Easthampton Congregational Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co.

322 F. Supp. 3d 230
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided May 10, 2018·No. Case No. 3:17-cv-30061-KAR·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

On April 25, 2016, the ceiling in the Fellowship Hall of the Easthampton Congregational Church ("the Church" or "Plaintiff") fell to the floor. This is a dispute about whether the Church's property insurance policy issued by Church Mutual Insurance Company ("Church Mutual" or "Defendant") provides coverage for the loss. The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion is allowed, and Defendant's motion is denied.1

II. Applicable Legal Standard

"Summary judgment is proper where 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Carroll v. Xerox Corp. , 294 F.3d 231, 236 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). "For this purpose, an issue is 'genuine' if it 'may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.' " Vineberg v. Bissonnette , 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc. , 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) ). "A fact is 'material' only if it 'possess[es] "the capacity to sway *232the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." ' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Hayes , 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997) ). In determining whether genuine disputes of material fact exist, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Id. "Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic Rule 56 standard, but rather simply require [the court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Adria Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Ferré Dev., Inc. , 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. , 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996) ).

"Under Massachusetts law,2 the interpretation of an insurance policy and the application of policy language to known facts pose questions of law for the court to decide." Nascimento v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. , 513 F.3d 273, 276 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. , 439 Mass. 387, 788 N.E.2d 522, 530 (2003) ). An insurance policy is construed under general rules of contract interpretation Brazas Sporting Arms, Inc. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. , 220 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Merchants Ins. Co. of N.H., Inc., v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. , 143 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1998) ). The court "begin[s] with the actual language of the policies, given its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. (citing GRE Ins. Grp. v. Metro. Boston Hous. P'ship, Inc. , 61 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 1995) ). Where a term is undefined, it is appropriate for the court to look to the dictionary definition for assistance in determining its ordinary meaning. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Raytheon Co. , 426 F.3d 491, 498-99 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Ellery v. Merchs.' Ins. Co. , 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 46, 48 (1825) ).

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Easthampton Congregational Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 3d 230 (D.D.C. 2018).

322 F. Supp. 3d 230 (Easthampton Congregational Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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