J-S01001-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
TAMRA A. EATMON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LYNN EATMON : : Appellant : No. 612 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered April 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No(s): FD-17-008955
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: March 3, 2026
Lynn Eatmon (“Father”) appeals pro se from the April 29, 2025 order
delineating the respective rights of Tamra A. Eatmon (“Mother”) and Father
regarding the custody of their child, M.E.1 We affirm.
We glean the following history from the certified record. The parties
married in July 2006. Father worked in IT support at Carnegie Mellon
University, while Mother was licensed as a registered nurse. M.E. was born in
May 2012. The three lived together until late 2017, when Mother filed a
complaint for custody and relocated M.E. to a newly-purchased house,
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The order is dated April 23, 2025, but was not entered through a notation
on the docket of service upon the parties until April 29, 2025. J-S01001-26
deeming their marital home unsafe in its existing condition and having lost
patience with Father’s failure to complete necessary renovations. Before long,
Father rejoined the family in the new residence. Mother filed another custody
complaint in September 2021, but that was dismissed in January 2022 when
neither party appeared for mediation.
Mother and M.E. left the new marital home in December 2022, this time
to take up residence in a homeless shelter.2 This resulted in M.E.’s removal
from her elementary school, where she had participated in a gifted program,
in favor of cyber schooling. Eventually, M.E. enrolled in a charter school of
Father’s choosing. However, that school did not have a gifted program. See
N.T. Trial, 4/22/25, at 72.
Mother filed a new custody complaint in April 2023 seeking sole physical
custody of M.E., and Father counterclaimed for sole physical and sole legal
custody. The parties attended a conciliation before a hearing officer in July
2023, with Mother having counsel and Father proceeding pro se. The result
was an interim order providing for shared legal custody, and Mother exercising
primary physical custody with Father having M.E. for eleven hours each
2 The shelter in question provided apartments for homeless families and was
not geared toward assisting victims of abuse. While Mother has filed two Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) petitions against Father, neither resulted in a finding that Father had perpetrated abuse on Mother or M.E., as Mother withdrew the first and the second, which we reference infra, was denied by the trial court after a hearing.
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Saturday. Mother began residing at her father’s home with M.E. at that time
and filed for divorce the following month.
The litigation continued with the trial court ordering a full custody
evaluation and scheduling a custody trial to commence on July 26, 2024. On
that date, the parties instead agreed to a consent order by which Father’s
periods of physical custody of M.E. gradually increased to an arrangement of
shared custody on a 5-2-2-5 basis. The court had cause to revisit that custody
arrangement on multiple occasions in the months that followed, whether
through planned review hearings or in deciding myriad motions presented by
the parties, most of them pursued by Father, who was again acting pro se
after a brief period of being represented by counsel. This custody schedule
was disrupted by the entry of a temporary PFA order that was ultimately
denied on its merits by the trial court. As Mother had sought a modification
of custody in connection with her PFA petition, the court ultimately held a full
custody trial on April 21 and 22, 2025.
At the outset of the trial, the court conducted an on-the-record, in
camera interview of M.E., who was then in seventh grade and on the verge of
turning thirteen years old. M.E. indicated that she did not like the current
custody schedule, and would prefer to stay with Mother, seeing Father only
when M.E. chose. When asked to instead offer an interval that the court could
specify in the custody order, M.E. suggested once per year. She indicated
that Mother demonstrated more concern for M.E.’s mental health, showing
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more respect for boundaries and allowing her more freedom to process her
feelings.
Father then put on his evidence, which for the most part attacked
Mother’s parenting performance rather than displaying his parenting acumen.
In that vein, Father’s case largely consisted of a haphazard proffer of
documents, often incomplete or undated, reflecting specific instances of
Mother’s ostensible parenting deficiencies.3 The major concern Father
highlighted was the number of times M.E. was absent or tardy for school.
However, his exhibit purporting to establish her attendance record was
unintelligible because the school’s website display was color-coded but his
printout was in black and white. See N.T. Trial, 4/21/25, at 40-42. Summing
up, Father asserted that his documents suggested that Mother was not
providing M.E. the stable environment and schooling that she needed.
Therefore, he should be given primary custody and would ensure that Mother
had “generous access” to M.E. Id. at 113-14.
