Eaton v. State
Opinion
The defendant, Phillip C. Eaton, appeals from his convictions of murder in the first degree and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.
I.
The defendant contends that ne was denied the equal protection and due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment because he was indicted by the Grand Jury of New Castle County of which the affirmative vote of only 60% of its total number is required by the Constitution to indict, whereas in Kent and Sussex Counties 70% is required. 1 The argument is that it is thus made less difficult for the prosecutor to secure an indictment in New Castle County than elsewhere in the State; that, therefore, the defendant here was indicted with less of a safeguard than a defendant in Kent or Sussex County would have enjoyed; that there is no rational basis for this lack of uniformity; and that, accordingly, the difference amounts to an invidious discrimination 2 as to one indicted in New Castle County.
We find the contention to be without merit.
There is a uniform, arithmetical formula required for indictment in all three Counties: a majority of the total number of the Grand Jury plus one. Thus, in a New Castle County Grand Jury of 15, the vote of 9 (a majority of 8 plus 1) is required; and in a Kent or Sussex County Grand Jury of 10, the vote of 7 (a majority of 6 plus 1) is required. To that extent, therefore, there is uniformity throughout the State.
The lack of uniformity lies in the difference in the number of election districts and in the total number of a Grand Jury in New Castle County as compared to Kent and Sussex Counties. We find a rational basis for this distinction in the greater population, and the consequent greater number of criminal prosecutions, in New Castle County as compared to the other two Counties.
Population disparity is a sufficient rational basis for the distinction made among political subdivisions of the State. There is no invidious discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Fusco, Del.Super., 335 A.2d 268 (1975); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 25 L.Ed. 989 (1879); Salsburg v. Maryland, *442 346 U.S. 545, 74 S.Ct. 280, 98 L.Ed. 281 (1954); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).
II.
The defendant presented evidence addressed to the issue of extreme emotional distress. In accordance with the provisions of 11 Del.C. § 641, 3 the Trial Judge charged the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving extreme emotional distress as an affirmative defense, by a preponderance of the evidence, in order to reduce the crime of murder in the first degree to manslaughter; that the “State has no burden to present any evidence on this matter.”
Subsequent to the trial of the instant case, this Court declared § 641 unconstitutional. Fuentes v. State, Del.Supr., 349 A.2d 1 (1975); see also Rivera v. State, Del.Supr., 351 A.2d 561 (1976). As in those cases, the Trial Court’s jury instruction in the instant case, based upon § 641, must be held to constitute error fatal to the murder conviction. But, as in those cases, it does not necessarily follow that justice requires a new trial; the most that the defendant is entitled to under the issue of extreme emotional distress is mitigation and conviction and sentence of manslaughter, a lesser included offense within his conviction of murder. 4
In this case, however, the State elects a new trial on the murder charge instead of a remand for conviction and sentence for manslaughter, as in Fuentes.
Accordingly, we do not reach the other grounds of appeal.
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Reversed and remanded for new trial.
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363 A.2d 440 (Eaton v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.