Early v. Durhal

• Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan
• Decided: August 12, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-12407
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION DENZEL EARLY, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-12407

v. Hon. Brandy R. McMillion United States District Judge FRED DURHAL III, et al., Defendant. / ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL Plaintiff Denzel Early (“Early”) brings this pro se civil rights action against Defendants Fred Durhal, III, Regional Business Executives and Store Owners operating in ZIP Code 48204, Unknown Parties A through Z (collectively,

“Defendants”) relating to “mismanagement of municipal budgets, discriminatory business practices that block legal use of U.S. silver and copper coinage, and chronic violations of public trust and state financial reporting duties.” See ECF No. 1,

PageID.1. He has also filed an application to proceed without the prepayment of fees (in forma pauperis). ECF No. 2. For the reasons below, this case is SUMMARILY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Early’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED AS MOOT. I. As best the Court can discern, Early is suing his Michigan State House

Representative, businesses in his residential area, and unknown state employees for what he believes to be “discriminatory economic practices,” “financial negligence,” and “community harm.” ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2. The Complaint is lacking any

rational factual support to these claims, other than conclusory statements that his congressional district has failed to provide transparent budget practices, businesses in his area do not accept silver and copper coins, and stores have failed to file Michigan tax forms. Id. at PageID.2. Early alleges four causes of action: (i)

violation of civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (ii) violation of legal tender statutes; (iii) fraudulent escheatment; and (iv) government and business collusion. Id. at PageID.3.

II. Early filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Brooks v. Holstege, No. 16-12501, 2016 WL 3667961, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2016). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks

an arguable basis in law or fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it is based on a meritless legal theory.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less

stringent standard, pro se pleadings remain subject to summary dismissal. “The mandated liberal construction . . . means that if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never

presented. . . .” Baccus v. Stirling, 2018 WL 8332581, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:18-CV-1880-JFA-JDA, 2019 WL 978866 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2019), aff’d, 776 F. App’x 142 (4th Cir. 2019)). Nor may

the Court “‘conjure up unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations.’” Williams v. Hall, No. 21-5540, 2022 WL 2966395, at *2 (6th Cir. July 27, 2022) (quoting Perry v. United Parcel Servs., 90 F. App’x 860, 861 (6th Cir. 2004)). A complaint doesn’t need detailed factual allegations, but it must include

enough facts to suggest a plausible claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Put differently, complaints must contain enough factual matter, taken as true, to suggest that the claim is plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible when the facts allow a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is responsible for the alleged misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Early’s Complaint alleges four counts, none of which are supported by the facts as alleged. First, to state a federal § 1983 civil rights claim, a plaintiff must

allege that he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978). Count I fails because Early fails to allege any constitutional right that has been violated. There is no

statutory or constitutional “right to equal economic participation” as alleged in the Complaint. See ECF No. 1, PageID.3. Moreover, Early fails to identify who violated the law, other than a general allegation as to “Defendants” – which is insufficient to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (complaint containing no specific facts in support of conclusory allegations of constitutional violations, or any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved, fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted). Second, Counts II and III fail because they each relate to Defendants’ denial and “refusal to accept lawful U.S. coinage” which also is not a substantive right

guaranteed by federal law. ECF No. 1, PageID.3. Early cites to 31 U.S.C. §5103 to support his claim that businesses in his area do not accept silver and copper coins. However, there is no private cause of action pursuant to that statute, as that section

simply defines what constitutes legal tender in the United States. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103. Count IV similarly fails because failure to file Form 372 with the Michigan Department of Treasury does not create a private cause of action for enforcement.

Regulation of tax filing failures lies with the Michigan Department of Treasury. Finally, even construing Early’s pro se Complaint liberally, the Court cannot “conjure up unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations,” nor can the Court create a claim for relief. See Williams, 2022 WL 2966395 at *2. Nothing contained

in the Complaint is sufficient for the Court to find Early has alleged any plausible claim of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and therefore

are subject to dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). IV. Accordingly, the Complaint (ECF No. 1) is SUMMARILY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety.

This is a final order that closes the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2025 s/Brandy R. McMillion Detroit, Michigan HON. BRANDY R. MCMILLION United States District Judge