East Kendall Inv. v. Bankers Real Estate
This text of 742 So. 2d 302 (East Kendall Inv. v. Bankers Real Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
EAST KENDALL INVESTMENTS, INC., Appellant,
v.
BANKERS REAL ESTATE PARTNERS, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
*303 Jay M. Levy of Jay M. Levy, P.A., Miami; Ira M. Witlin, Miami, for appellant.
Steven M. Silverman, Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
COPE, J.
East Kendall Investments, Inc. ("seller"), appeals a final judgment after a bench trial, which awarded a real estate broker's commission and attorney's fees to defendant-appellee Bankers Real Estate Partners, Inc. ("broker"). We affirm.
The broker entered into an exclusive listing agreement with the seller to *304 sell an apartment complex for $3,950,000 at certain financing terms. The agreement provided that commission was to be paid if the broker, the seller, or any other party found a buyer "ready, willing and able to purchase the property at the terms and for the price specified" in the agreement.[1] The agreement was to expire on August 10, 1996.
On August 9, 1996, the Keyes Company presented on behalf of Dr. Reuben Sorkin ("buyer") a letter of intent that contained a purchase price of $3,400,000. On August 13, the buyer increased his offer to $3,950,000, the full asking price. On August 16, the seller presented a counteroffer of $3,995,000a figure above the original asking price. Negotiations continued until the buyer met the new asking price. On September 10, the seller orally accepted buyer's letter of intent at the new price. On September 11, Keyes prepared on behalf of the buyer a second letter of intent reflecting those terms. The seller did not respond to the letter and the transaction did not proceed. The trial court found that the seller was responsible for the failure to consummate the sale.
When the seller refused to pay the broker's commission, the broker filed suit, alleging that it was entitled to a commission because it had produced a ready, willing, and able buyer during the term of the listing agreement. As an affirmative defense, the seller contended that the broker had not met all conditions precedent in the listing agreement because any offer received before the agreement's expiration date did not comply with the terms of the agreement. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the broker had produced a ready, willing, and able buyer in accordance with the terms of the agreement. This appeal follows.
The seller contends that because the buyer's only offer before the expiration of the listing agreement was at a purchase price lower than the full listing price, the buyer could not have been ready, willing, and able. The seller says that whatever happened after expiration of the listing agreement was legally irrelevant. We disagree.
The broker's undertaking here was to find a ready, willing, and able buyer for the property. It is common experience that the listing terms are the starting point for negotiations, see Arthur R. Gaudio, Real Estate Brokerage Law § 145, at 200 (1987), and it is rare for the buyer's first offer to be the highest offer he is prepared to make. In determining whether the buyer was ready, willing, and able, the trial court was entitled to look at the parties' continuous negotiations, which extended beyond the expiration of the listing agreement and culminated in an above-full-price offer on terms orally accepted by the seller. See 1 Ralph E. Boyer, Florida Real Estate Transactions § 2.05[3] (1998); Sanson v. Dutcher, Higginbotham & Bass, Inc., 401 So.2d 913, 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
The seller next contends that the broker is not entitled to a commission in any event because the buyer had only presented a nonbinding letter of intent. The seller argues that since the buyer did not present his offer in a form which, if accepted, would be legally binding, it follows that he cannot be considered ready, willing, and able. Under the facts of this case we disagree, because the trial court found that the seller was responsible for the failure to consummate the sale.
The seller is correct in saying that a broker ordinarily is not deemed to have located a ready, willing, and able buyer where the buyer has presented the offer in *305 the form of a nonbinding letter of intent. As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Agency:
d. Effect of completeness of terms given broker. The principal may either specify all his terms or furnish the broker with only part of the terms, the price, for example, with the understanding that further details are subject to negotiations between the principal and the customer when found.
If the principal has given to the broker what purports to be his complete terms and the broker produces a customer ready, able, and willing to enter into the transaction on those terms, the principal cannot avoid paying the agreed commission by declining to enter into the transaction, or by insisting upon variations of or additions to such prescribed terms which the customer is unwilling to accept....
When the principal has furnished the broker with only part of the terms, with the understanding that further details are subject to negotiation between the principal and the customer, the principal, unless acting in bad faith (see § 454), is free to terminate such negotiations without liability to the broker. The principal's promise to pay the broker a commission does not become binding unless the principal and the customer reach a present definitive oral or written agreement. The broker has not earned his commission, even though the principal and the customer have drafted a memorandum of their proposed agreement, if they did not intend such proposed agreement to be presently binding upon them and hence reserved signature of the memorandum for a later occasion; at this point, if either the principal or customer withholds such final consent, no commission is due.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 445 cmt. d (1958) (emphasis added); cf. McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 98 So.2d 781, 784 (Fla.1957) ("In a transaction of this nature which obviously involves a tremendous number of details the mere verbal accord between the parties as to the price is not the sole ingredient of the agreement to buy and sell sufficient to entitle the broker to a commission.").
Similarly, as explained by Professor Gaudio:
It is commonly stated that in order for the broker to produce a ready and willing buyer the contract or offer must be a valid and binding one. While this statement is correct, one must be cautious not to overextend its meaning. Obviously, since contracts for the sale of land must be in writing, an offer or oral contract to purchase is not enforceable and cannot be binding. Nevertheless, as indicated above, an oral offer or contract to purchase on the listing terms is sufficient to demonstrate that the buyer is ready and willing. What is intended by the "valid and binding" requirement is that the offer, when accepted by the seller with the formality required by law, will become a valid and binding contract not subject to any conditions which might thereafter render it unenforceable against the buyer. As a result, when the contract is merely an "agreement to agree" in the future, or is an agreement subject to further negotiations between attorneys, or is merely an option, the broker has not yet produced a ready and willing buyer.
Gaudio,
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
742 So. 2d 302, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 13438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/east-kendall-inv-v-bankers-real-estate-fladistctapp-1999.