joinder of Defendant Shipman and 11 Remands this Matter to State Court 12 Plaintiffs also seek leave to add Shipman, the Hotel’s 13 alleged General Manager, as a defendant in this case, alleging 14 they recently learned via discovery that Shipman had knowledge 15 that the height of the Hotel’s bathtubs created a safety issue 16 for customers and that he authorized the placement of the wooden 17 step ladders near the tubs which created a hazardous condition 18 causing E.D.’s injuries. Mot. Amend Compl. at 2, 4. 19 The Court finds that joinder of Shipman is appropriate here. 20 As discussed above, “courts have broad discretion in considering 21 whether to permit a plaintiff to join a non-diverse party under 22 section 1447(e).” Walker, 2021 WL 4594024, at *2. In exercising 23 this broad discretion, the Court may consider several 24 nonexclusive factors, including: (1) whether the party sought to 25 be joined is needed for just adjudication; (2) whether the 26 statute of limitations would preclude an original action against 27 the new defendants in state court; (3) whether there has been an 28 unexplained delay in requesting joinder; (4) whether joinder is 1 intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the 2 claims against the new defendant appear valid; and (6) whether 3 the denial of joinder will prejudice the parties. IBC Aviation 4 Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 5 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted); see 6 also Palestini v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 193 F.R.D. 654, 658 (S.D. 7 Cal. 2000). “A court need not consider all the issues, as any 8 factor can be decisive, and no one of them is a necessary 9 condition for joinder.” Leyba v. Walmart, Inc., No. 2:20-cv- 10 07604-ODW (Ex), 2021 WL 8893640, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2021). 11 1. Just Adjudication 12 The first factor considers whether Shipman is necessary for 13 adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining 14 Defendants. See Doyle v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 19-cv-10781-CJC- 15 SSx, 2020 WL 915887, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020). Joinder, 16 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), falls under a less restrictive 17 standard compared to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. See 18 Dordoni v. FCA US LLC, No. EDCV 20-1475-JGB-SHKx, 2020 WL 19 6082132, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020). Under Section 1447(e), 20 joinder is necessary when it will avoid separate and redundant 21 actions. Id. However, if the defendants are only tangentially 22 related, or joinder would not preclude complete relief, then 23 joinder is unnecessary. Id. 24 Defendants argue that there is no need to name additional 25 defendants for just adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims as the 26 current Defendants have adequate resources to pay any judgment 27 and Aimbridge Hospitality, LLC, which employs Shipman, is willing 28 to produce Shipman for deposition and trial. Opp’n at 5. 1 Plaintiffs respond that the addition of Shipman is appropriate as 2 he is a potentially liable party whose presence will allow for 3 complete resolution of all claims arising from the same 4 transaction or occurrence. Reply at 9, ECF No. 12. 5 Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint brings claims for 6 negligence and premises liability against Shipman. “The elements 7 of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the 8 same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate 9 cause resulting in injury.” Kesner v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 5th 10 1132, 1158 (2016). In general, “a defendant owes a duty of care 11 to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his [or her] 12 conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct 13 unreasonably dangerous.” Rotolo v. San Jose Sports & Entm’t, 14 LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th 307, 325 (2007) (alteration in original) 15 (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 16 434–35 (1976)). In addition, as discussed above, those who 17 control property have a duty to exercise ordinary care in 18 managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable 19 risk of harm. Annocki, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 37. Under long- 20 settled California law, a manager may be held liable for his or 21 her tortious acts, even if the employer is not. See Perkins v. 22 Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 787 (1912) (“if a tortious act has been 23 committed by an agent acting under authority of his principal, 24 the fact that the principal thus becomes liable does not, of 25 course, exonerate the agent from liability”); see also Shafer v. 26 Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 107 Cal. 27 App. 4th 54, 68-69 (2003), as modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 28 8, 2003) (agent or employee is always liable for his own torts, 1 whether his employer is liable or not; fact that tort was 2 committed by agent acting under authority of his principal and 3 principal thus becomes liable does not exonerate agent from 4 liability); Dillon v. Wallace, 148 Cal. App. 2d 447, 455 (1957) 5 (manager in charge of market where the plaintiff slipped and fell 6 was liable for his failure to act and breached a duty to protect 7 customers from injury). 8 Here, Plaintiffs allege Shipman was the General Manager of 9 the Hotel at the time of E.D.’s injuries; had a duty to keep the 10 Hotel premises reasonably safe; was on notice that customers were 11 having issues entering and exiting the Hotel’s baths; and was 12 involved in installing the step stools next to the baths as a 13 proposed solution for those customers’ difficulties without 14 exercising reasonable care, thereby causing E.D.’s injuries. See 15 First. Am. Compl. at 2, 8–10, 12–13, ECF No. 10-1. The Court 16 finds these allegations minimally sufficient to support 17 negligence and premises liability claims against Shipman. 18 Thus, this first factor supports the joinder of Shipman 19 because he is not tangentially related to the alleged causes of 20 action, but rather may be directly liable for his alleged 21 negligence in creating the dangerous condition leading to E.D.’s 22 injuries. In addition, the failure to join Shipman could lead to 23 separate and redundant actions. 24 2. Statute of Limitations 25 E.D. is a minor such that statute of limitations for his 26 claims are tolled during his minority under California Code of 27 Civil Procedure § 352. Mot. Amend Compl. at 10–12. As such, 28 1 E.D.’s proposed claims against Shipman would be timely if brought 2 separately in state court, weighing against joinder. 3 3. Timeliness 4 The third factor considers whether there has been an 5 unexplained delay in seeking joinder. See Doyle, 2020 WL 915887, 6 at *2. Courts typically consider the time that passed from when 7 the original complaint was filed to when the non-diverse 8 defendant was joined and whether dispositive motions have been 9 filed. Reyes v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:20-cv-00833-DAD-SKO, 2020 WL 10 7224286, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020). 11 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ request to join Shipman is 12 untimely as Defendants identified Shipman in their initial 13 disclosures in June 2025 as a person with knowledge of the facts 14 and circumstances of the Plaintiffs’ incident, yet Plaintiffs 15 waited another six months to amend. Opp’n at 2. Defendants 16 argue Plaintiffs chose to add Shipman as a defendant only after 17 realizing diversity jurisdiction could be destroyed. Id. at 5–6. 18 Plaintiffs moved to amend approximately a year after the 19 Complaint was filed and nine months after this case was removed 20 from state court. While not insignificant, Plaintiffs have 21 explained that their delay in seeking amendment was due, in part, 22 to information they only learned through discovery. In addition, 23 Defendants do not assert that any prejudice will result from 24 permitting amendment now. Indeed, the Court notes that discovery 25 has not closed, and no dispositive motions have been filed. 26 Courts have found amendment timely in circumstances similar to 27 this one. See, e.g., Yang v. Swissport USA, Inc., No. C 09- 28 03823, 2010 WL 2680800, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (granting 1 plaintiffs’ motion to amend filed nine months after removal where 2 “no dispositive motions ha[d] been filed, and the discovery 3 completed thus far [would] be relevant whether the case is 4 litigated in [federal] court or state court”). 5 Thus, the Court finds the third factor weighs slightly in 6 favor of joinder. 7 4. Purpose of Joinder and Validity of Claims 8 The fourth and fifth factors consider whether joinder is 9 solely to defeat federal jurisdiction and whether the claim 10 against the new party seems valid, respectively. See Doyle, 2020 11 WL 915887, at *2. An assessment of the strength of the claims 12 against the non-diverse defendant points to the purpose of the 13 joinder and whether it is solely to divest this Court of 14 jurisdiction. See Sabag v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-06639-CAS- 15 RAOx, 2016 WL 6581154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016). “A 16 defendant invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the 17 basis of fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden since there is a 18 general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.” 19 Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by and through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 20 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). A claim is valid if 21 there is a “possibility that a state court would find that the 22 complaint states a cause of action against any of the [non- 23 diverse] defendants.” Id. at 549 (quoting Hunter v. Philip 24 Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009)). 25 Here, Defendants argue that joining Shipman would constitute 26 fraudulent joinder because Shipman “in fact, had no knowledge of 27 prior claims of personal injury involving the subject step stools 28 and tall tubs, and corporate records document no such claims for 1 personal injuries were ever made.” Opp’n at 7. This argument 2 fails to satisfy the heavy burden of showing fraudulent joinder, 3 as joinder is fraudulent only if the defendant cannot be liable 4 to the plaintiff on any theory alleged in the complaint. Ritchey 5 v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). As 6 discussed above, Plaintiffs can state plausible negligence and 7 premises liability claims against Shipman. Thus, while adding 8 Shipman as a defendant to destroy diversity may be Plaintiffs’ 9 motive, at least in part, Plaintiffs’ claims against Shipman are 10 facially legitimate such that Plaintiffs’ motive is not solely to 11 destroy diversity. This supports joinder of Shipman. See 12 Trujillo v. Target Corp., No. 17-cv-06429 VAP (GJSx), 2017 WL 13 4864490, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2017) (validity of new claims 14 satisfied where the plaintiff alleged elements of a negligence 15 claim). 16 Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motive is a 17 neutral factor or modestly weighs in favor of granting 18 Plaintiffs’ motion. 19 5. Prejudice 20 The sixth factor considers whether any party will suffer 21 prejudice caused by the joinder or nonjoinder of the nondiverse 22 defendant. See Doyle, 2020 WL 915887, at *2. Here, Plaintiffs 23 argue the “addition of these defendants will not cause undue 24 prejudice to the existing parties” as the “case remains in the 25 early stages of discovery, providing ample opportunity for all 26 parties to conduct necessary discovery.” Reply at 5. The Court 27 agrees that it does not appear Defendants will suffer prejudice 28 if the motion is granted, and this case is remanded, as this case I IIE NEE III IIE IIE EO mR IIE III RIE II OS IE IE ED eee eee

1 is still in its early stages and the discovery cutoff has already 2 been extended through August 2026. See ECF No. 18. Further, 3 Defendants do not argue they will suffer any prejudice in their 4 Opposition. Alternatively, duplicative work and potentially 5 inconsistent rulings for Plaintiffs could be prejudicial. See 6 McDowell v. Ford Motor Co., No. SACV 16-01777-CJC(ASx), 2017 WL 7 252280, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017). Joinder here would also 8 promote judicial economy. 9 Thus, this factor weighs in favor of joinder. 10 Iv. ORDER 11 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 12 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 10). 13 Plaintiffs are granted leave to join CL1 SACRAMENTO, LLC. as a 14 defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Further, considering the 15 factors for joinder of a non-diverse defendant above, the Court 16 exercises its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 to permit 17 joinder of DAVID SHIPMAN. Because joinder of DAVID SHIPMAN 18 destroys the Court’s jurisdiction over this action, the Court 19 | REMANDS this matter to the Sacramento County Superior Court. 20 Finally, Counsel for Plaintiffs are ordered to pay $250 to clerk 21 of court no later than April 29, 2026. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: April 10, 2026 24 SMELLS ) 2° SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28 13