Early v. Toyota Motor Corp.

486 F. Supp. 2d 633, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39345, 2007 WL 1485977
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Kentucky
DecidedMarch 29, 2007
DocketCiv.A. 3:04-45
StatusPublished

This text of 486 F. Supp. 2d 633 (Early v. Toyota Motor Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Early v. Toyota Motor Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d 633, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39345, 2007 WL 1485977 (E.D. Ky. 2007).

Opinion

ORDER

CALDWELL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Exclude the Trial Testimony and Opinions of Jay Nogan (“Nogan”) filed by Toyota Motor Corporation and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., (“Toyota”). [R. 41]. Having considered the written submissions of the parties, the deposition of the proposed expert and having conducted a Daubert hearing on the matter, the Court will grant the motion and the testimony of Jay Nogan will be excluded.

I. Factual Background

The facts in this case are undisputed. On April 26, 2003, both Joshua Early and Timothy Mullins were found dead in a 1994 Toyota extended cab pickup truck at the Kentucky State Welcome Center and Rest Area located on Interstate 64 in Shelby County, Kentucky. Apparently, Early and Mullins had parked there on their way home after a late night out in Louisville, Kentucky. While no one knows how long the truck was parked at the rest area, employees of the Welcome Center observed that the truck’s engine had been running for quite some time and that two men appeared to be asleep inside the cabin. At about 1:30 p.m. an employee of the Welcome Center tried to wake the men, but couldn’t. Emergency personnel called to the scene determined that Early and Mullins were dead and that the carbon monoxide level inside the truck’s passenger compartment was 400 parts per million. An autopsy confirmed that the two men died of carbon monoxide poisoning.

II. Plaintiffs Claims for Relief

Plaintiffs seek relief on theories of strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the 1994 Toyota truck was defective due to the selection of material for a dust seal located on the steering column where it passes through the passenger compartment and into the steering control box. Plaintiffs contend that due to the alleged defective material used in the dust seal, it deteriorated and allowed toxic levels of carbon monoxide to enter the passenger compartment. They also claim that Toyota failed to exercise reasonable care in monitoring the field data and other sources of post sale information. 1

Plaintiffs offer Nogan as an expert in the fields of dust seal design and warning. His opinions are summarized in his report as follows:

1. Toyota knew of the danger of exhaust gases entering the passenger compartment and failed to adequately protect Early and Mullins from carbon monoxide poisoning.
*636 2. Toyota failed to use a dust seal that would last throughout the anticipated life of the vehicle, thus allowing engine compartment gases to enter the passenger compartment causing Plaintiffs’ deaths.
3. Toyota failed to warn of the need for inspection of the dust seal as part of the vehicle maintenance schedule, thus depriving Early of needed information and opportunity to repair the part.
4. In lieu of an “inspect and replace if needed” maintenance .schedule, Toyota failed to specify replacement of the steering column dust seal as a part of scheduled maintenance.
5. Toyota failed to instruct service personnel regarding the critical need for inspection of the steering column as part of the vehicle maintenance schedule.
6. Toyota recognized the need to replace other seals in the steering mechanism and failed to include a critical part like the steering column dust seal. Through its Repair Manual instructions, Toyota requires new seals to be used when work is performed independent of vehicle age.

(R. 41, Exhibit “E,” Nogan report). Toyota maintains that Nogan’s testimony should be excluded as he is not qualified to testify regarding the above matters and that his work is unreliable and improperly applied to the facts of this case.

III. Fed.R.Evid. 702

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) and Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the United States Supreme Court established standards for admitting expert opinion testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 702. First, a court must determine whether the expert is qualified to offer opinions in a particular subject area. Once the court determines that an expert is qualified to offer opinions in a particular subject area, it must consider whether the expert’s opinion is reliable. In Daubert, the Supreme Court suggested that the issue of reliability turns on whether an expert’s reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid or whether that reasoning or methodology can be properly applied to the facts in issue. In considering an expert’s reliability, trial court’s should consider the following:

1. Whether the theory or technique has been tested;
2. Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review;
3. The known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling the technique’s operation; and
4. Whether the theory or technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. 2 In making reliability determinations, the court’s inquiry must be specific to the particular issues in each case. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156, 119 S.Ct. *637 1167. In other words, a trial court must decide whether an expert has sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jury in deciding the issues in the case. Accordingly, an expert’s conclusions regarding causation must have a basis in established fact and cannot be premised on subjective beliefs or mere suppositions. McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800-801 (6th Cir.2000).

A. The Expert’s Qualifícations

The threshold question for this court is whether Nogan is qualified to offer the particular opinions he has formed in this case. He has been offered as an expert in both the areas of design defects and warnings. The Court concludes that he is not qualified to offer opinions on either subject.

As to the alleged design defect, Nogan’s Curriculum Vitae and testimony reflect that he holds a degree in mechanical engineering. However, as he testified at the Daubert

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486 F. Supp. 2d 633, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39345, 2007 WL 1485977, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/early-v-toyota-motor-corp-kyed-2007.