Earl J. Washington v. Zackery William Wechsler

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: July 7, 2025
• Docket: 2:22-cv-06256
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EARL J. WASHINGTON, et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-06256-FLA (Ex)

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 13 v. PLAINTIFF EARL J. WASHINGTON SHOULD NOT BE DISQUALIFIED 14 FROM REPRESENTING PLAINTIFF 15 ZACKERY WECHSLER, et al., LOLA MITSUK 16 Defendants. 17

28 1 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 2 This action involves allegations that Defendants the City of Los Angeles, Los 3 Angeles Police Department, Zackery William Wechsler, Ronald Jacobus, III, Alfredo 4 Garcia, Johnny Alejandro Rios, Kirk Stuwart Anderson, Marcus Andrew Eggleston, 5 Allya Czarina Kahn, Jeffri Kent Norat, and Richard Angel Acosta (“Defendants”) 6 violated the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs Earl J. Washington (“Washington”) and 7 Lola Mitsuk (“Mitsuk”). The operative Complaint alleges federal claims under 42 8 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, and false arrest, along 9 with related state claims. Dkt. 63. Washington, a licensed attorney, is representing 10 himself and Mitsuk. As relevant, before the court are the parties’ motions for 11 summary judgment. See Dkts. 147, 190. 12 Local Rule 83-3.1.2 states that each admitted attorney “shall be familiar with 13 and comply with the standards of professional conduct required of members of the 14 State Bar of California and contained in … the Rules of Professional Conduct of the 15 State Bar of California.” See Radcliffe v. Hernandez, 818 F.3d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 16 2016) (“The Ninth Circuit refers to the local rules of each district when deciding 17 which standards govern an ethical violation, and the Central District of California’s 18 local rules instruct courts to look to California law and California’s Rules of 19 Professional Conduct.”). 20 When an attorney represents multiple parties in the same action, there is a risk a 21 conflict of interest can arise. In that instance, it is “the duty of the district court to 22 examine the charge, since it is that court which is authorized to supervise the conduct 23 of the members of its bar.” Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co. of California, 24 534 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (citation omitted). The court “may 25 disqualify an attorney for not only acting improperly but also for failing to avoid the 26 appearance of impropriety.” Id. at 1324–25 (citation omitted). 27 “Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound 28 discretion of the trial court.” Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1 109, 113 (1992). Outright disqualification is generally disfavored “and should only be 2 imposed when absolutely necessary.” Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 3 796, 814 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Nevertheless, “[t]he paramount concern must be to 4 preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the 5 bar.” People ex rel. Dep’t of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 6 1135, 1145 (1999). Accordingly, the “right to counsel of one’s choice must yield to 7 ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.” 8 Id. 9 California Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.7 provides in part:

10 (a) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent from each client and 11 compliance with paragraph (d), represent a client if the representation is directly 12 adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter.

13 (b) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent from each affected 14 client and compliance with paragraph (d), represent a client if there is a significant risk the lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially 15 limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to or relationships with another client, a 16 former client, or a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests. 17 Absent an informed written consent by Mitsuk, Washington’s representation of 18 Mitsuk appears to violate the required standards of legal ethics and disqualify him 19 from continuing his representation of Mitsuk. Washington and Mitsuk are pursuing 20 the same claims against Defendants. However, there is a risk Washington’s 21 representation of Mitsuk has been or will be materially limited by his own interests. 22 For example, Washington and Mitsuk may have potential claims against each other, or 23 may have competing interests as to the claims they should bring against one or more 24 Defendants. At trial, Washington may be reluctant or decline to make certain 25 arguments, pursue lines of inquiry, or call certain witnesses that could benefit Mitsuk 26 but jeopardize his claims vis-à-vis those of Mitsuk. Washington also could refrain 27 from continued settlement negotiations, decline to settle altogether, or discourage or 28 impede Mitsuk from settling if prospective settlement terms favor Mitsuk, or if 1 settlement by Mitsuk weakens his position in the action. Some, or all, of these 2 possibilities could materially limit Washington’s ability to provide Mitsuk with 3 unconflicted legal representation. 4 The court, thus, has an obligation to inquire and to disqualify Washington 5 unless he can present evidence Mitsuk has given informed written consent regarding 6 any actual or potential conflict that has arisen, or could arise, from Washington’s 7 continued representation of Mitsuk and himself in the same action. See ABN Corp. v. 8 Groupe PELM Int’l Corp., Case No. 23-cv-00004-RFL, 2024 WL 818343, at *1 (N.D. 9 Cal. Feb. 27, 2024) (issuing order to show cause because defendant’s continued 10 representation of her co-defendants appears to violate required standards of legal 11 ethics and may disqualify defendant from continuing representation). 12 Accordingly, Washington is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, in writing, within 13 fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, why he should not be disqualified from 14 representing Mitsuk in this action. The response shall address whether Washington’s 15 representation complies with the California Rules of Professional Responsibility, 16 including, but not limited to, Rule 1.7. 17 If Washington believes he should not be disqualified because Mitsuk has 18 provided informed written consent, then he must submit proof of that informed written 19 consent to the court. Said proof may include the informed written consent signed by 20 Mitsuk, and/or a declaration executed by Mitsuk acknowledging her informed written 21 consent to Washington’s representation and authenticating she read, understood, and 22 agreed to the informed written consent, and indicating whether she consulted with 23 independent counsel before executing the informed written consent and/or declaration. 24 Failure to respond timely to this Order or submit adequate proof may result in 25 Washington’s disqualification without further notice. The court will hold the motions 26 for summary judgment (Dkts. 140, 193)—as well as the derivative motions related to 27 the motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 195, 196)—in abeyance until it has 28 | || determined whether Washington suffers from an incurable actual or potential conflict 2 | of interest. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 | Dated: July 7, 2025 7 FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge

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