NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
25-613
EBONY WILLIAMS, BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE NATURAL PARENT OF MADISON CLAIRE WILLIAMS, AN UNEMANCIPATED MINOR
VERSUS
U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS OWNER TRUSTEE FOR VRMTG ASSET TRUST
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20250383 HONORABLE SCOTT J. PRIVAT, DISTRICT JUDGE
CANDYCE G. PERRET JUDGE
Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Gary J. Ortego, Judges.
MOTIONS DENIED. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Ebony Williams Pro Se 100 Saskatchewan Ave. Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 453-6761 PRO SE FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Individually and as Natural Parent of Madison Claire Williams
Ryan McCabe McCabe Law Firm, LLC 214 Friedrichs Ave. Metairie, LA 70005 (504) 782-3436 COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR/APPELLEE: Valorie Denton Victorian PERRET, Judge.
Plaintiff/Appellant, Ebony Williams, individually and as the natural parent of
Madison Claire Williams, an unemancipated minor, appeals the May 5, 2025 Final
Judgment of the trial court dismissing all of Ms. Williams’s claims with prejudice in
favor of Defendant U.S. Bank Trust National Association, Not in its Individual
Capacity but Solely as Owner Trustee for VRMTG Asset Trust (“U.S. Bank”) and
Intervenor/Appellee, Valorie Denton Victorian. The trial court did so by granting
the peremptory exceptions of res judicata, no right of action, and no cause of action
filed by Ms. Victorian. Ms. Williams appeals this judgment and files several
additional pleadings in the appellate record.
Ms. Williams’s Emergency Motion for Restoration of Possession to the Trust
and Enforcement of Federal Judgment Pending Devolutive Appeal was previously
denied by this court on October 17, 2025, and her Motion to Supplement and Correct
the Appellate Record was denied on December 1, 2025. Ms. Williams filed three
additional motions, which were denied on January 14, 2026. Those motions
separately sought emergency supervisory jurisdiction, emergency assignment, and
expedited interim relief to prevent alleged irreparable public record harm and
irrevocable harm to a spendthrift trust.
The remaining three motions that require our attention in addition to a decision
on the merits are Ms. Williams’s Motion to Strike U.S. Bank Trust National
Association as Owner Trustee for VRMTG Asset Trust as a Party, Motion to Strike
Unauthorized Filings of Purported Intervenor, and Peremptory Exceptions.
After review, we deny Ms. Williams’s motions and affirm the judgment of the
trial court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
The most recent iteration of this case begins with Ms. Williams’s Ex Parte
Petition to Make Judgment Executory Under La.R.S. 13:4242, filed in the Louisiana
Fifteenth Judicial District Court on January 17, 2025. Therein, Ms. Williams,
individually and as the natural parent of Marie Claire Williams, sought to enforce a
judgment rendered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District
of Louisiana on May 19, 2023 (the “May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment”). The May
2023 Bankruptcy Judgment ordered the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court to “cancel
and erase” several “judgments and mortgages as they pertain to the Debtor, Ebony
Williams[.]” Ms. Williams specifically sought to enforce the provision pertaining
to a judgment recorded on March 22, 2023, which involved U.S. Bank. Ms.
Williams’s petition further sought the restoration of the mortgaged property located
at 120 Kingswood Drive to The Madison Claire Williams Irrevocable Living Trust
(“the Trust”), of which Madison Claire Williams is the beneficiary. It also sought a
cancellation of all actions taken by U.S. Bank, including the sale of the Kingswood
Drive property and deed recordation.
To understand this appeal, the following factual history is pertinent. Ms.
Williams owned property at 120 Kingswood Drive. She mortgaged that property in
2006 to secure a note for $103,000.00. The mortgage was cancelled on August 25,
2016, after being assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. in 2007.
On April 17, 2018, Ms. Williams created The Madison Claire Williams
Irrevocable Living Trust. Ms. Williams transferred the Kingswood Drive property
to the Trust. Ms. Williams is named as the Settlor of the Trust, Madison Claire
Williams is the beneficiary, and the trustee is MEW Group, LLC. The Trust includes
spendthrift provisions.
2 In 2019, a consent judgment was entered to reinstate the mortgage on
Kingswood Drive.1 Ms. Williams’s loan went into foreclosure, and Wells Fargo
filed a foreclosure action in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana against
Ms. Williams. Thereafter, the mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank, who was
substituted as the plaintiff in the foreclosure suit. The Trust was added as a
defendant.
While the foreclosure action was pending, Ms. Williams filed a voluntary
petition pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 26, 2019, in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana. She did
not list the Kingswood Drive property as an asset. However, U.S. Bank objected to
the Chapter 13 plan, asserting it held a security interest in Ms. Williams’s property
located at 120 Kingswood Drive by virtue of the mortgage dated July 12, 2006,
which secured a note in the amount of $103,000.00. The bankruptcy court entered
a consent order on June 2, 2020, which stated:
[T]he real property located at 120 Kingswood Drive, Lafayette, Louisiana 70501 (the “Property”) is not subject to the bankruptcy estate and the Debtor is not required to pay any amounts to Secured Creditor through the bankruptcy as to the Property; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. Sect. 362(a) is lifted IN REM as to the Property and that Secured Creditor may assert any rights it has as to the Property in state court.
