Easley v. County of El Dorado Probation Department

Ninth Circuit

Easley v. County of El Dorado Probation Department

478 F. App'x 447

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 13, 2012

Docket11-15608

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 478 F. App'x 447 (Easley v. County of El Dorado Probation Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Easley v. County of El Dorado Probation Department, 478 F. App'x 447 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Gary D. Easley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging state and federal claims arising out of his arrests and prosecutions for various criminal offenses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2001), and for an abuse of discretion conclusions as to the applicability of equitable tolling, Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled on Easley’s § 1983 claims because Easley failed to establish that he acted with diligence and good faith in filing suit after his prior, factually related action was dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Ervin v. County of Los Angeles, 848 F.2d 1018, 1019-20 (9th Cir.1988) (setting forth three-factor test for equitable tolling and concluding that plaintiffs unwarranted delay of more than a year in filing her federal civil rights claim after filing a tort action in state court was neither reasonable nor in good faith).

The district court properly dismissed Easley’s state law claims because Easley failed to timely present them before filing *448 suit as required by the California Government Claims Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2(a), 945.4, 950.2; Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 164 P.3d 630, 634 (Cal.2007) (timely claims presentation is a condition precedent to, and an element of, any claim against a public entity or its employees). Denial of further leave to amend these claims was not an abuse of discretion because it was clear that Easley could not plead such compliance. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990, 992 (9th Cir.2009) (no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile).

Easley’s remaining contentions, including with respect to the doctrines of substantial compliance, waiver, and estoppel, are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Gary D. Easley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging state and federal claims arising out of his arrests and prosecutions for various criminal offenses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2001), and for an abuse of discretion conclusions as to the applicability of equitable tolling, Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled on Easley’s § 1983 claims because Easley failed to establish that he acted with diligence and good faith in filing suit after his prior, factually related action was dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Ervin v. County of Los Angeles, 848 F.2d 1018, 1019-20 (9th Cir.1988) (setting forth three-factor test for equitable tolling and concluding that plaintiffs unwarranted delay of more than a year in filing her federal civil rights claim after filing a tort action in state court was neither reasonable nor in good faith).

The district court properly dismissed Easley’s state law claims because Easley failed to timely present them before filing *448 suit as required by the California Government Claims Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2(a), 945.4, 950.2; Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 164 P.3d 630, 634 (Cal.2007) (timely claims presentation is a condition precedent to, and an element of, any claim against a public entity or its employees). Denial of further leave to amend these claims was not an abuse of discretion because it was clear that Easley could not plead such compliance. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990, 992 (9th Cir.2009) (no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile).

Easley’s remaining contentions, including with respect to the doctrines of substantial compliance, waiver, and estoppel, are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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478 F. App'x 447, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/easley-v-county-of-el-dorado-probation-department-ca9-2012.

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