On cross-examination, Father was argumentative, refusing to concede
simple facts, such as that he had not gone to medical school as had the doctor
who recommended that M.E. participate in a partial hospitalization program
(“PHP”) to treat her anxiety and moderately severe depression. Id. at 136-
3 For example, as proof of Mother’s inattentiveness to M.E.’s nutritional needs,
Father offered an undated message from Mother asking him to take lunch to M.E. on one occasion. Another exhibit demonstrated that M.E. missed a chiropractor appointment at some point in 2024.
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38. In rejecting the representation that all his evidence about issues with
communication and custody exchanges was stale since it occurred before the
July 2024 consent order, Father noted that one of his exhibits concerned a
day in August 2024 when Mother had incoming calls disabled when he tried to
contact her. Id. at 179.
Father further demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the law or
appreciation of the impact of his proposed custodial arrangement. For
example, he suggested that his request to grant Mother “limited custody at
the discretion of [Father]” to make decisions about M.E.’s education and
medical care was somehow different than granting him sole legal custody. Id.
at 185-86. Similarly, while Father proposed that the custody order indicate
that law enforcement shall assist in enforcing physical custody transfers, he
admitted that he had “no idea” how that would work and disclaimed awareness
that it meant police would be empowered to remove M.E. from Mother’s
custody against M.E.’s will. Id. at 175. Father also claimed ignorance of such
things as M.E.’s feelings about the ideal custody arrangement, her sleep
habits, and whose help she prefers regarding school work.
Turning to Mother’s case, she informed the court of the activities she
and M.E. engage in during her periods of custody, such as gardening and art
projects, as well as chores M.E. has like keeping her room clean and organized,
as well as helping with cooking and dishes. See N.T. Trial, 4/22/25, at 33-
35. M.E. also enjoyed peer companionship while in Mother’s care, having a
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friend for sleepovers and riding bikes, and participating in activities such as
an Easter egg hunt. Id. at 33. Mother attested that she resided in a two-
bedroom apartment since January 2025 and intended to stay there for the
long term, with friends and family in the area as resources to assist when she
returned to working as a nurse.4 Id. at 67, 69, 74. Despite expressing her
belief that having M.E. reside primarily with her was in M.E.’s best interests,
Mother recognized the importance of M.E.’s relationship with Father, and
provided her with a phone she could use to call or text him any time she
desired. Id. at 69-70.
Mother conceded that M.E.’s school attendance record was concerning,
but noted that improvements had been made now that they are in stable
housing not far from M.E.’s charter school. Mother explained that the problem
was that, while preparing for school, M.E. would become fixated on things
such as her clothing not feeling right and temporarily shut down, delaying
their departure. Id. at 15. Mother opined that if M.E. had access to the
treatment and medication that her psychiatrist had recommended, but to
4 Mother also struggles with anxiety and depression, which was exacerbated
by the stress of the end of her marriage to Father. She was undergoing treatment and anticipated returning to her job with the Veterans’ Administration. See N.T. Trial, 4/22/25, at 73-76.
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which Father refused to consent, M.E. would be better able to focus instead of
becoming bogged down.5 Id. at 26-27.
The trial court explored this with Mother, questioning whether her belief
that she was not heard caused her go the opposite extreme and overindulge
M.E.’s feelings to the detriment of her “capability and the capacity to build a
resilience within [her]self, not reliant on other people hearing [her].” Id. at
106. Mother acknowledged that but maintained her desire that M.E. be
empowered; the court countered that “[s]ometimes you may just have a
misbehaved teenager who needs to have discipline.” Id. at 107.
Mother informed the court that she tried to have discussions with Father
about these issues, but Father did not consider her point of view. Instead of
it being a conversation, Father would give a monologue and then call Mother
“defiant” or “ungodly” if she expressed a different point of view. Id. at 37-
39. Mother observed Father exhibiting the same behavior when interacting
with M.E., who tries to respectfully comply rather than trigger a lecture, but
who has expressed homicidal and suicidal thoughts as a result of Father’s
haranguing. Id. at 39.
5 While Father was unwilling to accept the recommendations of M.E.’s psychiatrist for medication and a PHP, because he believed that they were founded upon his alienation from M.E., he did not reach out to the doctor to ascertain the actual basis for the recommendation nor suggest another provider to examine M.E. and recommend treatment for her significant mental health needs. See N.T. Trial 4/21/25, at 184-85; N.T. Trial 4/22/25, at 92.
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At bottom, Mother perceived that, rather than cooperating for M.E.’s
best interests, Father was “out for blood,” scrutinizing and documenting
Mother’s every minor non-compliance with the custody order in an attempt to
win the litigation. Id. at 38-42. When it came to co-parenting generally, and
specifically in assessing recommendations for M.E.’s mental health treatment,
Father would not “accept any resolution . . . other than what he believes to
be in her best interest.” Id. at 79.
This sentiment was echoed by Ashley Revels, who had provided weekly
co-parenting counseling to the parties from May to October 2024, and briefly
at the beginning of 2025. Ms. Revels indicated that Mother was receptive to
her feedback and incorporated her suggestions into the sessions. Id. at 149.
Conversely, while Father would hear and understand the feedback Ms. Revels
offered, he would disagree with it and refuse to implement her advice.6 Id.
Ms. Revels requested to speak to the parties’ individual therapists, but Father
was not receptive to that either. Id. at 152. When asked if co-parenting
counseling should be resumed, Ms. Revels opined “that it eventually could
benefit these parents, and if both of them were able to get their own individual
counseling and the counselors were both individually able to determine that
6 For example, Ms. Revels asked Father not to send Mother email correspondence because it was an overwhelming amount of information that could better be addressed in their sessions. However, “he was not open to no longer sending those e-mails, stating something to the effect [of] wanting to make sure she was fully informed of all aspects of his thought process and not wanting to keep her in the dark.” N.T. Trial, 4/22/25, at 151.
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they were ready to be able to be open to the other party.” Id. at 153.
However, without that, she did not anticipate that the counseling would be
successful. Id.
The trial court did not rule from the bench at the close of trial. The next
day, following a virtual session in which the court recited its findings as to the
statutory custody factors, the court issued the custody order at issue in this
appeal. It continued the parties’ shared legal custody as to all matters except
M.E.’s mental health treatment, over which Mother had sole authority. The
court ordered the parties to follow the recommendations of M.E.’s health
providers, specifically as to the suggested PHP. The court indicated that
Mother had “a duty to inform and discuss and explain to Father” her choices
“with respect to these limited decisions.” Order, 4/29/25, at ¶ 1(i).
As to physical custody, the court maintained the 5-2-2-5 schedule
during summers, but awarded Mother primary custody during the school year,
with Father having M.E. every other weekend and for one overnight during his
off week. Id. at ¶ 2(a), (b). The order further detailed vacation and holiday
schedules, and provided that AppClose was to remain the parties’
communication method, but was “not to be used for open dialogues and
discussions, nor recitations and recantations of perceived wrong doings or
positions.” Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5, 6(a). The court also instructed the parties to
maintain individual therapy and follow the recommendations of their
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therapists, including the resumption of co-parenting counseling when
appropriate. Id. at ¶ 7.
Father then filed seven motions, including those seeking
reconsideration, a new trial, recusal of the trial judge, a hold on M.E.’s
enrollment in the PHP, and requests for the court to review documents that
Father failed to offer at trial, such as the custody evaluation, and those the
court excluded pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, including a police report
Mother objected to as hearsay.7 The court denied all of Father’s motions.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal, but did not include a statement of
errors complained of on appeal as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
Accordingly, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Rule 1925(b), and
Father ultimately submitted a statement listing twenty-three grievances,
some vague or pertinent to prior proceedings in the case.8 The trial court
supplied a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing the preserved issues that it was
able to discern.
7 Not only was the custody evaluation report not offered into evidence at trial,
but we have not uncovered it anywhere within the record certified to this Court. However, as we mention infra, it appears that the trial court received the evaluation at some point and considered it in fashioning its order.
8 Father did not file his statement within twenty-one days of the filing of the
order. However, the docket entry does not note when the order was served upon the parties. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver based on the timing of his filing.
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Prior to the appeal being assigned to the instant panel, Father filed
applications for relief from this Court on June 11 and 24; August 6, 7, 15, and
21; September 15, 19, and 21; and November 6 and 14, 2025. This Court
denied every one of them, with the final denial order directing our
Prothonotary not to accept any further pro se applications from Father. See
Order, 12/12/25.
In his appellate brief, Father has narrowed his complaints to the
following four issues:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by materially reducing [Father]’s custodial time and granting [Mother] sole legal custody over mental health decisions without adequate findings under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5328(a) and 5338(a)?
