Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Chase-Shawmut Co.

249 F. 872, 162 C.C.A. 106, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 2307
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided March 26, 1918·No. No. 1303·Published

Opinion

ALDRICH, District Judge.

[1] The object of the Gibbs improvement patent (797,054), which describes and provides for an improved assembling of mechanical meáns for more securely holding in place terminal plates connected with electric fuse wires, or fusible strips, which serve to break circuits under conditions of abnormal and excessive electric currents, thereby affording protection to electrical apparatus, and protection to other property against danger of fires, was sufficiently set forth, and the means for doing it were sufficiently analyzed and elaborated by Judge Dodge, sitting in the District Court, with the result of sustaining the patent, and there seems to be no reason for disagreeing with that result, or for renewed discussion in respect to the patent, further than to look at the grounds upon which [873] the patent was sustained, so far as they are pertinent to the inquiry whether the finding of infringement should be sustained.

The learned judge in the court below said:

“Tlie locking plates, whether notched or not, co-operating with notches in the terminal plates to hold the latter against longitudinal movement when themselves held in place between the cap and, body, and, being the ‘means’ referred to in claim i, I regard as constituting the distinguishing feature ot the patented structure. In adapting these locking plates to operate-in the manner described, in combination with the other above elements claimed, 1 think invention was displayed and a patentable novelty added to the prior art sutlieient to sustain the patent. * * * It is true, however, that, in view of-the structures of the prior art, the claims are not entitled to a broad construction. While I do not regard them as confined strictly to the exact specific construction shown and described, I think they can bo permitted to cover only combinations including elements clearly equivalent in character and mode of operation.”

After saying this, the learned judge further said:

“Whether the defendant’s infringing device answers this description, I regard as a question not free from difficulty.”

[2, 3] It must be observed that, in stating the grounds for sustaining the patent, there is no suggestion of discovery, or of using new mechanical means, and we think there was nothing of that kind involved. All the patentee did was to suggest a way in which old mechanical means could be assembled for the purpose of doing something that had previously been done through different mechanical means. Under such circumstances, it would seem sufficiently settled that the inventor is only entitled to a range of equivalents commensurate with the scope of his invention.

While there seems to be no occasion to disagree with the District Court’s interpretation of the claims, or the proposition of that court’ that they are not to be confined strictly to the exact specific construction shown and described, and that they may be permitted to cover only combinations including elements clearly equivalent in character and mode of operation, it would seem that, under the circumstances of the patent, the protection should be limited pretty closely to the mechanical arrangement which the inventor has set forth in his specification. This is so because the merit of his invention resides in the device which he has described, and, whether it is called strict construction or narrow construction, the .interpretation is, after all, based upon the idea that the patentee is protected to the extent of his invention. Doubtless, if this were a situation in which the rule of liberal construction were admissible, the finding of infringement might well enough be sustained, but tested under the only admissible rule, that of strict construction, we think the question which the learned judge said -«vas one not free from difficulty should have been solved the other way.

Under the rule that the inventor is entitled only “to a range of equivalents commensurate with the scope of his invention,” and [874] where there is no suggestion of original discovery, and no suggestion of an invention of a new machine or of new mechanical means, and where an invention' resides in merely describing a mechanical assembling of old means to more securely hold old instrumentalities in place, the question of what is commensurate is largely influenced by the degree of merit involved in the invention, and there must be a considerable measure of merit to justify interpretations and findings which reach but and control trade and business as to things not clearly within the terms of patents.

The idea of breaking electric circuits through the instrumentality of zinc connections, and perhaps those of other yielding metals, was old in the art, and prior to both of the devices in question there were different mechanical arrangements for holding the fuse instrumentality in place. Gibbs particularly describes another arrangement, with nothing new except the manner in which the mechanical means are to be assembled, and the alleged infringer produces another where the assembling, in some particulars at least, is different from that of Gibbs.

Under such circumstances, to constitute infringement, there must be an employment of the same principle of assembling, or of substantially the same principle, if it can be called a principle, or, in other words, an appropriation of the substantial scheme of mechanical arrangement. It seems to us that the alleged infringer has not done that. His scheme of assembling is quite different from that described in the patented uncommercial device.

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Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Chase-Shawmut Co., 249 F. 872, 162 C.C.A. 106, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 2307 (1st Cir. 1918).

249 F. 872 (Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Chase-Shawmut Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.