Eastman v. Mayor of New York

5 Rob. 389
CourtThe Superior Court of New York City
DecidedFebruary 15, 1868
StatusPublished

This text of 5 Rob. 389 (Eastman v. Mayor of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering The Superior Court of New York City primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eastman v. Mayor of New York, 5 Rob. 389 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1868).

Opinion

Robertson, Ch. J.

If there were any means’ of escape from the binding authority of the decision in the court of highest resort in this state in the case of Darlington v. The Mayor, &c. of New York, (31 N. Y. Rep. 164,) a very serious question would arise, to wit, how far the statute of 1855, under which the plaintiff claims, (N. Y. Sess. Laws of 1855, ch. 428,) was repealed, as to the cities of New York and Brooklyn and the whole metropolitan district, by the passage of the metropolitan police act of 1857. (New York Sess. Laws of 1857, ch. 569.) So gross an injustice could hardly he presumed to have! been intended to be perpetrated as to deprive a municipal body, as such, of all power of concerted action in having means on hand to prevent a riot aid yet make it responsible for its consequences, however unexpectedly it occurred. Such an appropriation of property could hardly be anything but confiscation. I do not, however, perceive that the case of Baldwin and another v. The Mayor, &c. of New York,) lately decided in the Court of Appeals, (MS. April term, 1866,) or the opinion delivered in it, however, sound and just, has so disturbed the foundation of- the decision in the first mentioned case, as to the constitutionality of the law of 1855, as to render it still an open question. The right of obtaining a judgment under that statute for damages, is entirely distinct from any question as to the mode of satisfying it. This court would be bound to adhere to its own decisions in-Davidson v. The Mayor, &c. of New York, and Darlington v. the Same, (2 Rob. 230 et seq.,) if such statute he not imperative that such judgment is to be satisfied by an execution in the ordinary way against property held by the city corporation, hut contemplates some other mode of satisfying it. But if the statute be thus imperative, and if all prop: erty -held by the defendants as a corporation is subject to [398]*398the call of the state for any purpose, whenever and however it chooses to claim or apply it, and such judgment and an execution thereon be the mode of reaching it, as seems to be laid down in the case in the Court of Appeals already cited, (Darlington v. Mayor, &c. ubi sup.) we are bound by that decision, and not at liberty to doubt its correctness.

There is no room under the statute of 1855 for any question of diligence on the part of the city authorities. It is imperative, if the party damnified 'has not been guilty of any want of diligence on his part. Eor could any failure of a bailee, such as Marsten, to notify the mayor or sheriff be imputed as an omission against the plaintiff. Such notification is a mere question of good faith, and there is no evidence before us that he, the plaintiff, knew of any threats of, or expected a riot. Some ‘question might, perhaps, be ■raised on the exclusion by the statute, (p. 801, § 3,) of a party damnified by a riot from recovering any thing unless he “shall have used all reasonable diligence to prevent such damage.” What is meant by this, is not, perhaps, very definite. It evidently does not confine the requisite diligence to exertions during a riot; otherwise, it would have said “ shall use.” But “ shall have used ” clearly refers to the time anterior to some event, (which, of course, is the injury complained of as a consequence of the rio.t,) and was meant, undoubtedly, to refer to previous precautions and care used to prevent destruction by a mob. Those who seek indemnity against the action of a mob, are at least bound to keep property-likely to be the objects of attack, in the position a man of ordinary prudence would keep it if he wished to guard against a mob. It might be doubted, in this case, whether fire arms in a city, during a highly excitable state of the public mind and a civil war, were protected with reasonable diligence by being left in the work shop of a gunsmith, without extra fastenings or barriers. ■ The referee, however, did not pass upon that question, as one of fact, and questions of law involved in it may be postponed, until [399]*399it is seen whether other facts in the case may not render a decision upon it unnecessary.

¡Nor will it be necessary, in this case, as it stands before us, to consider whether the mere theft of property during a riot sufficiently constitutes an injury or destruction within the meaning of the'statute. The occasion of its passage, as well as its language, would seem to imply, rather injury from the passions of a mob, than abstraction by a band of thieves. The report of the referee in this case, has rendered any question as to the injury superfluous, as it has found that the guns for whose entire value he allows, were rendered worthless in consequence of the riot, and thereby destroyed, and the guns for injury to which he allows' compensation, were damaged to the sum allowed. This leaves the sole question upon it one of fact, whether so many guns were rendered worthless by the rioters, and so many injured to the extent of the damage allowed.

' ¡No spectators .of the conduct of the mob on the occasion in question, examined as witnesses on the trial, saw destroyed, injured or carried away, any thing like the number of guns reported by the referee. The existence of fragments of any thing like as many then destroyed or injured, was not established. And above all, no evidence was given of the quantity of remains of broken boxes which were not carried away, so as to obtain an approximation to their numbers, although it was proved enough to contain the rescued guns and parts bf guns, were found unbroken. The only witnesses who spoke of destruction of the boxes, were the plaintiff, (who, although he did not see them broken, said they were “smashed,”) and Marsten, who spoke of them as being broken up; but neither of them specified any number, and, although the plaintiff so saw them the day after the riot, forty-four cases (brought from the factory, wherein to pack the rescued guns) were found there whole a week after the riot. ¡No mention was made by any witness of unbroken and unopened cases of arms being hurled from the fifth story into the street, which could easily have been done by the rioters, [400]*400and would have been the most effectual and rapid way of demolishing the boxes and getting at the arms to destroy them, if that were the object. Although, so far as the purpose of the rioters was concerned, it seems to have been rather to procure arms for purposes of plunder, or arming themselves, than merely to destroy a particular kind of property, or injure obnoxious individuals, which generally are the objects of a riot.

The referee’s report was evidently based upon an assumed presence of the number of guns specified by him in the factory in question, and therefore that the .disposition manifested by the rioters to destroy them, their destruction of a considerable number, and the opportunity to destroy all, and the final disappearance from such buildings of all the guns, would together establish their actual destruction by the rioters. Eo doubt Marsten originally packed 8123 carbines belonging to the plaintiff in 157 cases, and sent them in the year 1862 to the opposite factory, where they were deposited; but how long they remained there does not appear. The plaintiff would not state that he ever saw all of such guns in the factory in question, after the removal back. Even Mr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Darlington v. . Mayor, C., of New York
31 N.Y. 164 (New York Court of Appeals, 1865)
Davidson v. Mayor of New York
2 Rob. 230 (The Superior Court of New York City, 1864)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
5 Rob. 389, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eastman-v-mayor-of-new-york-nysuperctnyc-1868.