(emphasis added).
Following the lifting of the stay in rem, the fifteenth judicial district court
proceeded with the foreclosure action and entered a judgment on March 21, 2023.
That judgment was rendered in favor of U.S. Bank and against Ms. Williams, in rem,
1 This fact is gathered from Ms. Williams’s Motion to Cancel Judgments and Mortgages filed with the bankruptcy court and attached as an exhibit to Ms. Victorian’s exceptions.
3 and MEW Group, LLC as Trustee of the Trust for a principal amount owed,
$127,428.83, as well as interest of $28,965.01. The trial court also rendered
judgment recognizing and enforcing U.S. Bank’s mortgage on the property. The
judgment specifically ordered that U.S. Bank’s rights to enforce the judgment were
“IN REM ONLY” and “limited to the collateral (immovable property) for the
amount of such judgment.” Lastly, the judgment permitted the enforcement of the
mortgage by the Sheriff and ordered a Writ of Fieri Facias be issued. This judgment
(the “March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment”) was not appealed.
Ms. Williams immediately returned to bankruptcy court on April 8, 2023, and
filed a Motion to Cancel Judgments and Mortgages alleging that she did not own
any immovable property subject to the bankruptcy estate and that she received a
discharge on June 7, 2021. Thereafter, she provided a list of liabilities, mortgages,
and mortgage assignments she alleged were related to the discharge seeking to have
them cancelled “as they pertain to the Debtor[.]” She also alleged that liabilities
obtained after her discharge, which relate back to discharged liabilities should be
cancelled “as they pertain to the Debtor[.]” This included the assignment of
mortgage from Wells Fargo to U.S. Bank and the March 21, 2023 Foreclosure
Judgment. Ms. Williams then asserted:
The continued recordation in the public records of a mortgage, mortgage assignments, and judgments, for which the Debtor has been discharged . . . continues to negatively affect the Debtor’s credit rating, prevents the Debtor from realizing a fresh start under the Bankruptcy Code, and is a violation of the discharge injunction for which sanctions may be warranted.
Ms. Williams sought an order directing “the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court’s office
to cancel and erase from its records said mortgage/mortgage assignments/judgments
listed in the motion as they pertain only to the Debtor.”
4 The bankruptcy court granted her motion on May 19, 2023. The judgment
“ordered that the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court is authorized and directed to cancel
and erase the following judgments and mortgages as they pertain to the Debtor,
Ebony Williams[.]” Pertinent to the current case, the judgment listed:
h. Judgment dated March 21, 2023, in favor of Plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust National Association, Not In Its Individual Capacity But Solely As Owner Trustee for VRMTG Asset Trust, and against Defendants, Ebony Williams, In Rem, and Mew Group, LLC as Trustee Of The Madison Claire Williams Irrevocable Living Trust.
Note: The aforesaid Judgment was rendered in the civil suit entitled U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS OWNER TRUSTEE FOR VRMTG ASSET TRUST, AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS, EBONY WILLIAMS, IN REM, AND MEW GROUP, LLC AS TRUSTEE OF THE MADISON CLAIRE WILLIAMS IRREVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, Docket #20185720 Div E, 15th Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette, State of Louisiana, and filed in the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court Mortgage Records on 03/22/2023 under File Number 2023- 000086666.
In state court, on August 15, 2023, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Writ of
Mandamus and Rule to Show Cause in a separate docket number, naming Louis
Perret, as Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court, and U.S. Bank as Defendants. Ms.
Williams sought to compel the clerk of court to cancel the March 2023 Foreclosure
Judgment and mortgage. She not only attacked the March 2023 Foreclosure
Judgment collaterally, but specifically argued the mortgage and judgment should be
cancelled pursuant to the May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment granting her Motion to
Cancel Judgments. The district court heard the case on October 9, 2023, and
rendered judgment denying the petition on October 18, 2023. After appeal, this court
affirmed that judgment on May 29, 2024. Williams v. Perret, 24-23 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/29/24), 411 So.3d 663.
5 Concurrently, pursuant to the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment, a sheriff’s
sale was held on October 11, 2023, with U.S. Bank purchasing the Kingswood Drive
property. U.S. Bank, in turn, sold the property to Ms. Victorian via Special Warranty
Deed on June 4, 2024, and the deed was filed in the conveyance records on June 24,
2024.