2. Did the court err in failing to address evidence of educational neglect, truancy, and the child’s removal from a gifted program?
3. Did the trial court fail to properly consider the court-ordered custody evaluation, and do circumstances surrounding the consent order cast doubt on procedural fairness?
4. Did the court’s pattern of discretionary rulings—including evidentiary exclusions, enforcement disparities, and unchecked violations—undermine the fairness of the proceedings?
Father’s brief at 3-4.
Before we address Father’s challenges to the court’s ruling, we consider
Mother’s contention that other procedural defects warrant dismissal of this
appeal. She notes that Father failed to file a reproduced record, and he
disputes evidentiary rulings with “no reference to the record of the items of
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which he complains were ‘excluded.’” Mother’s brief at 6-7. She further
observes that, in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) and (b), Father’s “entire
argument is a list of grievances with little or no citation to the record or any
legal authority and is devoid of any citations to the record to support said
argument.” Id. at 7.
Father responds to Mother’s argument by stating: “The Superior Court
disfavors dismissal of custody appeals on technical grounds where substantive
issues are presented. See M.E.V. v. F.P.W., 100 A.3d 670, 681 (Pa.Super.
2014) (trial courts must consider all sixteen custody factors and articulate
their reasoning to permit review).”9 Father’s reply brief at 2.
It is well-settled that, “although this Court is willing to construe liberally
materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special
benefit.” Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa.Super.
2017). “A pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in
the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.” Smithson v. Columbia Gas of
PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up). “Any
layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some
reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training
will prove his undoing.” Id. (cleaned up).
9 Although the M.E.V. decision indeed enforced a trial court’s obligation to discuss each factor distinctly rather than en masse, it does not support Father’s assertion that this Court should overlook an appellant’s failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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While Father plainly failed to adhere to many requirements of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure, we decline to sanction him with summary dismissal of
the appeal. To the extent that Father’s noncompliance has left this Court
unable to conduct meaningful review, we will deem those arguments waived.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 271 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(“It is not the role of this Court to develop Appellant’s argument.”). However,
we will consider the merits of those issues that the trial court addressed in its
Rule 1925(a) opinion and are sufficiently developed in his brief.
The following legal principles govern our consideration of this appeal:
Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse of discretion. Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record.
In reviewing a custody order, we must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the trial court who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).
Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328, a court ordering any form of custody is
required to ascertain the best interest of the child involved by examining
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enumerated factors. In particular, in entering its custody order, the trial court
must assess the following factors, with weighted consideration to those
affecting the safety of the child:
(1) Which party is more likely to ensure the safety of the child.
(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s household, which may include past or current protection from abuse or sexual violence protection orders where there has been a finding of abuse.
(2.1) The information set forth in [§] 5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective services).
(2.2) Violent or assaultive behavior committed by a party.
(2.3) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and another party if contact is consistent with the safety needs of the child.
(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the child.
(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, family life and community life, except if changes are necessary to protect the safety of the child or a party.
(5) The availability of extended family.
(6) The child’s sibling relationships.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s developmental stage, maturity and judgment.
(8) The attempts of a party to turn the child against the other party, except in cases of abuse where reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the safety of the child. A party’s reasonable concerns for the safety of the child and the party’s reasonable efforts to protect the child shall not be considered attempts to turn the child against the other party. A child’s
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deficient or negative relationship with a party shall not be presumed to be caused by the other party.
(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for the child’s emotional needs.
(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the child.
(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party’s effort to protect a child or self from abuse by another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of a party’s household.
(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a party’s household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a) (effective August 13, 2024, to August 28, 2025).10
It is well-settled that “[i]t is within the trial court’s purview as the finder
of fact to determine which factors are most salient and critical in each
particular case.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.Super. 2013). While
a trial court must consider each of the statutory factors, “the amount of weight
10 Legislation effective on August 29, 2025, modified the custody factors. However, we examine the version of the statute in place in April 2025, when the court entered its order.
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that a court places on any one factor is almost entirely discretionary.” O.G.
v. A.B., 234 A.3d 766, 777 (Pa.Super. 2020); see also D.Q. v. K.K., 241
A.3d 1112, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“The discretion that a trial court employs
in custody matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special
nature of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on the
lives of the parties concerned.” (cleaned up)).
