Earl v. Earl

86 A. 940, 81 N.J. Eq. 444, 11 Buchanan 444, 1913 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 90
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedApril 19, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 86 A. 940 (Earl v. Earl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Earl v. Earl, 86 A. 940, 81 N.J. Eq. 444, 11 Buchanan 444, 1913 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 90 (N.J. Ct. App. 1913).

Opinion

Lewis, Y. O.

This action is for divorce on the grounds of adultery. The petition of Irma Leigh Earl is for an absolute divorce. The petitioner charges ’the defendant, Binney Woodward Earl, with [445]*445communicating to her the secret disease of gonorrhea. The initial appearance of the defendant in this court was by answer denying the charges alleged in the petition. On April 30th, 1912, the defendant moved for and obtained leave to file a cross-petition, charging the petitioner with adultery, and naming Mark Whitfield, á servant in the household of the petitioner and defendant, as co-respondent.

It is shown by the evidence that both the petitioner and defendant had gonorrhea, and the question of course is, Which one had it first and communicated it to the other? The .petitioner insists that the defendant communicated the disease to her, and, on the other hand, the defendant claims that the disease was given to him' by his wife.

At the hearing of the case, testimony was admitted concerning the conduct of the defendant prior to his marriage. It was insisted by the petitioner’s counsel that this testimony was admissible under the circumstances of the case, as. showing the disposition of the defendant, and the court must confess to considerable sympathy with this view, when a divorce is sought for adultery, the charge being based upon the communication of a secret disease. There is no question, however, that under the authorities in New Jersey it must be excluded. Evidence of ante-nuptial incontinence is not admissible to support the charge of adultery in a bill for divorce. Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. (6 C. E. Gr.) 61.

In a preliminary way it may be said that this marriage was that of a young girl of good family, in moderate circumstances, to a young man in affluent position. At the time of the marriage the defendant was twenty-two years of age, and the petitioner nineteen. It was a runaway match, and, as appears by the testimony, was objected to by the parents of the petitioner. The parties lived together until October, 1911, when the petitioner returned to the home of her mother.

Great stress is laid upon the fact that the petitioner remained with the defendant for some months after the discovery of the disease, which, it is alleged, he communicated to her; but it is shown by the testimony of the defendant that there was no cohabitation during this period, that the petitioner was not aware [446]*446of the character of the disease or its source; that she had been persuaded by the mother of the defendant and informed by the defendant himself that the disease had been contracted from a toilet. In treating of this phase of the case, it should be remembered that the petitioner, up to the time of her discovery of the ■ secret disease, had lived in comfort and happiness with the defendant. The testimony shows that the attitude of the mother-in-law and of the husband, the defendant, from the time of the discovery, was extremely kind and considerate to her; that the petitioner had no means of support except that jn’ovided by her-husband and his family and was dependent upon them. There is nothing developed in the testimony that proves to the satisfaction of the court that she was anything but an innocent- young-woman. Yo adulterous act on her part has been proven, and no evil associations have been shown. It was not unreasonable, under all these circumstances, for her to remain some time in the home of the defendant, even after the revelation of the secret disease, and her remaining there is not held to have worked such a condonation that would preclude her from securing a divorce under the petition filed.

The petitioner’s case, in some measure, is dependent upon admissions made by the defendant to the petitioner’s mother, Mary M. Leigh, and to her brothers, Dr. Chester Leigh and John Clinton Leigh. Aside from this, however, is the very important testimony of Dr. George D. Tracey, who attended both the petitioner and defendant. This is the only evidence offered by either petitioner or defendant from an outside source, i. <?., outside of the family, dealing with the time at which the petitioner and defendant were inoculated with the secret disease. This evidence seems to clearly establish the fact that Binney Woodward Earl first had this secret disease. Dr. Tracey first treated the defendant on July 5th, 1911. In the latter part of June or early part of July, 1911, the defendant first complained of a'burning sensation when urinating. The first treatment given the defendant by Dr. Tracey was at the defendant’s house, and for the first few days thereafter, he continued treating the defendant at the defendant’s house. Later, the defendant went to the doctor’s office for attention. The doctor went on his vacation on July 9th that [447]*447year. He remained away about two weeks or more, and upon his return, he treated Mrs. Earl. His testimony is, that he treated her after July 30th. While, upon cross-examination, Dr. Tracey stated that he might conclude from his examination of Mrs. Earl that she had been suffering from the disease for a period of eight weeks or more, yet, on redirect examination, he said that he was sure that her condition was not chronic, and that he could not tell whether it was of two weeks or four weeks or eight weeks standing.

Mary M. Leigh, the petitioner’s mother, said that she had a conversation with the defendant in which she asked him why he tried to give Dr. Tracey the impression that he had contracted the disease from his wife, to which he replied that Irma did not give it to him; that he did not want Dr. Tracey or his mother to think so; that he knew he had given it to his wife. To Mrs. Leigh the defendant also said that his mother wanted him to say that he had contracted this disease from his wife, but he refused to say so because he knew that he had inoculated her. To the petitioner’s brother John Clinton Leigh the defendant also said that his mother wanted him to say that he got the disease from his wife, but that this was not true; that he did not get it from her; that the fact was that he might have got it from! a toilet. The defendant also had a conversation with Dr. Chester Leigh, another brother of the petitioner, two or three days after the visit by the petitioner to the specialist, Krusen, July 31st. To him the defendant said: “Chester, I have the gonorrhea. I know 1 gave it to your sister, hut I do not know how I got it. Dr. Tracey told me that I might have gotten it from a toilet, but when he told me that, he laughed.” It is shown throughout the testimony that the defendant frequently admitted to his wife, in the presence of her mother, that he had contracted the disease and communicated it to the petitioner.

A denial of these admissions, is made by the defendant, and it is strongly urged by his counsel that the admissions of the defendant to the members of the family of the petitioner axe not sufficient in law to sustain a decree. There is no doubt that the confessions of the defendant are to be taken with extreme caution, and, without corroborating circumstances, might not be [448]*448deemed sufficient to sustain petitioner’s case. The cases of Clutch v. Clutch, 1 N. J. Eq. (Saxt.) 474; Miller v. Miller, 2 N. J. Eq. (1 Gr. Ch.) 139, and Perkins v. Perkins, 59 N. J. Eq. (14 Dick.) 515, are cited in support of this contention, but they are easily differentiated from this action. The evidence in the eases mentioned was, that the alleged offenders had made statements of wrong-doing. In Clutch v. Clutch

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kremis v. Kremis
161 A. 255 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1932)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
86 A. 940, 81 N.J. Eq. 444, 11 Buchanan 444, 1913 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 90, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/earl-v-earl-njch-1913.