On January 17, 2025, Ms. Williams filed the Ex Parte Petition to Make
Judgment Executory Under La.R.S. 13:4242, which forms the basis for the suit now
on appeal. Therein, Ms. Williams, individually and as the natural parent of Marie
Claire Williams, sought to enforce the May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment, specifically
the portion “which ordered the cancellations of the judgment recorded on March 22,
2023, under file number 2023-0008666[.]” Appellant’s petition further sought the
restoration of the Kingswood Drive property to the Trust and a cancellation of all
actions taken by U.S. Bank, including the filing of a Writ of Fieri Facias, the sale of
the Kingswood Drive property, and the sheriff’s deed recordation. A hearing on the
petition was set for March 10, 2025.
On February 12, 2025, Appellant filed a Petition for Instructions (R.S. 9:2233).
However, the petition for instructions was denied on February 19, 2025, with the
trial court noting: “This is a writ of mandamus. There must be a hearing. When she
files a rule and serves the parties, I will set for hearing.”
Thereafter, Appellant filed a Writ of Mandamus on March 7, 2025, to enforce
the spendthrift provisions of the Trust and restore possession of the property back to
the Trust. She sought the same relief as she did in her petition for instructions,
namely, to have the Sheriff sale and special warranty deed declared absolute nullities,
to recognize the Trust as owner of the Kingswood Drive property, to have a writ of
possession be issued in favor of the Trust, and costs cast to U.S. Bank. Named
6 “defendants” to this filing were U.S. Bank and Ms. Victorian. A hearing was set for
May 5, 2025.
On the same day, Appellant filed a Rule to Show Cause making the same
allegations. She then filed a Rule for Possession on March 14, 2025. The order
provided included both the Writ of Mandamus and the Rule for Possession, which
was denied on March 19, 2025. The trial court’s notation on the denial states:
“Please serve as indicated and the mandamus hearing will be heard on 5/5/25.”
On April 7, 2025, Ms. Victorian filed a Petition for Intervention as purchaser
of the contested property to defend her title to the property. She filed without leave
of court, citing La.Code Civ.P. arts. 1033 and 1092 because U.S. Bank had not filed
an Answer. Concurrently with her petition, Ms. Victorian filed and incorporated
exceptions of res judicata, no right of action, and no cause of action. Regarding res
judicata, Ms. Victorian asserted that all current claims were adjudicated by the
bankruptcy judgment and the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment, and that both are
final judgments. Ms. Victorian also argued that neither Ms. Williams nor her
daughter had any direct ownership interest in the property and, therefore, had no
right of action to bring this lawsuit. Ms. Victorian also argued that Ms. Williams
could not seek enforcement of a judgment under La.R.S. 13:4242 because the May
2023 Bankruptcy Judgment was entered by a court in Louisiana with jurisdiction
over the parties, not a court outside of Louisiana. Thus, Ms. Victorian claimed that
Appellant did not assert a cause of action. Lastly, Ms. Victorian asserted that there
was no cause of action for a writ of mandamus based on La.R.S. 9:2233.
On April 17, 2025, Ms. Williams filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting that all claims against the corpus of the Trust are barred by law and sought
to, again, have the property returned to the Trust. She also argued that U.S. Bank’s
7 sale to Ms. Victorian was an absolute nullity because the contract was not made
between the Trust and Ms. Victorian. This was denied.2
On May 5, 2025, a hearing was held. According to the minutes, Ms.
Victorian’s exceptions and Ms. Williams’s writ of mandamus and costs were before
the court. The trial court, according to the transcript, recited that the parties appeared
for “Motion for writ of mandamus, costs, and for all general and equitable relief filed
on behalf of Ms. Williams” as well as Ms. Victorian’s exceptions. Ms. Williams
asked the court whether the petition to make executory was part of the hearing, and
the trial court responded only that the exceptions had to be heard first. After the
hearing, the trial court granted Ms. Victorian’s exceptions and dismissed all of Ms.
Williams’s claims with prejudice. Ms. Williams appeals.
On appeal, Ms. Williams asserts seven assignments of error as follows:
Decretal Defect and Facial Unenforceability (La. C.C.P. arts. 1918–1919) ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 — The trial court erred by rendering a facially unenforceable final judgment lacking decretal precision under La. C.C.P. art. 1918 (and, insofar as immovable rights are implicated, La. C.C.P. art. 1919), because the decree fails to identify the specific demand(s) adjudicated, the specific exception(s) sustained as to those demands, and the parties/capacities bound—while entering judgment in favor of U.S. Bank Trust (VRMTG Asset Trust), c/o Selene Finance despite no appearance and without a particular description of the immovable.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 — Overbreadth: Separately Set Matters Swept Into a Blanket “With Prejudice” Dismissal The trial court erred by converting an exceptions-first sequencing into a blanket “with prejudice” dismissal of “all claims,” thereby sweeping distinct, separately set demands—including the Executory/Enforcement Demand, trust-instructions relief, mandamus enforcement, and possession relief—without a demand- by-demand adjudication specifying what was actually decided and which exception applied to which demand.
