East Bay Funding Corp. v. McCaul

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

East Bay Funding Corp. v. McCaul

305 A.D.2d 139, 757 N.Y.S.2d 845, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4957

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 6, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 305 A.D.2d 139 (East Bay Funding Corp. v. McCaul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

East Bay Funding Corp. v. McCaul, 305 A.D.2d 139, 757 N.Y.S.2d 845, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4957 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

Pincite

Opinion

Determination of respondent Superintendent of Banks, dated May 21, 2001, revoking petitioner’s mortgage banker license and fining petitioner $100,000, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Leland DeGrasse, J.], entered on or about February 16, 2002), dismissed, without costs.

[140]*140Substantial evidence supports respondent’s finding that petitioner routinely charged consumers excessive mortgage brokerage fees for which no meaningful processing or underwriting was provided and that were drastically disproportionate to the time spent and expertise involved. We reject petitioner’s argument that respondent cannot sanction on the basis of such finding since there is no law or regulation that limits the fee, i.e., “number of points,” a mortgage broker can charge. Respondent’s construction of Banking Law article 12-D is entitled to deference if not irrational or unreasonable (see Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438 [1971]). Therein, it is the declared policy of the State “to ensure that the mortgage lending industry is operating fairly, honestly and efficiently, free from deceptive and anti-competitive practices” (Banking Law § 589). This was adequate to give petitioner constitutionally fair notice that the fees it was charging were excessive (see Matter of Gold v Lomenzo, 29 NY2d 468, 476-479 [1972]). We have considered petitioner’s other arguments, including that respondent’s conduct in a prior proceeding estops it from asserting that petitioner’s fees were excessive, and that respondent is bound by a settlement agreement reached in this proceeding, and find them unavailing. We note the findings of other violations that petitioner does not contest. Concur — Buckley, P.J., Nardelli, Mazzarelli, Sullivan and Gonzalez, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Determination of respondent Superintendent of Banks, dated May 21, 2001, revoking petitioner’s mortgage banker license and fining petitioner $100,000, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Leland DeGrasse, J.], entered on or about February 16, 2002), dismissed, without costs.

[140]*140Substantial evidence supports respondent’s finding that petitioner routinely charged consumers excessive mortgage brokerage fees for which no meaningful processing or underwriting was provided and that were drastically disproportionate to the time spent and expertise involved. We reject petitioner’s argument that respondent cannot sanction on the basis of such finding since there is no law or regulation that limits the fee, i.e., “number of points,” a mortgage broker can charge. Respondent’s construction of Banking Law article 12-D is entitled to deference if not irrational or unreasonable (see Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438 [1971]). Therein, it is the declared policy of the State “to ensure that the mortgage lending industry is operating fairly, honestly and efficiently, free from deceptive and anti-competitive practices” (Banking Law § 589). This was adequate to give petitioner constitutionally fair notice that the fees it was charging were excessive (see Matter of Gold v Lomenzo, 29 NY2d 468, 476-479 [1972]). We have considered petitioner’s other arguments, including that respondent’s conduct in a prior proceeding estops it from asserting that petitioner’s fees were excessive, and that respondent is bound by a settlement agreement reached in this proceeding, and find them unavailing. We note the findings of other violations that petitioner does not contest. Concur — Buckley, P.J., Nardelli, Mazzarelli, Sullivan and Gonzalez, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

305 A.D.2d 139, 757 N.Y.S.2d 845, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/east-bay-funding-corp-v-mccaul-nyappdiv-2003.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack