UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DERRICK ECKARDT, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:25-cv-2168 (JMC)
v.
KBR LUXURY, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Derrick Eckardt and Jasmine Herndon filed this case alleging that KBR Luxury, Inc., failed
to perform its contractual obligation to renovate Eckardt and Herndon’s home. Despite its
awareness of this lawsuit, KBR has failed to respond. Eckardt and Herndon have therefore moved
for entry of default judgment. The Court GRANTS their motion.1
I. BACKGROUND
Eckardt and Herndon both work for the State Department. 2 See ECF 1 ¶ 1. While they were
stationed abroad, they contracted with KBR Luxury to renovate their D.C. home. See id. ¶¶ 4–6.
Eckardt and Herndon were planning to return to D.C., and the agreement estimated that the
renovation would be complete around the time they planned to get home. See id. ¶¶ 5–6. When
they arrived, however, their house was not ready for them. See id. ¶ 7. Eckardt and Herndon were
forced to rent an apartment “while their home remained a construction site.” Id. Nearly a year later,
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of quoted materials has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks and citations, and by incorporating emphases, changes to capitalization, and other bracketed alterations therein. All pincites to documents filed on the docket are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 2 The Court takes as true the allegations in the complaint, which KBR Luxury “is deemed to [have] admit[ted]” upon the clerk’s entry of default. Robinson v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 171, 178 (D.D.C. 2014).
1 “the house was still an active construction site.” Id. ¶ 8. At that point, KBR Luxury stopped all
work on the renovation, leaving Eckardt and Herndon’s “house in shambles.” Id. Since then,
Eckardt and Herndon had a different contractor complete the renovations at “substantial additional
expense.” Id. ¶ 9.
Eckardt and Herndon tried mediating their dispute with KBR Luxury through the District
of Columbia’s Office of the Attorney General. See id. ¶ 10. In that mediation, KBR “conveyed an
offer” that Eckardt and Herndon “suggested they would be willing to accept.” Id. But KBR Luxury
then “ceased all contact with” Eckardt and Herndon. Id.
Having tried and failed to resolve the dispute out of court, Eckardt and Herndon filed this
lawsuit. See ECF 1. Eckardt and Herndon effected personal service on KBR’s registered agent.
See ECF 5 at 1; ECF 4. They also notified that same agent of the lawsuit at an email address the
agent had previously used when participating in the mediation with the D.C. Attorney General.
See ECF 5 at 1–2; ECF 5-1 at 1. But KBR Luxury never responded to the complaint, so Eckardt
and Herndon asked the clerk of court to enter a default against KBR, which the clerk did.
See ECF 5; ECF 6. Eckardt and Herndon then moved for entry of default judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). See ECF 7.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To warrant a default judgment, the defendant must be considered a totally unresponsive
party, and its default plainly willful, reflected by its failure to respond to the summons and
complaint, the entry of a default, and the motion for a default judgment.” Teamsters Loc. 639-
Emps. Health Tr. v. Boiler & Furnace Cleaners, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2008).
Generally, in “the absence of any request to set aside the default or suggestion by the defendant
that it has a meritorious defense, it is clear that the standard for default judgment has been
satisfied.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier Drywall, LLC,
2 531 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008). The trial court has the discretion to determine whether a
default judgment is appropriate. See Hanley-Wood, LLC v. Hanley Wood, LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d
147, 150 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In so doing,
the court must “make an independent determination of the sum to be awarded unless the amount
of damages is certain.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall
Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002).
“A defaulting defendant is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation in the
complaint.” R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 30. When a defendant does not contest
its liability, a court needs only to determine whether the allegations in the complaint are well-pled.
See Fanning v. AMF Mech. Corp., 326 F.R.D. 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2018).
III. ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court is satisfied that it “has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action,
as well as personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.” Capitol Paving of D.C., Inc. v. H&L Constr.
Corp., No. 24-cv-02148, 2025 WL 1134960, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2025). KBR Luxury is a
Maryland corporation that has its principal place of business in Maryland; Eckardt and Herndon
are both domiciled in the District of Columbia; and more than $75,000 is at stake. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 1–
2, 11. The requirements of diversity jurisdiction are therefore satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332;
CostCommand, LLC v. WH Adm’rs, Inc., 820 F.3d 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Because KBR Luxury
contracted to do renovations in the District of Columbia, so too does the Court have personal
jurisdiction over KBR Luxury in this suit arising out of its failure to fulfill that contractual promise.