2 The trial court noted that Ms. Williams only submitted an order and never requested the motion be set for a hearing.
8 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 — Material Discrepancy Between Oral Ruling and Written Judgment The trial court erred by signing a written judgment materially broader than the oral ruling, where the court orally sustained only res judicata and dismissed “these matters,” but the written decree sustains plural exceptions, adds futility-based denial of amendment, dismisses “all claims . . . with prejudice,” and enters relief in favor of additional parties, creating an overinclusive and misleading preclusive instrument.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4 — Improper Mooting/Dismissal of the Executory/Enforcement Demand (Recorded Bankruptcy Cancellation/Erasure Order) The trial court erred by using intervenor’s exceptions to moot and dismiss the Executory/Enforcement Demand seeking compliance with the Recorded Bankruptcy Cancellation/Erasure Order, thereby neutralizing a binding federal cancellation/erasure directive and impairing the Schedule A/B Preserved Claims without a merits adjudication of the enforcement relief requested.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5 — Failure to Give Operative Effect to the Recorded Bankruptcy Cancellation/Erasure Order and to Remedy Continuing Public- Record Publication Burdens The trial court erred by failing to give immediate operative effect to the Recorded Bankruptcy Cancellation/Erasure Order and by allowing continuing public-record publication burdens to persist—despite the Executory/Enforcement Demand and ministerial-enforcement posture—while dismissing “all claims … with prejudice” and tolerating a “partial cancellation” framing inconsistent with the recorded federal directive.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6 — Improper Sustaining of Res Judicata Given Trust Ownership/Capacity Misalignment and Bankruptcy Administration Posture The trial court erred by sustaining res judicata and imposing a blanket with-prejudice dismissal despite the absence of party/capacity identity (given the Trust-ownership and fiduciary/representative capacities asserted) and despite the bankruptcy administration posture reflected in the Recorded Bankruptcy Cancellation/Erasure Order, the Executory/Enforcement Demand, and the Schedule A/B Preserved Claims, resulting in improper preclusion of distinct demands and federally administered rights.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7 — Failure to Adjudicate Absolute Nullity of the Derivative FiFa/Deed Chain Stemming from a Canceled/Ordered-Erased Predicate
9 The trial court erred by dismissing “all claims … with prejudice” without adjudicating the pleaded absolute nullity of the derivative FiFa/Sheriff’s Deed/Special Warranty Deed chain that necessarily depends on predicate instruments canceled of record and ordered canceled/erased, thereby leaving allegedly void acts functionally operative in the public records and possession posture.
APPELLATE MOTION DISCUSSION:
Ms. Williams has filed three additional motions on appeal that require our
attention. We will address those first.
Peremptory Exceptions:
Ms. Williams filed a motion alleging several peremptory exceptions on appeal,
namely: lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata, discharge in bankruptcy, no
right of action, and no cause of action. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article
2163 permits the appellate court to “consider a peremptory exception filed for the
first time” on appeal when it is filed “prior to a submission of the case for a decision
and if proof of the ground of the exception appears of record.” Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure Article 927(B) also authorizes the appellate court to recognize
peremptory exceptions, apart from the objection of prescription, sua sponte.
However, we note that neither of these articles require the court to consider Ms.
Williams’s exceptions raised for the first time on appeal, as the language in La.Code
Civ.P. art. 2163 is permissive, not mandatory. Fla. Gas Transmission Co., LLC v.
Tex. Brine Co., LLC, 22-4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/3/22), 348 So.3d 93, writ denied, 22-
1344 (La. 12/20/22), 352 So.3d 85.
Ms. Williams’s concerns raised in her exceptions deal largely with claims of
mortgages against her personally, not in rem. Ms. Williams’s actions in the trial
court sought, through various procedural filings, to nullify the March 2023
Foreclosure Judgment, sheriff’s sale, and subsequent sale to Ms. Victorian in order
10 to return the Kingswood Property back to the Trust’s ownership. These actions all
occurred after U.S. Bank proceeded in rem against the Kingswood property, not Ms.
Williams personally.
We feel this court’s opinion on Ms. Williams’s assignments of error will
sufficiently answer all issues in this case. Therefore, we decline to consider Ms.
Williams’s peremptory exceptions raised on appeal. This motion is denied.
Motion to Strike Unauthorized Filings of Purported Intervenor:
Ms. Williams’s Motion to Strike Unauthorized Filings of Purported
Intervenor, seeks to strike all the pleadings in the appellate record filed by Ms.
Victorian. Ms. Williams alleges that, because the order for Ms. Victorian’s Petition
for Intervention was not signed by a judge, she never acquired party status and all
pleadings filed on her behalf should be struck. Additionally, Ms. Williams argues
that Ms. Victorian’s failure to answer the writ of mandamus or rule of possession
prevents her from filing exceptions seeking dismissal.
Ms. Victorian filed her Petition of Intervention on April 7, 2025. Ms.
