Earl Gammon v. Robin E. Boggs
This text of 2018 ME 152 (Earl Gammon v. Robin E. Boggs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 152 Docket: Kno-18-129 Argued: November 6, 2018 Decided: November 15, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
EARL GAMMON et al.
v.
ROBIN E. BOGGS et al.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] In this dispute over the location of the boundary between the land
of Earl and Mary Gammon and the land of Leland E. Boggs II, Leland and
Robin E. Boggs1 appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court (Knox
County, Stokes, J.) declaring the location of that boundary line. The Boggses
contend that the court erred by (1) denying their motion to continue when they
were unprepared for trial; (2) restricting a previously designated expert to
providing rebuttal testimony when that expert had withdrawn and they had
designated a different expert for trial; (3) finding that, in addition to having
proved record ownership of the land in dispute, the Gammons had alternatively
1 Robin E. Boggs is the son of Leland Boggs II. He is a party to this case because he lives on the
parcel of his father’s land that is the subject of this dispute. 2
proved title by adverse possession; and (4) denying the Boggses’ motion for
additional findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).
[¶2] The points on appeal generally address discretionary decisions
made by the trial court in its management of the proceeding. Review of the
record, the docket entries, the several decisions of the trial court, and the briefs
of the parties on appeal demonstrates that the litigation was highly contentious.
Because of lack of cooperation between the parties, delays by the parties in
preparing and providing discovery material, and a change of counsel by the
Boggses, the trial court, on several occasions, appropriately exercised its
discretion to grant requests to continue previously set trial dates and discovery
deadlines.
[¶3] The court set a final trial date of December 19, 2016. Trial was held
over six days, December 19-21, 2016, and February 1-3, 2017. Reflecting its
experience over the course of the litigation, the court, in its opinion, observed:
It was obvious to the court during the trial of this matter that the Gammons’ and Boggs’ families held strong feelings of antipathy towards each other. The court was dismayed by the fact that the attorneys for the parties appeared to have assumed that antipathy towards each other. Indeed, the court felt compelled on more than one occasion to remind counsel of their professional responsibility to conduct themselves in a civil and appropriate manner during the trial. 3
[¶4] Commendably, the court had kept the case on track through
considerable effort involving hearings, telephone conferences, and written
orders.
[¶5] In his brief on appeal, after acknowledging the trial court’s
accommodation of some of the points argued in the Boggses’ post-judgment
motions, the Boggses’ counsel argues that “[t]his still leaves Boggs
disadvantaged by, after a noisy withdrawal by his original attorney just before
trial, having to proceed without an expert surveyor witness and with
replacement counsel unprepared to try this boundary dispute.” Later in the
brief, counsel asserts that “Boggs was forced to proceed unprepared through
no fault of Boggs” and that, after his previous expert withdrew, counsel was
compelled “to scramble to find a replacement expert, . . . who . . . never had time
to prepare.”
[¶6] Such claims about a trial court’s case management practices, taken
on their face and out of context—as such claims are sometimes asserted—can
make a trial court’s case management efforts seem callous and in disregard of
the trial court’s obligation to try to achieve justice through due process of law.
Adding context may—as here—demonstrate a very different series of events. 4
[¶7] The docket entries reflect that the complaint in this matter was filed
on February 26, 2015. The Boggses’ latest trial counsel, who continues as
counsel on appeal, first entered his appearance in the case on May 2, 20162—
seven and one-half months before the actual first day of trial, certainly not “just
before trial,” as counsel asserts in his brief to us. In fact, because prior counsel
had withdrawn, the court had removed the case from the May trial list and
continued the trial, ultimately setting the December trial date.
[¶8] The record further reflects that by June 17, 2016, six months before
the first day of trial, at the Boggses’ request and over objection from the
Gammons, the Boggses’ counsel had identified the replacement expert—
although counsel’s brief to us indicates that counsel had some concern as to
whether the expert chosen would or could adequately prepare for trial in the
ensuing six months. It is not at all clear why six months would not be enough
time to retain and prepare an expert to testify in a boundary dispute case, and
counsel’s claims to the contrary and his placement of blame on the trial court
are neither persuasive nor credible.
2 At oral argument, the Boggses’ counsel indicated that he entered his appearance on April 27, 2016. 5
[¶9] Contrary to the Boggses’ contentions, the trial court committed no
error, nor did it abuse its discretion, either in its case management orders or in
its findings and conclusions. First, after the case had been pending for nearly
twenty-two months and the court had already granted the Boggses’ several
requests for continuances and enlargements of time, the Boggses’ continued
lack of preparation was not a substantial reason to allow further delay. See
Fox Island Granite Co. v. Am. Granite Mfrs., Inc., 2006 ME 14, ¶¶ 4-8,
890 A.2d 700.
[¶10] Second, the Boggses’ late attempt to use their prior, withdrawn,
expert witness for nonrebuttal purposes when the replacement expert had
been designated was in contravention of the court’s scheduling order, which
allowed only one expert per issue, and it would have resulted in unfair
prejudice to the Gammons. See M.R. Civ. P. 16(d) (authorizing the court to
sanction a party for failing to comply with the requirements governing pretrial
procedure); M.R. Evid. 403; Spickler v. York, 566 A.2d 1385, 1389 (Me. 1989).
[¶11] Third, the court’s judgment contains adequate findings of fact to
support its alternative finding that the Gammons established title by adverse
possession. See Harvey v. Furrow, 2014 ME 149, ¶¶ 11-19, 107 A.3d 604. 6
[¶12] Fourth and finally, the court’s judgment provides a sufficient basis
to inform the parties of its reasoning and allows for informed appellate review;
it was, therefore, not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny the Boggses’
motion for additional findings. Their proposed findings were simply attempts
to reargue points or have the court provide further explanation of its decision.
See Wandishin v. Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 19, 976 A.2d 949; Sewall v.
Saritvanich, 1999 ME 46, ¶¶ 9-10, 726 A.2d 224.
[¶13] We again remind counsel that hyperbole, ad hominem attacks, and
a manufactured sense of outrage, while possibly desired by clients, are not only
routinely unpersuasive, but may in fact detract from any actual solid legal
argument made by counsel.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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