A critical component of appellate review is recognition that “the
knowledge gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody
proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed
record.” Id. (cleaned up). Hence, it is not our function “to determine whether
the trial court reached the right decision; rather, we must consider whether,
based on the evidence presented, given due deference to the trial court’s
weight and credibility determinations, the trial court erred or abused its
discretion[.]” King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005) (cleaned
up).
Mindful of these principles, we turn to Father’s claims of error. As his
first two issues assail the trial court’s application of § 5328(a), we consider its
analysis of the statutory factors, which it related thusly:
I found that both parties could ensure the safety of the child, so factor 1 favored neither party. I found factors 2.1 and 2.2 inapplicable, favoring neither party. Factor 2.3 also favored neither as I believe both were likely to encourage and permit frequent contact with the other party and that M.E. would be safe with either parent. I considered Father’s argument that Mother secured a PFA specifically to keep him from seeing his daughter, but did not find that claim supported by the evidence. That
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incident had more to do with M.E.’s anxiety and mental health struggles.
Mother is favored by factor 3. Based on the evidence presented and the parties’ demeanor, I believed that Mother was more likely to attend to the emotional needs of M.E. in that she did so in a more child-friendly manner as opposed to Father’s more adult-driven approach. Factor 4, the need for continuity and stability in the child’s education, family life and community life, was a major factor in my analysis and favored Mother. I increased Father’s time with M.E. from one day per week to a 50/50 schedule in 2024. M.E’s mental health, however, has not improved, and she has expressed a desire not to see Father at all. In addition, Father has opposed the mental health treatment M.E. clearly needs. This refusal on Father’s part is a core problem in this matter.
Factors 5 and 6 are not applicable. As for the preference of M.E., factor 7, although I find her to be very intelligent, she is only [twelve] and I cannot rely completely on her stated preference[,] which was to never see her Father because of the way he deals with her emotional issues. While I did not consider her testimony dispositive on factor 7 because of her age, I did consider and weigh her testimony about her relationship with her father in addressing the other factors.
I have not seen evidence of attempts by either party to alienate M.E. from the other parent. (Factor 8). I believe that M.E.’s alienation from Father is a product of his behavior and, especially, his resistance to any kind of medication.
While I have no doubt that both parents love their daughter, Mother has demonstrated a better ability to address M.E.’s emotional needs. (Factor 9). Factor 10, which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental and special need of the child, strongly favors Mother. Factors 11 and 12 are not applicable.
Factor 13, the level of conflict between the parties, is a major issue in my decision. Father does not seem capable of modifying his problematic behaviors, even when I encourage that he does so or when Mother or the child’s therapist recommends something different than his preference. Finally, I found that
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factors 14 and 15 favored neither party. I also did not identify other relevant factors that influenced my decision. (Factor 16).
I weighed these factors, the evidence presented, and what I have learned about the parties as this litigation has progressed. I concluded that the order entered on April 23, 2025, including the slight change in physical custody and giving Mother sole control over M.E.’s mental health treatment decisions, was in the best interests of M.E. Father still has significant time with M.E., with only a reduction when school is in session. And because of his refusal to cooperate with providing appropriate help to address M.E.’s emotional and mental health issues, Mother had to be given the authority to act unilaterally on such matters.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/9/25, at 4-6 (cleaned up).
Disputes concerning three particular factors comprise Father’s challenge
to the court’s application of § 5328(a). Citing M.E.’s school attendance
records and the testimony about her tardiness and absences, Father argues
that the court’s finding in favor of Mother as to the fourth factor were faulty
because the court “failed to weigh substantial evidence showing that
continuity in the child’s education had been compromised during [Mother’s]
custodial time.” Father’s brief at 6. He also cites M.E.’s removal from her
elementary school’s gifted program when she and Mother left the marital
residence in 2022 as proof that Mother undermined M.E.’s educational
stability. Id.
As to the tenth factor involving the child’s daily needs, Father again
condemns Mother’s track record of not ensuring M.E.’s timely school
attendance and underscores his evidence that he provided a more consistent
daily routine and better made certain that M.E. completed her homework. Id.
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Father further disputes the court’s assessment of the thirteenth factor insofar
as it placed the blame on him for the ongoing conflict between the parties,
citing his testimony that he “sought collaborative medical decision-making and
objected only to a specific program’s suitability.” Id.