Victorian intervened as a third person with an interest in the pending action as a
defendant and resisted Ms. Williams’s demand in order to “enforce a right related to
or connected with the object of the pending action” pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art.
1091. Interventions are permitted without leave of court when filed prior to “the
time the answer to the principal demand is filed.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1033. U.S.
Bank never filed an answer to Ms. Williams’s suit. Additionally, prior to the
intervention petition, Ms. Williams requested the court serve Ms. Victorian with the
March 7, 2025 Writ of Mandamus (R.S. 9:2233) and Rule to Show Cause. 3 Ms.
3 Ms. Williams’ pleading incorrectly cites to La.R.S. 9:2233.
11 Victorian then intervened and filed exceptions. As noted by Ms. Victorian, Ms.
Williams also actively defended against Ms. Victorian’s pleadings, including filing
an answer to the petition for intervention and at the hearing on Ms. Victorian’s
exceptions.
Despite the above, Ms. Williams raises these issues for the first time on appeal.
Considering the above, and that “appellate courts generally will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal[,]” we find no merit to Ms. Williams’s assertions.
Mosing v. Domas, 02-12, p. 11 (La. 10/15/02), 830 So.2d 967, 975; See also
Succession of Clark, 24-416 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/19/25), 405 So.3d 1187.
Ms. Williams then argues the merits of this appeal, suggesting that the
Kingswood Drive property cannot be alienated from the Trust and that the May 2023
Bankruptcy Judgment canceled the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment; thus, she
argues, Ms. Victorian could not obtain ownership of the property and, therefore, has
no right of action in the current case. For the reasons discussed below in affirming
the trial court’s judgment, we find no merit to these arguments.
Accordingly, Ms. Williams’s Motion to Strike Unauthorized Filings of
Purported Intervenor is denied.
Motion to Strike U.S. Bank Trust National Association as Owner Trustee for VRMTG Asset Trust as a Party:
In this last motion, Ms. Williams argues that U.S. Bank cannot be treated as a
party because it never responded to any pleadings, never appeared, and “never
submitted itself to the court’s jurisdiction” citing La.Code Civ.P. art. 2002. This
argument is also made in Assignment of Error Number One. Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure Article 2002 (emphasis added) states that a “final judgment shall be
annulled if it is rendered: . . . Against a defendant who has not been served with
12 process as required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction, or
against whom a valid default judgment has not been taken.” Ms. Williams also cites
La.Code Civ.P. art. 6 (emphasis added), which states:
A. Jurisdiction over the person is the legal power and authority of a court to render a personal judgment against a party to an action or proceeding. The exercise of this jurisdiction requires:
(1) The service of process on the defendant, or on his agent for the service of process, or the express waiver of citation and service under Article 1201.
(2) The service of process on the attorney at law appointed by the court to defend an action or proceeding brought against an absent or incompetent defendant who is domiciled in this state.
(3) The submission of the party to the jurisdiction of the court by commencing an action or by the waiver of objection to jurisdiction by failure to timely file the declinatory exception.
First, we note that no judgment has been rendered against U.S. Bank in these
proceedings. Additionally, U.S. Bank was named by Ms. Williams in her petition
and service was ordered on all parties. Ms. Williams also specifically named U.S.
Bank as a defendant in her writ of mandamus filed on March 7, 2025, and requested
U.S. Bank be served with that pleading. There is no indication service was not
procured.
Ms. Williams then argues that U.S. Bank has no remaining interest after the
May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment cancelled its mortgage and cancelled the March
2023 Foreclosure Judgment; thus, she argues, U.S. Bank had no enforceable interest
against the Trust, essentially arguing the merits of her claim that the property should
be returned to the Trust.
After reviewing the foregoing and for the reasons discussed more thoroughly
below regarding the merits, we deny Ms. Williams’s Motion to Strike U.S. Bank
Trust National Association as Owner Trustee for VRMTG Asset Trust as a Party.
13 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR DISCUSSION:
Assignments of Error Numbers 1–3:
Ms. Williams’s first three assignments of error allege issues with the language
of the May 5, 2025 Judgment. She alleges the judgment fails to use proper decretal
language as required by La.Code Civ.P. arts. 1918 and 1919, that the judgment
should have identified all of her demands separately and indicated why each demand
was being dismissed, and that the judgment is broader than the oral reasons given at
the hearing on Ms. Victorian’s exceptions. For the following reasons, we find no
merit to these assignments of error.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1918 provides:
A. A final judgment in accordance with Article 1841 shall be identified as such by appropriate language; shall be signed and dated; and shall, in its decree identify the name of the party in whose favor that relief is awarded, the name of the party against whom the relief is awarded, and the relief that is awarded.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1919 states:
All final judgments which affect title to immovable property shall describe the immovable property affected with particularity.
This article does not apply to judgments in succession proceedings recognizing heirs or legatees and sending them into possession.