See Schwartz v. CDI Japan, Ltd., 938 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1996). Because the jurisdictional
prerequisites are satisfied, the Court considers next whether Eckardt and Herndon’s “allegations
are sufficiently well-pled to establish liability and the damages to which” they are entitled.
3 Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Flexo Grp., Inc., No. 24-cv-2389, 2025 WL 1795025, at *2 (D.D.C. June
30, 2025).
A. Liability
To obtain a default judgment on their breach of contract claim, Eckardt and Herndon need
only have adequately pled (1) that they formed “a valid contract” with KBR Luxury, (2) that KBR
breached a “duty arising out of the contract,” and (3) that they suffered damages as a result of
KBR’s breach. Francis v. Rehman, 110 A.3d 615, 620 (D.C. 2015). Eckardt and Herndon have
satisfied each of those elements. Their complaint (which incorporates as exhibits the original
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DERRICK ECKARDT, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:25-cv-2168 (JMC)
v.
KBR LUXURY, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Derrick Eckardt and Jasmine Herndon filed this case alleging that KBR Luxury, Inc., failed
to perform its contractual obligation to renovate Eckardt and Herndon’s home. Despite its
awareness of this lawsuit, KBR has failed to respond. Eckardt and Herndon have therefore moved
for entry of default judgment. The Court GRANTS their motion.1
I. BACKGROUND
Eckardt and Herndon both work for the State Department. 2 See ECF 1 ¶ 1. While they were
stationed abroad, they contracted with KBR Luxury to renovate their D.C. home. See id. ¶¶ 4–6.
Eckardt and Herndon were planning to return to D.C., and the agreement estimated that the
renovation would be complete around the time they planned to get home. See id. ¶¶ 5–6. When
they arrived, however, their house was not ready for them. See id. ¶ 7. Eckardt and Herndon were
forced to rent an apartment “while their home remained a construction site.” Id. Nearly a year later,
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of quoted materials has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks and citations, and by incorporating emphases, changes to capitalization, and other bracketed alterations therein. All pincites to documents filed on the docket are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 2 The Court takes as true the allegations in the complaint, which KBR Luxury “is deemed to [have] admit[ted]” upon the clerk’s entry of default. Robinson v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 171, 178 (D.D.C. 2014).
1 “the house was still an active construction site.” Id. ¶ 8. At that point, KBR Luxury stopped all
work on the renovation, leaving Eckardt and Herndon’s “house in shambles.” Id. Since then,
Eckardt and Herndon had a different contractor complete the renovations at “substantial additional
expense.” Id. ¶ 9.
Eckardt and Herndon tried mediating their dispute with KBR Luxury through the District
of Columbia’s Office of the Attorney General. See id. ¶ 10. In that mediation, KBR “conveyed an
offer” that Eckardt and Herndon “suggested they would be willing to accept.” Id. But KBR Luxury
then “ceased all contact with” Eckardt and Herndon. Id.
Having tried and failed to resolve the dispute out of court, Eckardt and Herndon filed this
lawsuit. See ECF 1. Eckardt and Herndon effected personal service on KBR’s registered agent.
See ECF 5 at 1; ECF 4. They also notified that same agent of the lawsuit at an email address the
agent had previously used when participating in the mediation with the D.C. Attorney General.
See ECF 5 at 1–2; ECF 5-1 at 1. But KBR Luxury never responded to the complaint, so Eckardt
and Herndon asked the clerk of court to enter a default against KBR, which the clerk did.
See ECF 5; ECF 6. Eckardt and Herndon then moved for entry of default judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). See ECF 7.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To warrant a default judgment, the defendant must be considered a totally unresponsive
party, and its default plainly willful, reflected by its failure to respond to the summons and
complaint, the entry of a default, and the motion for a default judgment.” Teamsters Loc. 639-
Emps. Health Tr. v. Boiler & Furnace Cleaners, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2008).
Generally, in “the absence of any request to set aside the default or suggestion by the defendant
that it has a meritorious defense, it is clear that the standard for default judgment has been
satisfied.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier Drywall, LLC,
2 531 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008). The trial court has the discretion to determine whether a
default judgment is appropriate. See Hanley-Wood, LLC v. Hanley Wood, LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d
147, 150 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In so doing,
the court must “make an independent determination of the sum to be awarded unless the amount
of damages is certain.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall
Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002).
