EASLEY-EL v. TALBOT

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 19, 2021
Docket1:19-cv-03138
StatusUnknown

This text of EASLEY-EL v. TALBOT (EASLEY-EL v. TALBOT) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
EASLEY-EL v. TALBOT, (S.D. Ind. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

LERON EVERETT EASLEY-EL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:19-cv-03138-JRS-DML ) PAUL TALBOT, ) WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES, ) DUSHAN ZATECKY, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff LeRon Everett Easley-El, is an inmate of the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"). He alleges that prison health care providers and administrators at Pendleton Correctional Facility ("Pendleton") refused to treat his vertigo by denying him a bottom bunk pass in violation of his constitutional rights. The defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Easley-El's medical needs and that he was provided treatment consistent with Dr. Talbot's professional judgment. For the reasons explained below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party must support any asserted disputed or undisputed fact by citing to specific portions of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also support a fact by showing that the materials cited by an adverse party do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show

that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the only disputed facts that matter are material ones—those that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2016). "A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609−10 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d

708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider the cited materials and need not "scour the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion. Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University, 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Consistent with the summary judgment standard the following material facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are undisputed. A. Leron Easley-El Mr. Easley-El has vertigo and is currently prescribed and taking the prescription medication, Meclizine, for his reports of dizziness. Dkt. 49-3. at p. 16 (Easley-El Depo. Trans). He is currently housed in the L Dorm at Pendleton, which is an open dorm, and has been housed there for about three (3) years. Dkt. 49-3 at p. 11. In the L Dorm, Mr. Easley-El has the opportunity to participate in recreational time and participates almost every day. Additionally, Mr. Easley-El has had a job at Pendleton for almost one year and works five days per week. Mr. Easley- El has never missed work due to his feelings of dizziness. Id. at p. 12-13, 34. Mr. Easley-El testified that he is suing Dr. Talbot because he had a bottom bunk pass for his medical condition (vertigo) regularly renewed since 2015,1 but then in April 2019, Dr. Talbot told Mr. Easley that he no longer met the criteria to receive a medical bottom bunk pass. Id. at p. 17-18. Mr. Easley-El is suing Wexford of Indiana because it is Dr. Talbot's employer. Id. at p. 22. In July 2015, Mr. Easley-El fell from the top bunk where he was assigned. After that, he was assigned to a bottom bunk and has never been reassigned to a top bunk. Dkt. 49-3 at p. 21.

Mr. Easley-El currently has a bottom bunk pass. Id. Mr. Easley-El is worried and anxious that he

1 For example, Mr. Easley-El was provided a three-month bottom bunk pass on July 1, 2015, Dkt. 52-1 at 2; a six-month bottom bunk pass on August 21, 2015, id. at 3; a six-month bottom bunk pass on February 10, 2016, id. at 4; a three-month bottom bunk pass on July 19, 2016, id. at 5; a six-month bottom bunk pass on December 16, 2016, id. at 6; a six-month bottom bunk pass on May 24, 2017, id. at 7; a six-month bottom bunk pass on June 20, 2017, id. at 8; a six-month bottom bunk pass on December 8, 2017, id. at 9; a six-month bottom bunk pass on July 5, 2018, id. at 10; a six-month bottom bunk pass on December 13, 2018, id. at 11, a six-month bottom bunk pass on February 6, 2020, id. at 12; and a six-month bottom bunk pass on August 24, 2020, id. at 13. may be placed on a top-bunk again if he does not receive a permanent bottom bunk pass from the medical staff. Id. at p. 39. In March 2020, Mr. Easley-El fell out of a chair in his dorm but did not notify the medical staff or a custody officer about the fall. Other than the fall from the bunk in 2015 and the fall from

the chair in 2020, Mr. Easley-El has had no other falls at Pendleton. Id. at p. 27-28. Mr. Easley-El believes he fits in the criteria for a bottom bunk pass because his periodic dizziness is similar to epilepsy or a seizure, two conditions that do qualify for a bottom bunk pass. Id. at p. 25 and 31. Mr. Easley-El admits that he has not been diagnosed with either epilepsy or a seizure disorder. Id. at p. 31-32. B. Dr. Paul Talbot, M.D. Paul Talbot, M.D. is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Indiana. Dr. Talbot was employed as a physician by Wexford at Pendleton through November 2019. Dkt. 49-2 (Affidavit of Paul Talbot, M.D.) ⁋⁋ 1-2, 15. During his time as a treating physician at Pendleton, Dr. Talbot had an opportunity to see

and treat Mr. Easley-El on several occasions. On December 8, 2017, Dr. Talbot met with Mr. Easley-El for a chronic care visit. Mr. Easley-El's chronic conditions were identified as hypertension, GERD, and scalp psoriasis. At this appointment, Mr.

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