The judgment herein meets all requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1918—the
exceptions being adjudicated are identified; those exceptions were granted in favor
of the mover, identified as Ms. Victorian and U.S. Bank, and against Ms. Williams.;
and the relief awarded was stated. Specifically, the judgment states:
The above-captioned matter came for hearing on May 5, 2025[,] on the Peremptory Exceptions of Res Judicata, No Right of Action, and No Cause of Action . . . asserted by intervenor Valorie Denton Victorian . . . .
....
14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that [] Ms. Victorian’s Exceptions are sustained, and the Court hereby enters a final judgment in favor of intervenor Valorie Denton Victorian and defendant U.S. Bank National Association, Not in its Individual Capacity But Solely as Owner Trustee for VRMTG Asset Trust and against plaintiff Ebony Williams Both Individually and as the Natural Parent of Madison Claire Williams, an Unemancipated Minor, as to all claims asserted, all as set forth herein.
The judgment then declares that an amendment of the pleadings would not change
the outcome, thus, the court was dismissing Ms. Williams’s claims with prejudice.
As to identifying her demands separately, the trial court noted that the hearing
included the motion for writ of mandamus and “all general and equitable relief filed
on behalf of Ms. Williams” and the minor. The judgment indicates the court
reviewed all of “Ms. Williams’ various filings in this matter” and determined the
exceptions should be sustained. Clearly the court determined that granting the
exceptions dismissed all of Ms. Williams’s claims. We find that the judgment before
us meets all requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1918.
Furthermore, while the facts herein involve a piece of property and a mortgage,
the judgment itself does not affect title to immovable property. In all of her
pleadings, Ms. Williams ultimately seeks the return of immovable property to the
Trust, as it is presently owned by Ms. Victorian. However, the judgment herein does
nothing to change the ownership of that property or affect the title in another way.
Louisiana Revised Statutes Article 1919 is simply inapplicable to the judgment at
hand.
Ms. Williams also argues that the court could not enter judgment in favor of
U.S. Bank because it made no appearance. As previously discussed, we find no
merit to this assertion.
15 Lastly, Ms. Williams asserts that the written judgment is “materially broader”
than the oral ruling given by the trial court. When ruling in open court, the trial court
indicated that it was granting Ms. Victorian’s exception of res judicata, which
rendered her exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action moot. This is
supported by the minutes for May 5, 2025. The written judgment sustains all three
exceptions. When discrepancies exist between oral reasons or minutes and the
written judgment of the trial court, the written judgment prevails. See Rodgers v.
Rodgers, 26,093 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94), 643 So.2d 764. “Additionally, the
jurisprudence clearly holds that the trial judge may, within his authority, render a
judgment which differs substantially from his prior oral statement. The oral reasons
form no part of the judgment.” Id. at 766. As all three exceptions were before the
court and argued on May 5, 2025, we find no issue with the trial court’s written
judgment differing from its ruling pronounced in open court. We find no merit to
this argument.
Assignments of Error Numbers 4 and 7:
Ms. Williams asserts that the trial court erred by procedurally “mooting” and
dismissing her claims without consideration of the merits. However, the purpose of
a peremptory exception is that exact outcome. “An exception is a means of
defense . . . used by the defendant . . . to retard, dismiss, or defeat the demand[.]”
La.Code Civ.P. art. 921. The peremptory exception, specifically, which includes the
res judicata, no cause of action, and no right of action exceptions filed by Ms.
Victorian, serves “to have the plaintiff’s action declared legally nonexistent, or
barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.”
La.Code Civ.P. art. 923. Thus, by definition, the granting of one of these exceptions
would prevent the trial court from considering the merits of Ms. Williams’s claims.
16 There is no error in the trial court’s failure to consider the merits when a peremptory
exception is properly granted.
Assignments of Error Numbers 5 and 6:
Ms. Williams’s remaining assignments of error pertain to the trial court’s
granting of Ms. Victorian’s exceptions and dismissal of Ms. Williams’s demand for
enforcement of the May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment and her writ of mandamus.
Ms. Williams brought this action on behalf of herself as well as her daughter.
The ultimate objective of all the pleadings filed by Ms. Williams is the return of the
Kingswood Drive property to the Trust, of which her daughter is the beneficiary.
We agree with the trial court that Ms. Williams has no cause of action,
particularly Ms. Williams’s petition to enforce a federal judgment canceling
mortgages and judgments as they pertain to Ms. Williams in order to cancel a
mortgage enforced in rem, to restore that property to the Trust, and to cancel the
sheriff’s deed. The peremptory exception of no cause of action challenges whether
the facts alleged in the petition, when presumed true, “can support any remedy under
the law.” Stonebridge Health Sys., LLC v. Miller, 24-684, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/8/25), 416 So.3d 611, 617. The standard of review is de novo. Id. at 616.
