Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States

26 Cust. Ct. 267, 1951 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 43
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJune 12, 1951
DocketC. D. 1333
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 26 Cust. Ct. 267 (Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 26 Cust. Ct. 267, 1951 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 43 (cusc 1951).

Opinion

Cole, Judge:

Geo. S. Bush & Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, 26 Cust. Ct. 251, C. D. 1332, decided concurrently herewith, controls, disposition of the present case. The issues in both are identical and much of the voluminous proof offered by the respective parties appears in each case, malting both records substantially the same. Plaintiff’s counsel, in their brief, explain the condition in this way:

This case was tried concurrently with the Geo. S. Bush & Co. Inc., et al. v. United States, Protest No. 120086-K, which involved shark liver oil imported from Canada. Except for that,testimony involving the respective methods of production of the shark liver, oil, and that testimony touching on the restrictions, imposed by the Canadian Government upon the exportation of shark livers, the evidence in all other respects is identical. Messrs. Lawrence, Tuttle & Harper, counsel for the plaintiff in the Geo. S. Bush case have written an able and comprehensive brief in that case, in which the issues of law and fact are thoroughly presented, and to which we respectfully refer the court in considering the case at bar.

Because the two cases are so closely associated, the decision herein will follow the same reasoning and embody some of the language employed in the Bush case, supra.

In this case, the merchandise consists of shark-liver oil from Mexico; in the Bush case, the substance was- dogfish-liver oil from Canada. Here, as there, the commodity was classified as an advanced drug under paragraph 34 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 34) ,1 assessing duty at 10 per centum ad valorem, and plaintiff claims free entry under paragraph 1669 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1201, par. 1669)2 as a crude drug.

During the course of the trial, defendant injected an alternative claim, urging classification under the provision for “Shark oil and shark-liver oil, including oil produced from sharks known as dogfish, not specially provided for,” in paragraph 52 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the trade agreement with Canada, 74 Treas. Dec. 235, [269]*269T. D. 49752, carrying a rate of 10 per centum ad valorem, the same as that applied by the collector.

In presenting such claim, however, defendant ..has not abandoned the collector’s classification as an advanced drug, so we find defendant in the dual position of seeking a new classification and at the same time attempting to support the collector’s action. The condition is the same as that developed in the Bush case, sufra. In fact, defendant's brief, arguing the point in identical language as that used in the Bush case, erroneously refers to the merchandise in question as “dogfish-liver oil imported from Canada.” That the present merchandise is shark-liver oil from Mexico, is no bar for invoking a provision of the Canadian Trade Agreement, sufra, because under the most-favored-nation clause of section 350 (a) of the Tariff Act •of 1930, as amended 3 (19 U. S. C. § 1351 (a)) — the statute that authorized the President to negotiate foreign trade agreements — the •concessions granted under said trade agreement are also applicable to products from Mexico.

Both parties, arguing for or against the applicability of paragraph 52, as amended, sufra, raise the same contentions in this case as those presented in the Bush case, sufra. Because our conclusion there is equally applicable here, especially in view of plaintiff’s uncontradicted testimony that shark-liver oil, the medicinal substance, was not developed as a commercial commodity until 1944, several years after the Tariff Act of 1930 became effective, no useful purpose would be served by repeating here all that we said there. Following such previous reasoning in the Bush case, we hold that said paragraph 52, as amended, has no application to the shark-liver oil under consideration in this case.

[270]*270Elimination of amended paragraph 52, supra, reduces the issue to the single question concerning the condition of the shark-liver oil here involved. That the substance is a drug, within the meaning, of the term as set forth in paragraph 34, is implied in the collector’s classification, which rests upon the presumption that all facts essential to' sustain such action were found to exist. W. T. Grant Co. v. United States, 23 Cust. Ct. 58, C. D. 1191, affirmed in Same v. Same, 38 C. C. P. A. 57, C. A. D. 440, decided October 31, 1950. Thus, the issue is narrowed to the question whether this shark-liver oil is in a crude state, as claimed, or advanced in value or condition, as assessed.

The case has been the subject of several hearings as enumerated in the writer’s dissenting opinion in Geo. S. Bush & Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, 22 Cust. Ct. 158, C. D. 1175. Final submission was-made at Seattle, Wash., before a single member of this court on circuit under statutory authorization issued by the chief judge to hear or to hear and determine the case (28 U. S. C., 1946 ed., Supp. III, § 254). The right of the division to assume jurisdiction was largely the subject of said C. D. 1175. The views of the writer of this opinion continue as the minority expression from this division on the matter. Under the practice and procedure of the court and the rules applicable thereto, much litigation before the court is dependent upon my participation in a decision of the same. Adhering to my position in C. D. 1175, supra, but for the purpose of expediting the work of the court, I am preparing this opinion and participating in the judgment attached thereto.

• Shark livers, like dogfish livers, are desirable for their quantity of the therapeutically valuable vitamin A. To obtain the maximum amount of vitamin-A content, the livers are destroyed and the therapeutic element is extracted in oil.

The source of the shark livers and processing thereof to acquire the oil under consideration were explained by two of plaintiff’s witnesses, the general manager, and the chief chemist of the Mexican exporting company. Their combined testimony establishes the following pertinent facts.

Livers are taken from sharks caught in waters of the Gulf of California, off the east and west coasts of Mexico. They are chopped into pieces and put into 5-gallon cans, that remain unsealed and to which is added a quantity of salt (approximately 1 per centum of the weight). Fishing boats, equipped to preserve the livers, under refrigeration, transport them to the processing plant, where they are sorted according to species, of which there are three, hammerhead, bolador, and barroso. Each is easily distinguishable through texture and color. Following segregation, all of them are subjected to the same process for extraction of the oñ. The fivers are ground to destruction in a so-called “Enterprise” mill, reducing them to a fine paste that is pumped [271]*271to cooking tanks where water and sodium hydroxide (lye) are added. Lye is used to “break down the proteins” and obtain a better yield of oil.

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Related

U. S. Vitamin Corp. v. United States
33 Cust. Ct. 269 (U.S. Customs Court, 1954)
Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. United States
27 Cust. Ct. 317 (U.S. Customs Court, 1951)

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Bluebook (online)
26 Cust. Ct. 267, 1951 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 43, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eastman-kodak-co-v-united-states-cusc-1951.