Eastes v. Superior Oil Co.

65 F. Supp. 998, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2670
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedApril 12, 1946
DocketNo. 3019
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 65 F. Supp. 998 (Eastes v. Superior Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eastes v. Superior Oil Co., 65 F. Supp. 998, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2670 (W.D. La. 1946).

Opinion

PORTERIE, District Judge.

Libelants claim from respondents, Superior Oil Company, and D. M. Picton Towing Company, Incorporated, in solido, damages in the sum of $8,039.63, with 5% per annum from November 7, 1943, until paid, as damages to their motor boat, named Tramp, resulting from its sinking, caused by its running onto a submerged piling, near the dock of the Superior Oil Company located in the Gulf of Mexico about one mile offshore and about twelve miles east of Calcasieu River Pass.

By an amended complaint libelants claim additionally $1,000 for attorney’s fees.

The liability of the Superior Oil Company is based on its negligence in placing and leaving this piling in the Gulf hidden and submerged, and that of D. M. Picton Company is next connected because it had contracted with the Superior Oil Company to remove this piling from the Gulf, and that it had negligently failed to do so, leaving it as a hazard to navigation.

The defense of Superior is a denial that the Tramp sank as a result of striking any submerged piling; then, in the alternative, it prays that if judgment be against Superior and Picton in solido, satisfaction of the judgment be first had from Picton, and then, further in the alternative, if judgment be rendered against it, a judgment in the same amount be rendered in favor of it against Picton for the latter’s failure to comply with its contract to remove all the piling.

Picton answered the libel on the merits, denying liability, admitting the contract [1000]*1000with Superior to remove certain piling, but that if a piling had caused the damage to the Tramp, it was not a piling that it had agreed to remove. Further, in its answer it alleged that the contract it had with Superior was under the inspection and approval of Superior.

Picton’s defenses, more itemized, are: That libelants were not parties or privies to the contract between Picton and the Superior; that Picton had completed its contract and left Superior’s premises nearly three years before the alleged damage; that Picton’s work under the contract had been performed, accepted by Superior, and paid for, and accordingly, Picton owed no duty to libelants, and the libel against it should be dismissed; that if libelant sustained damage as alleged in the libel, it was sustained as the result of its being upon the Superior’s premises as an invitee and in the performance of a service for the benefit of the Superior, and that Superior owed to libelant the duty of seeing to it that the premises were safe for such use by libelant; that Picton was relieved of furnishing a bond to indemnify Superior should Picton fail to fully comply with its contract, and accordingly, that now Picton can not be brought in by Superior to stand in its stead; in other words, that it was not in the contemplation of the parties that Picton should be held so responsible; that a court in admiralty is without jurisdiction to pass upon the contract between Picton and Superior, because a contract to remove piling is non-maritime and for that reason the petition for a judgment filed by Superior against Picton should be dismissed; and that libelant seeking to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained through the fault of another, has failed to discharge the burden of proof resting upon it to prove negligence and that on that ground the libel filed should be dismissed as to both defendants.

We should rule immediately on the point directed to the jurisdiction.

The drilling platform is some fifteen miles out, in the Gulf of Mexico, and the following provision is extracted from the written contract:

“That all of the salvaged material will be delivered either upon barge or dock at Lake Charles, Louisiana, as designated by this company * *

It is admitted that items of machinery, steel tanks, in the aggregate weight of over one hundred tons, were transported by sea and inland water.

We conclude that Picton’s contract to remove piling and transport by boat the machinery that it salvaged from the water was a maritime contract. 1 Benedict, Section 66, p. 137; Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. City of New York, 2 Cir., 135 F.2d 443.

Furthermore, even if Picton’s contract with Superior was not a maritime contract, there is jurisdiction in admiralty to permit Picton to be impleaded under the circumstances of this case. Evans v. New York & P. S. S. Co., D.C., 163 F. 405, 407; The Thomas F. O’Brien, D.C., 26 F.2d 674; The Alert, D.C., 40 F. 836; Soderberg v. Atlantic Lighterage Corporation et al., 2 Cir., 19 F.2d 286; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207, 47 S.Ct. 357, 71 L.Ed. 612. Admiralty Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723.

As this case was tried by us over a year ago, in order to be sure that none of its facts and legal principles be omitted, we have read the full transcript, as well as the three able briefs by the three firms, and have re-examined, of necessity, all of the maps and exhibits.

The main defense made by both respondents is that the libelants have not proved their case with that legal certainty that is necessary to sustain a judgment; in other words, the libelants have failed to sustain the burden of proof resting upon them of proving negligence.

In most cases of this character in admiralty, the fact of collision is clearly established and is beyond debate, but in this case it is a matter of circumstantial evidence, and there is a necessity for a full discussion.

In their favor, we have to admit that libelants begin with three fully proved facts in the record:

[1001]*1001A. That the Tramp, after backing but a short distance, bobbing up and down three to four feet in a heavy sea, for one reason or another, suddenly and immediately sank —a matter of, at most, five minutes.

B. Within two days thereafter, upon a search of the sea bottom in the vicinity of the sinking, using a bridle, there was located a submerged piling lying at an angle of 45 degrees, pointing north to the shore, whose tip was just suumerged about three to three and a half feet below the level of the water.

C. Some few days after the sinking of the Tramp, at first chance to see, when work for its towing and salvage was in progress (on the second day), a hole in the bottom of the boat, caused clearly by a piercing force from the outside, about ten by twelve inches in size, was found a little back of center.

The exact location of this piling was determined to be 142 feet northeast of the northeast corner of the burned platform area; then, from the scaled map, it would be about 150 feet from the point the Tramp began to back out to the point that it allegedly had its bottom pierced by the submerged piling. We shall consider in seriatim the various defense theories offered as against the contention of libelant that it was this submerged piling that caused the disaster.

1. There was first the theory that the seacocks of the Tramp were open and that brought about the sinking.

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Bluebook (online)
65 F. Supp. 998, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2670, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eastes-v-superior-oil-co-lawd-1946.