After reviewing Ms. Williams’s petition, along with the May 2023
Bankruptcy Judgment that was both referenced and attached to the petition, we find
Ms. Williams does not assert a cause of action. Ms. Williams erroneously asserts
that the May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment was rendered in favor of herself and MEW
Group, LLC, the trustee of the Trust. The May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment clearly
directs the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court to cancel and erase judgments and
mortgages as they pertain to Ms. Williams, the debtor. The March 2023 Foreclosure
Judgment, filed under mortgage record number 2023-00008666, as listed in the May
17 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment, is an in rem judgment. This court noted in Williams,
411 So.3d at 9 (quoting Norwest Bank v. Walker, 05-1068, p. 1 n.1 (La.App 4 Cir.
5/24/06), 933 So.2d 222, 223 n.1), “An in rem judgment operates directly against
property and affects all parties’ interest in the property. . . . In contrast, a personal
judgment imposes personal liability on a defendant and may be satisfied from any
of the defendant’s property not exempt from seizure.”
While Ms. Williams may be able to enforce the May 2023 Bankruptcy
Judgment as to her debts personally, which are listed in that judgment, that is not the
relief she seeks. She sought only to have the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment
cancelled, a judgment which did not adjudicate any personal liability. Additionally,
the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment is against both Ms. Williams, in rem, and
MEW Group, LLC as Trustee of the Madison Claire Williams Irrevocable Living
Trust.
Considering the foregoing, we find no error in the trial court’s grant of Ms.
Victorian’s exception of no cause of action.
Next, we will consider whether Ms. Williams, individually and on behalf of
her daughter, has a right of action in the remaining proceedings, particularly in the
writ of mandamus. The trial court found she does not. “[A]n action can be brought
only by a person having a real and actual interest which he asserts.” La.Code Civ.P.
art. 681. Regarding Ms. Williams in her capacity as representative of her minor
daughter, the Trust beneficiary, La.R.S. 9:2222 provides:
A trustee is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of the trust estate, except that a beneficiary may sue to enforce such a right, in order to protect his own interest, in an action against:
(1) A trustee and an obligor, if the trustee improperly refuses, neglects, or is unable for any reason, to bring an action against the obligor; or
18 (2) An obligor, if there is no trustee or the trustee cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the proper court.
In Huber v. Calcasieu Marine National Bank of Lake Charles, 262 So.2d 404
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1972), a trustee and trust beneficiaries sued to enforce a right of the
trust estate. The appellate court upheld the grant of an exception of no right of action
as to the beneficiaries citing La.R.S. 9:2222, while stating: “Except in special
situations not relevant here, the trustee is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right
of the trust estate.” Id. at 407. While recognizing that La.R.S. 9:2222 permits
beneficiaries to assert an action to protect its interests, that situation arises when “the
trustee ‘improperly refuses, neglects or is unable for any reason to bring an action
against the obligor.’” Id. The court found that circumstance did not exist in the
present case because “the trustee has filed suit and hence the beneficiaries have no
right of action.” Id.
As an example of that exception, in The Trust for Schwegmann v. The
Schwegmann Family Trust, 05-95 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 905 So.2d 1143, the fifth
circuit found that the plaintiffs, a beneficiary and the trust, not represented by the
trustee, had a right of action under La.R.S. 9:2222, to enforce a right of the trust
against an obligor. In this case, the trustee of the “Margie Trust” breached his
fiduciary duty and took money from the trust that was then used to establish the
Schwegmann Family Trusts. Ms. Brown, the beneficiary of the “Margie Trust,”
sought to proceed against the Schwegmann trusts in tracing and recovering that
money. The court found that the beneficiary had a right of action against the
Schwegmann trusts because those “trusts are third-party obligors holding property
belonging to Margie Brown [beneficiary], and under that statute she clearly is
permitted to enforce a right of the trust estate, because she is the owner of the trust
19 principle herself and, hence, is the only one besides her trustee who has a right of
action here.” Id. at 1148. The trustee in this case was the one accused of improperly
handling the trust corpus and had, in a separate case, been determined to have
breached his fiduciary duty to the trust.
In the present case, there is no evidence that the trustee refused, neglected, or
is unable for any reason, to bring an action against the obligor. It is also clear that
the trustee exists and has previously been subjected to the jurisdiction of the proper
court when it filed a writ of mandamus against the Lafayette Clerk of Court in
Williams, 411 So.3d 663.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s granting of Ms. Victorian’s
exception of no right of action as to Ms. Williams on behalf of Madison Claire
Williams, Trust beneficiary.
Regarding Ms. Williams individually, she seeks the Writ of Mandamus to
enforce the spendthrift provisions of the Trust in order to have the March 2023
Foreclosure Judgment declared an absolute nullity and the property restored to the
Trust. For the reasons discussed above, the trustee is the proper party to bring such
a cause of action, not Ms. Williams.
We will also address the trial court’s grant of res judicata.
