Earle L. Reynolds v. United States

286 F.2d 433, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 2904
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 29, 1960
Docket16689
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 286 F.2d 433 (Earle L. Reynolds v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Earle L. Reynolds v. United States, 286 F.2d 433, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 2904 (9th Cir. 1960).

Opinion

ORR, Circuit Judge.

Appellant is an anthropologist who spent several years in the early 1950’s studying the effects of radiation on the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb blasts. In 1958 the Atomic Energy Commission was conducting a series of nuclear tests at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds in the Pacific. In connection with these tests the Commission on April 11, 1958, promulgated a regulation barring United States citizens from entering a 390,000 square mile “Danger Area” surrounding the proving grounds, except with the express approval of appropriate officials. This regulation is set out in the footnotes. 1

*434 It was purportedly issued under and authorized by § 161 (i) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (i), which provides:

“§ 161. In the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized to—
“(i) prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary (1) to protect Restricted Data received by any person in connection with any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, (2) to guard against the loss or diversion of any special nuclear material acquired by any person pursuant to section 53 or produced by any person in connection with any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, and to prevent any use or disposition thereof which the Commission may determine to be inimical to the common defense and security, and (3) to govern any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, including standards and restrictions governing the design, location, and operation of facilities used in the conduct of such activity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property;”

Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2273, provides:

“§ 223. Whoever willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, any provision of this Act for which no penalty is specifically provided or of any regulation or order prescribed or issued under section 65 or subsections 161 (b), (i) or (p) shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, except that whoever commits such an offense with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.”

Appellant testified that he believed nuclear testing was creating grave dangers to the human race, that freedom of the seas and freedom of navigation on the seas were being threatened by the Commission’s regulation, and that the regulation was illegal and unconstitutional. On July 2, 1958, appellant sailed his yacht, the Phoenix, into the prohibited area, after first notifying the Coast Guard that he was entering the area as a protest against nuclear testing. He was arrested and charged with violating 42 U.S.C.A. 2273 (§ 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, supra), which prohibits wilful violations of any regulation prescribed under section 161 (i) of the Act (supra). Appellant was tried and convicted in August of 1959; the trial court had theretofore refused to grant a motion for continuance in order to allow appellant’s chosen counsel to represent him at the trial. Appellant was sentenced to two years imprisonment with suspension of the last eighteen months on probation. Appellant claims (1) that § 161 (i) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not authorize the Atomic Energy Commission to issue the regulation heretofore set out in footnote one (supra), (2) that if it did so authorize, § 161 (i) is too vague and indefinite to satisfy constitutional requirements for statutes which have criminal penalties, (3) that this regulation deprives appellant of his First and Fifth Amendment rights of peaceable protest and freedom *435 of movement, (4) that appellant was denied a fair trial on the issue of wilfulness, and (5) that he was denied his right under the Sixth Amendment to be defended by the counsel of his choice. We have reached the conclusion that ground (1) is meritorious and dispositive of this appeal.

§ 161 (i) authorizes the Commission to issue regulations (1) to protect Restricted Data received by any person in connection with any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, (2) to guard against loss or diversion of any special nuclear material acquired by any person pursuant to § 53, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2073 (which allows the Commission to issue licenses for the possession of special nuclear material and to distribute such material to qualified applicants) or produced by any person in connection with any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, and to prevent any use or disposition thereof which the Commission may determine to be inimical to the common defense and security, and (3) to govern any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, including standards and restrictions governing design, location and operation of facilities used in the conduct of such activity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives the Commission power to authorize private industry to participate in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy and to own or possess various nuclear materials and production facilities in so doing. Appellant argues that the sole purpose of § 161 (i) is to allow the Commission to enact security and safety regulations to govern the private parties who are so authorized to participate in the atomic energy program. Hence it is contended that § 161 (i) gives no authority to enact regulations dealing solely with the Commission’s own activities, and especially not a regulation forbidding what is essentially nothing more than a trespass upon property being utilized by the Commission itself. This contention is supported by the fact that a separate trespass section was added to the Act by an amendment in 1956. § 229, 42 U.S. C.A. § 2278a. The Government takes the position that § 161(i) authorizes any and all regulations designed to protect Restricted Data, to guard against loss or misuse of special nuclear material, or to protect health and safety, in connection with any activity under the Atomic Energy Act, whether an activity of licensees or of the Commission itself. It further asserts that § 229 could not have applied to the situation involved here and that § 229 refers to mere trespasses per se while § 161 (i) deals with those involving dangers to Restricted Data, special nuclear material, or the health and safety of the public. For a solution we resort to an examination of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the 1956 amendments to the Act, and their respective legislative histories.

We first notice that § 161 (i) was not part of the original Atomic Energy Act. The original Atomic Energy Act was enacted in 1946; it contained provisions almost identical to § 91(a) of the 1954 Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2121(a), which authorizes the Commission to produce and test atomic weapons, but it contained no provision similar to § 161 (i). See S.Rep. No. 1699, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 55, 76, U.S.Code Cong. & Adm. News 1954, p. 3456. § 161 (i) originated with the 1954 Act, which was the first major overhaul of the 1946 Act.

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Bluebook (online)
286 F.2d 433, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 2904, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/earle-l-reynolds-v-united-states-ca9-1960.