De MUNIZ, J.
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, in which plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of statutes that circumscribe video lottery games and the allocation of lottery proceeds. In their first claim, they allege that the Lottery Commission will violate Article XV, section 4(7) of the Oregon Constitution,1 by implementing ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217,2 because “video poker will have the effect of creating casino gambling.” In their second claim, they allege that ORS 461.5463 is unconstitutional, because it [739]*739allocates lottery revenues for purposes other than creating jobs and furthering economic development, and it authorizes more than 16% of the revenues to be used for administrative costs.4
Defendants and intervenors moved for judgment on the pleadings on both claims. The court concluded that both claims presented only legal issues that could be decided without the development of an evidentiary record, and it granted the motions.5 We reverse.
Plaintiffs contend that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate, because evidence is required to discern the meaning of the constitutional term “casino.” They also contend that the implementation of “video poker” creates casinos and that the incidental benefits of ORS 461.546 do not satisfy the constitutional requirement that lottery revenues be used for the purpose of creating jobs and furthering economic development. Defendants contend that the statutes [740]*740“[limit] the availability of video poker in ways that ensure that casinos are never created.”6 They also contend that the allocations in ORS 461.546 are valid, because
“[t]he expenditure of funds for [local law enforcement and gambling addiction programs] undeniably creates jobs and targets social conditions * * * that directly affect the state’s efforts to attract business and employment opportunities.”
A judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when the pleadings affirmatively show that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Hawkins v. Conklin, 307 Or 262, 264, 768 P2d 66 (1988). However, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied if there are disputed issues of material fact, because the motion assumes that the alleged facts are true. ORCP 21B; Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or 33, 35, 672 P2d 697 (1983); Rexius Forest By-Products v. A & R Lumber Sales, 112 Or App 114, 117, 827 P2d 1359 (1992).
In their first claim, plaintiffs sought a declaration that ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217 are unconstitutional and requested that the court enjoin the Lottery Commission from implementing the provisions of those statutes. They alleged:
“9.
“[A] primary purpose and effect of [ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217] is to encourage and expand state-sponsored video poker in the State of Oregon. * * *
“13.
“When [ORS 461.215 and 461.217 are] implemented, state-sponsored video poker games will be operated solely in bars and other establishments licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages by the Oregon Liquor Control Commission, and will be operated on such premises in conjunction with other gambling games sponsored by Defendants, including but not limited to Keno, ‘Breakopen’ games, and Sports Action.
“14.
“When [ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217 are] implemented, state-sponsored video poker will have the effect of creating casino gambling in the State of Oregon, in violation of Art. XV § 4(7) of the Oregon Constitution.”
[741]*741For the purposes of our review, we assume that the Lottery Commission will implement “video poker” under the authority established by ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217. Article XV, section 4(7), does not define the term “casino,” nor did the voter’s pamphlet that accompanied the 1984 lottery initiative. In its order granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court concluded:
“The reference to the term ‘casinos’ in Article XV, section 4(7) of the Oregon Constitution is capable of construction in accordance with its common, everyday definition. Based on that construction, neither ORS 461.215 [nor ORS 461.217] violates Article XV, section 4(7) of the state constitution[.]”
Although the court did not indicate what it found to be the “common, everyday definition” of “casino,” the parties agree that a determination of their rights depends on the meaning of that term.
Plaintiffs suggest this definition for “casino”:
“An establishment that offers its patrons a variety of on-premises, interactive gambling activities, specifically including ‘casino’ games, from which the establishment derives substantial income.”
Defendants offer this definition:
“[A] ‘gambling house,’ a building principally devoted to the activity of gambling.”
Each of those contrasting definitions is reasonable. Because the term “casino” is ambiguous, the court could only have discerned what the voters had intended by examining extrinsic materials. See Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or 472, 484-85, 753 P2d 939 (1988). Appropriate materials might include dictionary definitions, scholarly treatises, testimony by the drafters of the 1984 initiative and testimony by experts on the gambling industry.7 Some of those materials may be judicially noticeable, but others are not: e.g., the opinions of experts.
Rather than allowing plaintiffs to present evidence that would have been relevant to the proper determination of
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De MUNIZ, J.
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, in which plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of statutes that circumscribe video lottery games and the allocation of lottery proceeds. In their first claim, they allege that the Lottery Commission will violate Article XV, section 4(7) of the Oregon Constitution,1 by implementing ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217,2 because “video poker will have the effect of creating casino gambling.” In their second claim, they allege that ORS 461.5463 is unconstitutional, because it [739]*739allocates lottery revenues for purposes other than creating jobs and furthering economic development, and it authorizes more than 16% of the revenues to be used for administrative costs.4
Defendants and intervenors moved for judgment on the pleadings on both claims. The court concluded that both claims presented only legal issues that could be decided without the development of an evidentiary record, and it granted the motions.5 We reverse.
Plaintiffs contend that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate, because evidence is required to discern the meaning of the constitutional term “casino.” They also contend that the implementation of “video poker” creates casinos and that the incidental benefits of ORS 461.546 do not satisfy the constitutional requirement that lottery revenues be used for the purpose of creating jobs and furthering economic development. Defendants contend that the statutes [740]*740“[limit] the availability of video poker in ways that ensure that casinos are never created.”6 They also contend that the allocations in ORS 461.546 are valid, because
“[t]he expenditure of funds for [local law enforcement and gambling addiction programs] undeniably creates jobs and targets social conditions * * * that directly affect the state’s efforts to attract business and employment opportunities.”
A judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when the pleadings affirmatively show that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Hawkins v. Conklin, 307 Or 262, 264, 768 P2d 66 (1988). However, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied if there are disputed issues of material fact, because the motion assumes that the alleged facts are true. ORCP 21B; Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or 33, 35, 672 P2d 697 (1983); Rexius Forest By-Products v. A & R Lumber Sales, 112 Or App 114, 117, 827 P2d 1359 (1992).
In their first claim, plaintiffs sought a declaration that ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217 are unconstitutional and requested that the court enjoin the Lottery Commission from implementing the provisions of those statutes. They alleged:
“9.
“[A] primary purpose and effect of [ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217] is to encourage and expand state-sponsored video poker in the State of Oregon. * * *
“13.
“When [ORS 461.215 and 461.217 are] implemented, state-sponsored video poker games will be operated solely in bars and other establishments licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages by the Oregon Liquor Control Commission, and will be operated on such premises in conjunction with other gambling games sponsored by Defendants, including but not limited to Keno, ‘Breakopen’ games, and Sports Action.
“14.
“When [ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217 are] implemented, state-sponsored video poker will have the effect of creating casino gambling in the State of Oregon, in violation of Art. XV § 4(7) of the Oregon Constitution.”
[741]*741For the purposes of our review, we assume that the Lottery Commission will implement “video poker” under the authority established by ORS 461.215 and ORS 461.217. Article XV, section 4(7), does not define the term “casino,” nor did the voter’s pamphlet that accompanied the 1984 lottery initiative. In its order granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court concluded:
“The reference to the term ‘casinos’ in Article XV, section 4(7) of the Oregon Constitution is capable of construction in accordance with its common, everyday definition. Based on that construction, neither ORS 461.215 [nor ORS 461.217] violates Article XV, section 4(7) of the state constitution[.]”
Although the court did not indicate what it found to be the “common, everyday definition” of “casino,” the parties agree that a determination of their rights depends on the meaning of that term.
Plaintiffs suggest this definition for “casino”:
“An establishment that offers its patrons a variety of on-premises, interactive gambling activities, specifically including ‘casino’ games, from which the establishment derives substantial income.”
Defendants offer this definition:
“[A] ‘gambling house,’ a building principally devoted to the activity of gambling.”
Each of those contrasting definitions is reasonable. Because the term “casino” is ambiguous, the court could only have discerned what the voters had intended by examining extrinsic materials. See Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or 472, 484-85, 753 P2d 939 (1988). Appropriate materials might include dictionary definitions, scholarly treatises, testimony by the drafters of the 1984 initiative and testimony by experts on the gambling industry.7 Some of those materials may be judicially noticeable, but others are not: e.g., the opinions of experts.
Rather than allowing plaintiffs to present evidence that would have been relevant to the proper determination of [742]*742the meaning of “casino,” the court apparently ascribed a plain meaning to the term. In Beason v. Harcleroad, 105 Or App 376, 383, 805 P2d 700 (1991), we observed:
“Motions [for judgment on the pleadings] should be allowed only when the allegations in the pleadings are clear enough to enable a court to recognize and analyze the dispositive legal issues. Because pleadings rarely provide that clarity, particularly in complex cases such as this where the law is not fully developed, motions for judgment on the pleadings are not favored.” (Emphasis supplied; original emphasis deleted.)
This is a case where the law is not fully developed, because we have never before had occasion to construe the term “casino.” Without an evidentiary record, the trial court could only have speculated about the contours of “casinos” and “video poker.” In order to make those determinations, the court would need to know how “video poker” works, how it is played and what, if anything, makes it different from other games that the Lottery Commission conducts. The characteristics of the game are not the sorts of things of which we can take judicial notice.
Plaintiffs are entitled to present evidence to show what “casinos” and “video poker” are and why “video poker” violates the constitutional proscription against “casinos.” The court erred by granting the motions for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ first claim.
In their second claim, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the allocation of lottery revenues under ORS 461.546 impermissibly earmarks proceeds for the enforcement of gambling laws and for mental health programs designed to treat gambling addiction. They contend that those allocations are inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that lottery proceeds be used for the purpose of creating jobs and furthering economic development-. Plaintiffs further contend that any economic benefits of ORS 461.546 are merely incidental effects of the expenditures for mental health programs and gaming law enforcement. They also contend that those allocations exceed the limitation on administrative expenses to 16% of lottery proceeds. Defendants contend that the use of revenues for law enforcement and addiction programs will create jobs and promote economic development.
[743]*743The court concluded that the allocations identified by the statute do not violate Article XV, section 4(3) of the constitution, because they fall within the rubric of economic development.8 However, without taking evidence, the court could only speculate whether the revenue allocations authorized by ORS 461.546 are consistent with the economic development requirements of the constitution. Plaintiffs are entitled to present evidence to support their claim that the allocations in ORS 461.546 are not for the purpose of creating jobs and furthering economic development in Oregon. The court erred by granting the motions for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ second claim.
Reversed and remanded.