The purpose of both federal and state law on res judicata is essentially the same; to promote judicial efficiency and final resolution of disputes by preventing needless relitigation. As explained by former Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr.,
It is implicit in the concept of a judicial system that controversies be finally resolved so that parties may enjoy their rights and so that conflicting legal obligations may not be imposed on an individual; litigation must end at some point. Precluding relitigation prevents inefficient use of the courts’ resources, reduces the possibility of harassment through vexatious suits, and helps maintain respect for
20 the judicial proceeds by guarding against inconsistent decisions.
Dixon, Booksh, Zimmering, Res Judicata in Louisiana since Hope v. Madison, 51 Tul.L.Rev. 611 (1977), footnotes in quotation omitted.
Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Ref. Co., 95-654, pp.11–12 (La. 1/16/96),
666 So.2d 624, 631.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231 sets forth the law on res judicata:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
The supreme court in Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385, p. 8 (La. 2/25/03),
843 So.2d 1049, 1053, set forth five elements to res judicata:
(1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.
Whether the trial court’s grant of Ms. Victorian’s exception of res judicata
was correct is a mixed question of law and fact. Fogleman v. Meaux Surface Prot.,
Inc., 10-1210 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58 So.3d 1057, writ denied, 11-712 (La.
21 5/27/11), 63 So.3d 995. Factual findings are reviewed for manifest error, while
questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.; See also Sutton v. Adams, 22-1672 (La.
3/7/23), 356 So.3d 1017. For instance, whether a prior judgment has the effect of
res judicata is a question of law. Fogleman, 58 So.3d 1057.
Additionally, when a federal judgment is involved, federal law is applicable
to determine the res judicata effect on ensuing litigation. Id.
Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). “[A]ny judgment under federal res judicata law, bars a subsequent suit if all of the following tests are satisfied: 1) both cases involve the same parties; 2) the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the prior decision was a final judgment on the merits; and 4) the same cause of action is at issue in both cases”. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc., 666 So.2d at 633, citing Matter of Baudoin, 981 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.1993); Eubanks [v. FDIC, 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.1992)].
Id. at 1060.
Ms. Williams’s petition seeks to enforce the May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment
as it pertains to the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment, under file number 2023-
00008666. After requesting that this portion of the May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment
be enforced, she requests the trial court undo all actions taken by U.S. Bank that
relied on the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment, including the sheriff’s sale held on
October 11, 2023, and the sheriff’s deed recorded under file number 2023-00038237.
In her writ of mandamus, Ms. Williams also seeks to undo the Special Warranty
Deed in which U.S. Bank sold the property to Ms. Victorian in order to return the
property to the Trust.
22 As discussed above, the May 2023 Bankruptcy Judgment, canceling
judgments and mortgages as to Ms. Williams individually has no bearing on an in
rem judgment affecting the Kingswood Drive property.
As to the remainder of her claims, two final judgments already preclude any
attacks on the sheriff’s sale and the Special Warranty Deed. The June 2, 2020
bankruptcy consent order, which was never challenged, lifted the stay as to the
Kingswood Drive property and permitted creditors to assert rights against it in rem
in state court. Thereafter, the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment enforced U.S.
Bank’s mortgage, in rem, and permitted the sheriff’s sale, ordering the issuance of a
Writ of Fieri Facias. The causes of action Ms. Williams now asserts existed at the
time of the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment and arose out of the transaction or
occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation. Ms. Williams’s main
contention is the fact that the Kingswood Drive property belonged to the Trust,
which had spendthrift provisions, and prevented creditors, including U.S. Bank,
from alienating the property from the Trust. In the March 2023 Foreclosure
Judgment, U.S. Bank’s mortgage was recognized and enforced in rem, and the Writ
of Fieri Facias was ordered to be issued. Parties in that suit were U.S. Bank, Ms.
Williams, and MEW Group, LLC as Trustee for the Trust.
The March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment is final as it was not appealed and not
annulled. While Ms. Williams attempts to assert that the actions of U.S. Bank should
be declared an absolute nullity pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2030, involving the
nullity of contracts, and La.Civ.Code art. 2452, regarding the sale of a thing
belonging to another—no party has sought the annulment of the judgment, which is
governed by La.Code Civ.P. arts. 2002–2006.
A final judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered:
23 (1) Against an incompetent person not represented as required by law.
(2) Against a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction, or against whom a valid default judgment has not been taken.
(3) By a court which does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
La.Code Civ.P. art. 2002(A). Additionally, while those vices provided for in
La.Code Civ.P. art. 2002 can be brought at any time, those in article 2004, require
the petition for annulment to be brought within one year of the discovery of the vice.
The basis for an annulment under either article has not been pled and does not appear
in this record.
As the March 2023 Foreclosure Judgment has not been appealed or annulled,
it is final and has dispensed with the challenges to ownership of the Kingswood
Drive property.
DECREE:
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and those motions
raised by Appellant, Ebony Williams, individually and as the natural parent of
Madison Claire Williams, an unemancipated minor, on appeal are denied. Costs of
this appeal are taxed to Appellant.
MOTIONS DENIED. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.