“A defaulting defendant is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation in the
complaint.” R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 30. When a defendant does not contest
its liability, a court needs only to determine whether the allegations in the complaint are well-pled.
See Fanning v. AMF Mech. Corp., 326 F.R.D. 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2018).
III. ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court is satisfied that it “has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action,
as well as personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.” Capitol Paving of D.C., Inc. v. H&L Constr.
Corp., No. 24-cv-02148, 2025 WL 1134960, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2025). KBR Luxury is a
Maryland corporation that has its principal place of business in Maryland; Eckardt and Herndon
are both domiciled in the District of Columbia; and more than $75,000 is at stake. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 1–
2, 11. The requirements of diversity jurisdiction are therefore satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332;
CostCommand, LLC v. WH Adm’rs, Inc., 820 F.3d 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Because KBR Luxury
contracted to do renovations in the District of Columbia, so too does the Court have personal
jurisdiction over KBR Luxury in this suit arising out of its failure to fulfill that contractual promise.
See Schwartz v. CDI Japan, Ltd., 938 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1996). Because the jurisdictional
prerequisites are satisfied, the Court considers next whether Eckardt and Herndon’s “allegations
are sufficiently well-pled to establish liability and the damages to which” they are entitled.
3 Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Flexo Grp., Inc., No. 24-cv-2389, 2025 WL 1795025, at *2 (D.D.C. June
30, 2025).
A. Liability
To obtain a default judgment on their breach of contract claim, Eckardt and Herndon need
only have adequately pled (1) that they formed “a valid contract” with KBR Luxury, (2) that KBR
breached a “duty arising out of the contract,” and (3) that they suffered damages as a result of
KBR’s breach. Francis v. Rehman, 110 A.3d 615, 620 (D.C. 2015). Eckardt and Herndon have
satisfied each of those elements. Their complaint (which incorporates as exhibits the original
contract, as well as two change orders) alleges that KBR Luxury agreed to renovate Eckardt and
Herndon’s home. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 4, 6; ECF 1-1 at 2. KBR Luxury did not complete the renovation
project. See ECF 1 ¶ 8. As a result of KBR’s failure to do what it promised, Eckardt and Herndon
were forced to hire another contractor to complete the project at an increased cost. See id. ¶ 9. That
suffices to establish KBR’s liability.
B. Damages
Although a default judgment establishes the defendant’s liability, the Court must “make an
independent determination of the sum to be awarded” unless “the amount of damages is certain.”
Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001). Courts “may rely on detailed affidavits or
documentary evidence to determine the appropriate sum for the default judgment.” Flynn v. Mastro
Masonry Contractors, 237 F. Supp. 2d 66, 69 (D.D.C. 2002). Eckardt and Herndon have put
forward sufficient evidence from which the Court can calculate their damages.
Under D.C. law, “[w]here a party fails to complete a service which it agreed to perform
under a contract, the non-breaching party is entitled to receive the amount it costs to complete the
service, to the extent that amount exceeds the original contract price.” Rowan Heating-Air
4 Conditioning-Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Williams, 580 A.2d 583, 585 (D.C. 1990). Before KBR Luxury
“stopped work entirely,” Eckardt and Herndon had already paid the firm $260,163.80. ECF 7-
2 ¶ 3. Eckardt and Herndon then hired another company to complete the renovation (which also
required correcting work done and damages caused by KBR). See id. ¶ 4. That cost Eckardt and
Herndon another $613,328.69. See id. ¶ 5. The total cost to Eckardt and Herndon of completing
the renovation, then, was $873,492.49. That amount “less the original contract price” Eckardt and
Herndon agreed to pay KBR Luxury—$438,425—is the measure of “compensatory damages” to
which Eckardt and Herndon are entitled. Rowan Heating-Air Conditioning-Sheet Metal, Inc.,
580 A.2d at 585; see ECF 7-2 ¶¶ 1–2; see also ECF 1-1 at 7; ECF 1-2 at 2; ECF 1-3 at 2 (original
contract and change orders attached to complaint). The Court therefore awards Eckardt and
Herndon $435,067.49 in damages.
* * *
Eckardt and Herndon’s motion for entry of default judgment is granted and judgment is
entered in the amount of $435,067.49. An order consistent with this memorandum opinion will
issue separately.
SO ORDERED.
Jia M. Cobb U.S. District Court Judge
DATE: October 15, 2025