Sticking with this theme, in his second issue, Father again stresses the
gifted program removal and the more recent attendance-record concerns and
maintains that “the court’s silence on these points undermines the integrity of
its analysis.” Id
Father is entitled to no relief on these claims. His arguments do not
identify factual findings that are unsupported by the record; they merely
suggest that the ultimate decision the court reached as to these factors is not
warranted by the record. In other words, instead of identifying any abuse of
discretion, Father “essentially ask[s] this Court to re-find facts, re-weigh
evidence, and re-assess credibility. That is not our role.” D.R.L. v. K.L.C.,
216 A.3d 276, 286 (Pa.Super. 2019). Our review of the certified record,
including the trial court’s examination of witnesses during the custody trial,
reveals that the court considered each of the factors and all the evidence
properly before it, and reached a conclusion as to M.E.’s overall best interests
that was well within its discretion.
Next, Father asserts that the trial court failed “to give proper weight to
custody evaluation.” Father’s brief at 8 (capitalization altered). He argues
that the court “glosse[d] over the evaluator’s specific findings . . . without
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stating why it rejected key conclusions[.]” Id. The findings he emphasizes
relate to school tardiness along with M.E.’s “need for consistent time with both
parents to stabilize routines,” and the hindrance to coordination caused by
unilateral decision making.11 Id.
As our recitation above denotes, the record confirms that the trial court
considered the relevant evidence and it was for the trial court, not this Court,
to determine the proper weight to be assigned to each factor. See also Trial
Court Opinion, 7/9/25, at 10-11 (indicating that the court “considered Father’s
evidence regarding M.E.’s troubling attendance record,” as well as the custody
evaluation, despite the absence of its formal admission at trial). That Father
would weigh the evidence and the factors differently does not establish an
abuse of discretion.
Without reference to the certified record, or the citation or discussion of
any legal authority, Father next asserts that his consent to the prior custody
order that was supplanted by the order sub judice was not voluntary. See
Father’s brief at 8. As the trial court aptly observed:
Any concerns Father had with the July 26, 2024, consent order should have been raised at that time, either to [the trial court] or in an appeal. He took no action and cannot now seek to challenge that order. Moreover, any such challenge is moot since a new [o]rder has been entered.
11 We may only assume that these matters were mentioned in the evaluator’s
report since, as noted above, it was not offered into evidence at trial and it was not otherwise included in the certified record.
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Trial Court Opinion, 7/9/25, at 10-11. We agree. The issue merits no relief.
Father’s penultimate complaint is that the trial court improperly granted
Mother sole legal custody as to M.E.’s mental health treatment and delegated
“future legal custody to unspecified third parties” by ordering the parties to
follow the recommendations of M.E.’s mental health providers. See Father’s
brief at 8.
The trial court did not address this matter in its opinion, as it was not
included in Father’s statement of errors complained of on appeal. Not only
does he raise this issue for the first time on appeal, but he fails to develop his
argument with citation to relevant authority. Accordingly, this issue is waived.
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Nemirovsky v. Nemirovsky,
776 A.2d 988, 994 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding waiver applied to “cursory, four
sentence argument” unsupported by citation to case law).
Father’s final argument is, in toto, as follows:
Over the course of proceedings, several discretionary rulings consistently disadvantaged [Father]:
• Interim Custody: For nearly a year, [Father] was confined to minimal parenting time, weakening both his role and leverage.
• Evidentiary Rulings: Key documents (e.g., school tardiness record) were excluded due to formatting despite prior submission in acceptable form.
• Weighting of Factors: Admissions by [Mother] regarding tardiness, lack of structure, and uncoordinated decision- making were not integrated into the court’s factor findings.
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• Post-Trial Orders: June 2025 withholding of custody based on ambiguous language in a follow-up order reflects risk of over-delegation.
These cumulative concerns point to a manifestly unreasonable application of discretion.
Father’s brief at 9.
This raises both matters that we have already rejected above and new
issues that are waived because they are neither developed by discussion of
pertinent law nor anchored in the certified record such that we have any idea
about what Father complains. Moreover, as we explained in denying some of
Father’s serial applications for relief, if he wished to challenge orders entered
by the trial court after this appeal was filed, he had to separately and timely
appeal those orders. See Order, 10/17/25. Thus, Father’s final claim of error
does not establish grounds for relief.
In sum, Father has presented us with no preserved, developed
argument to convince us that the trial court’s April 29, 2025 custody order
was the product of an error of law or abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we
have no basis to disturb it.
Order affirmed.
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3/3/2026
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