Eastland Joint Vocational School District v. Department of Education
This text of 362 N.E.2d 654 (Eastland Joint Vocational School District v. Department of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The basic questions presented by this appeal are whether the State Board of Education is empowered to assign a school district to a joint vocational school district, and whether, such assignment having been made, the Bóard is- empowered to require the two districts to [93]*93contract so that students affected are offered suitable vocational services.
R. 0.3313.91 provides, in relevant part:
“The State Board of Education may assign school districts to joint vocational districts and shall require districts to enter into contractual agreements pursuant to Section 3313.90 of the Revised Code so that special education students as well as others may receive suitable vocational services.”
Cross-appellant Eastland asserts that the Board may not assign a local school district to an existing joint vocational school district absent the consent of the latter’s board of education, and without providing an opportunity for a petition of remonstrance by the electors of the local school district. Eastland contends further that R. C. 3313.-91 must be read in pari materia with R. C. 3311.213, which provides for the enlargement of an existing joint vocational school district. The Court of Appeals held, similarly, that the Board could not order joinder, inasmuch as none is possible unless the provisions of R. C. 3311.213 are followed.
In our opinion, R. C. 3311.213 relates to the voluntary expansion of existing joint vocational school districts. The statute became effective on October 26, 1961, six years before the establishment and maintenance of an adequate vocational education program by each school district was required by R. C. 3313.90.1 Under the facts at bar, R. C. [94]*943313.91 should be read in the perspective of R. C. 3313.90, as opposed to R. C. 3311.213. R. C. 3313.91 pertains to situations wherein the expansion of an exsiting joint voea-[95]*95tional school district cannot be reached via voluntary agreement; R. C. 3311.213 applies in situations where the joinder is voluntarily accepted.
Pursuant to R. C. 1.47(B), it is presumed that in enacting a statute the General Assembly intended that the’ entire law be effective. The wording of R. C. 3313.91, that the Board “may assign school districts to joint vocational districts,” clearly denotes the Board’s authority to mandate the outright joinder of school districts to joint vocational districts. The identification of “assignment” with “joinder,” in the instant case, is appropriate.2 This construction obtains despite the use of the conjunctive “and.” Were that word to signal legislative delegation to the Board of authority merely to compel contractual arrangements, as argued by cross-appellant and alluded to in the Court of Appeals, the General Assembly could simply have enacted that portion of R. C. 3313.91 which follows the conjunction.
This court has pointed out that, in statutory’ interpretation, courts “must look to the statute itself to determine legislative intent, and if such intent is clearly expressed therein, the statute may not be restricted, constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged; significance in effect should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act, and in the absence of any definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in which they are used.” Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N. E. 2d 370, [96]*96paragraph five of the syllabus; Cincinnati Nature Center v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 122, 125, 357 N. E. 2d 381.
Under the provisions of R. C. 3313.91, the State Board of Education is empowered to assign school districts to joint vocational school districts. Such assignment having been made, the State Board of Education is under a duty to direct those districts to contract so as to provide suitable vocational services.
We note that the opinion of the referee discerned the inadequate facilities of Eastland as the sole reason for Eastland’s rejection of the assignment of students from Hamilton. The December 9, 1974, resolution of the Board called for the admission of Hamilton students into East-land on an availability of pupil station basis, and upon payment of a charge for each student. The Board seemingly apprehended that logic regulates the admission of Hamilton students into Eastland only as necessary facilities become available, and not in such a fashion that proper education from the vocational standpoint cannot be afforded to those students affected by the order. This appears to be a prudent course, insuring sufficient protection for a district already filled to capacity.
The Court of Common Pleas found the Board’s resolution to be supported by reliable, probative, and. substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals agreed with that appraisal of these facts and we will not disturb this finding.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed.-
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362 N.E.2d 654, 50 Ohio St. 2d 91, 4 Ohio Op. 3d 204, 1977 Ohio LEXIS 382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eastland-joint-vocational-school-district-v-department-of-education-ohio-1977.