Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Riley

213 N.W. 209, 203 Iowa 583
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedApril 5, 1927
StatusPublished

This text of 213 N.W. 209 (Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Riley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Riley, 213 N.W. 209, 203 Iowa 583 (iowa 1927).

Opinion

*584 Morling, J.

Defendant Hart had a judgment lien, which the court below held to be superior to plaintiff’s lien. The only-question presented by this appeal is that of priority between these liens. Defendant Hart moves to dismiss the appeal, on the ground, among others, that the question presented is moot. He has filed a showing — not disputed — that, on December 28, 1923, suit to foreclose mortgage, dated February 15, 1921, on the premises in controversy, to the First National Bank of Waukon, was brought, to which the mortgagor, mechanic’s lien and judgment debtors, and the present plaintiff and the defendant Hart were made parties; that the original notice showing personal service on all defendants to the foreclosure was filed December 28, 1923; that, on January 8, 1924, the second day of the term, default was entered against the debtor defendants and Hart, and decree of foreclosure was rendered, as prayed, against all defendants in default; that special execution was issued, showing sale of the premises in controversy to the plaintiff in the foreclosure, the First National Bank; that, on May 19, 1926, sheriff’s deed was executed to the First National Bank, and recorded. The- mechanic’s lien involved in this case is for material furnished in 1922. While it does not specifically appear that default and foreclosure in the mortgage ease were formally entered against the plaintiff in this case, it does appear that the plaintiff’s lien is junior to the mortgage lien; that plaintiff was duly made a party to the mortgage foreclosure, and was served; and that the defendant Hart no longer has any interest in the premises in controversy. He so alleges, and asks for dismissal on that ground. Presumptively, on the record, the plaintiff’s only right in the premises was to redeem, from the decree of foreclosure. Lindsey v. Delano, 78 Iowa 350; Gargan v. Grimes, 47 Iowa 180; Witham v. Blood, 124 Iowa 695. Plaintiff makes no claim to the contrary. The question presented by the appeal is moot.

The judgment is — Affirmed.

Evans, C. J., and De Graff and Albert, JJ., concur.

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Related

Gargan v. Grimes
47 Iowa 180 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1877)
Lindsey v. Delano
43 N.W. 218 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1889)
Witham v. Blood
100 N.W. 558 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1904)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
213 N.W. 209, 203 Iowa 583, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eclipse-lumber-co-v-riley-iowa-1927.